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THE FIVE FACES OF FREEDOM
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
J.L. HILL*
Abstract: In the deepest sense, this Article seeks to bridge the gap
between philosophy, political theory, and constitutional law. It examines
how our constitutional tradition conceives of freedom, perhaps the most
important value in the American legal order. It discusses five distinct
though intertwined traditions, each drawn from a different philosophical
theory of freedom. These five faces of freedom are (1) the "positive"
ideal—freedom as the right to vote and to take part in government, (2)
the "negative" ideal—freedom from constraint or government inter-
ference, (3) the progressive ideal, (4) self-individuating liberalism—free-
dom as the right to discover, develop, and express one's core identity, and
(5) the "homeostatic-communitarian" ideal—freedom as inhering in a
network of communal social relations located within a broader pluralistic
society. Each Part. provides an overview of the philosophical foundation of
one of the faces of freedom and then traces its constitutional
development. The Article concludes by discussing how the contours of
freedom have changed over the course of our history.
INTRODUCTION
There exists a great gulf between many philosophical concep-
tions of freedom and prevailing legal ideals concerning the nature of
liberty. If we were to ask a philosopher what "freedom" means, we
might be answered that it consists of the openness or availability of
meaningful choice options to any hypothetical choosing individual.'
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis; ID., Ph.D.,
Georgetown University,
I Accordingly, the greater the number of acts that one can perform, the freer one is.
Thus freedom can be increased either by reducing the level of constraint that prevents the
individual from choosing otherwise available options, or by increasing the number of avail-
able options, choices, or activities. Man in a state of nature may be relatively unconstrained
in the first sense, yet his range of available options may be very limited. In contrast, a resi-
dent of Manhattan is undoubtedly constrained in a myriad of ways unknown to a Robinson
Crusoe, but is "freer" than Crusoe because of the greater range of options available to him.
Even though he often is considered a negative liberal, Isaiah Berlin held this more moder-
ate conception of freedom. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS or LIBERTY (1958), reprinted
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Others with a more naturalistic view of the world conceptualize free-
dom as the absence of physical or interpersonal conditions that ren-
der certain courses of action difficult or impossible. 2 Other philo-
sophical traditions equate freedom with the capacity for meaningful
self-expression in the public domain. 3
 Others conceive of freedom in
interpersonal terms, equating it with the absence of domination. 4
 Still
to LIBERIN 166,169-78 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (consisting of an essay Berlin first deliv-
ered in lecture form at the University of Oxford on Oct. 31, 1958).
2
 This is the classic negative definition of freedom, in which freedom is defined as the
absence of constraint. As discussed in Part II, negative theories of freedom come in two
varieties: those that conceive of constraint in either physical or political terms. The former
view derives from Hobbes; the latter from Locke and his precursors. In fact, there is a spec-
trum of theories that encompass both ideas to one extent or another. For example, one
author argues that "an agent's overall freedom can be expressed as a fraction. which repre-
sents the proportion of conceivable actions which the agent is not prevented (by any other
agent) from performing." IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM 28 (1999). Carter's is the
most thorough example of what we might call an "empirical" conception of freedom. It
seeks to define freedom in spatial-physical terms as the extent to which possible courses of
action are not prevented by other human beings. Empirical theories of freedom seek to
"de-normatize" freedom, to show that we can measure freedom without placing a value on
the various courses of action that may be open to an actor. For a similar conception of
freedom, see FEux E. OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS Or FREEDOM 211-27 (1961); see also Felix
E. Oppen helm. Social Freedom and Its Parameters, 7 j. LORETICAL Poi. 403,414-19 (1995)
(partially revising sonic of his views). But see Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978), reprinted in A MATTER Or PRINCIPLE 181,
189 (1985). Dworkin suggests that a totalitarian state may have more freedom in the em-
pirical sense if it forbids freedom of speech and worship, but has fewer traffic lights than
an urban democracy. Sec id. Some freedoms, such as freedom of speech, are more impor-
tant than others, demonstrating that there is an irreducible normative dimension to our
concepts of freedom. Sec id.
One issue confronted by those who hold negative conceptions of freedom is whether a
certain course of action must be impossible, or merely difficult (and then how difficult?) for
the agent to be considered unfree to perform it. Compare HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON
RIGIIIS 33-34 (1994) (arguing that it must be impossible), with CARTER, supra, at 220, and
Oppenheim, supra, at 406-07 (claiming that a certain level of difficulty makes one unfree).
3
 For perhaps the deepest philosophical interpretation of one version of republican
political theory, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON 22-78 (2d ed. 1998) [here-
inafter ARENDT. THE HUMAN CONDITION]. What most distinguishes Arendt's views from
liberal conceptions of freedom is her insistence that liberty is a political value that has
nothing to do with human will, or with maximizing choices: "What all Greek philosophers
... took for granted is that freedom is exclusively located in the political realm ...." Id. at
31; see also HANNAH ARENDT, What is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE (1968), re-
printed in Tim PORTABLE HANNAH ARENDT 438,444-55 (Peter Baehr ed., 2000) ("Freedom
as related to politics is not a phenomenon of the will" nor is it equivalent to sovereignty;
rather, it is the capacity to begin and to sustain political action, collectively).
4
 Though interpreted in various ways, libertarians, civic republicans, and left-
progressives often have equated liberty with an interpersonal state of non-domination. Sce
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION Or LIBERTY 12 (1960) (stating that freedom means "the
possibility of a person's acting according to his own decisions and plans, in contrast to the
position of one who was irrevocably subject to the will of another," or 
— independence of
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others consider freedom to be an intrapersonal ideal, the capacity to act
autonomously.5 The most ambitious or utopian hold the uncompromis-
ing view that freedom is nothing less than the total realization of the
human will in the sphere of worldly activity. 6 Philosophers, alas, have
failed to achieve much consensus, but have instead provided a bewil-
dering plethora of answers to the question: What is freedom? 7
the arbitrary will of another'"). This same view of freedom lies at the heart of Rousseau's
republicanism: "IE]ach man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody." JEAN-
jAcqu ES ROUSSEAU, Ti I E SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in Tir E SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES 179, 192 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1973). Ironically, the libertarian and republican
extremes M political thought share a conunon conception of freedom.
6 Freedom as personal autonomy contrasts most vividly with empirical concepts of
freedom in that it holds that free acts musthe rational, and not simply the product of voli-
dons or desires. This conception of freedom. which has been central to our ideas from
Kant's time but can be traced back to Stoic ideas, is usually viewed as a more "positive" idea
of freedom. See infra Part LA (discussing the concept of positive freedom). For contempo-
rary accounts of freedom as autonomous action in accordance with objective rational
principles, see generally STANLEY I. BENN, AniroRv or FREEnost (1988); see also Charles
Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in T1 IDEA or Ftt aims' 175 (A. Ryan ed., 1979),
reprinted in PHILOSOPHY AND "ME HUMAN SCIENCES 211, 211-29 (1985). Joseph Raz has
offered an account that ensconces this concept of autonomy within a wider COMIIMIli-
tarian framework. See generally josErti RAz, `flit; Mottm.rry or Ft/Er:nom (1986).
6 Freedom is sometimes simply defined as the capacity to satisfy one's desires. One is
free to the extent that one is able to do what one wishes to do. The desire-satisfaction
model of freedom is an extreme conception of positive freedom. Sec LAWRENCE CROCKER.
POSITIVE LIBERTY 30-47 (1980). The conception is sometimes attacked by claiming that, if
freedom is desire-satisfaction, then one can become more "free" simply by reducing his
desires. See Wright Neely, Ftredom and Desire, 83 Put.. REV. 32,38 (1974),
A related idea is the notion that freedom is "effective power" to achieve one's desires. See
John Dewey, Liberty and Social Contml, Soc. FRoNTtra, Nov. 1935, at 41,41. This idea lies at
the heart of the progressive conception of freedom. Sec Martin Bronfenbrenner, Two Concepts
of Economic Freedom, 65 I:flocs 157,159-60 (1955) (comparing the classical liberal disjunc-
tion between liberty and power and the "neo-liberal" definition of liberty that conjoins the
two concepts). But see HAYEK, supaz note 4, at 16-17 (criticizing this conception).
7 See TIM GRAY, FREEDOM 17-83 (1991). Gray argues that there are seven core mean-
ings of freedom in philosophical discourse, including the absence of constraint, the capac-
ity and opportunity to make choices, the satisfaction of one's desires, the absence of inter-
ference or domination by others, the achievement of personal autonomy, self-
determination, and self-mastery. Within each conception of freedom, there are great dif-
ferences of opinion. For those who adopt! the "absence of constraint" model, the term
"constraint" can refer to physical constraints, social or legal constraints, or even internal
incapacities. Similarly, for those who defend a "republican" ideal, the right to self-
government can mean an individual's right to vote, or a more generalized ideal similar to
Rousseau's general will.
A recent attempt to subsume all of these definitions under a more general idea sug-
gests that all of these various notions of freedom represent different examples of the same
conceptthat statements about freedom reflect a triadic relation between an agent, an
obstacle, and a goal. According to this view, freedom is simply the freedom of an actor from
any particular kind of constraint, whether the constraint is internal or external, physical or
social, to pursue a certain goal or activity, whether the activity be world conquest, self-
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Freedom is arguably the central animating value of the American
political order, yet American statesmen and political thinkers have
done little better than philosophers in arriving at a uniform under-
standing of the idea. 8 Beneath every political edifice lies a particular,
sometimes inchoate, conception of freedom, but freedom has meant
realization, the demand for a working wage, or the right to an abortion. This definition
has the apparent virtue of combining a "negative" and a "positive" dimension of free-
dom—that freedom is both the freedom of an actor from certain constraints, and freedom
from these constraints to have, or to do, or to be some particular thing, or activity, or goal.
See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr„ Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 Pim. REV. 312 (1967), re-
printed in LIBER'IY 100, 102-07 (David Miller ed., 1991) (arguing that different concep-
tions of freedom pick out particular kinds of constraint and goals as worthy of singular
focus). The libertarian is most concerned about the kinds of constraints that government
creates whereas progressives expand the definition of "constraint" to include obstacles
imposed by private forces. Others with a broader conception of constraint have included
internal incapacities—physical weakness or disability, the lack of intelligence, or the capac-
ity to persevere. Similarly, various thinkers have differed regarding the goals worthy of
focusing on. For the civic republican, freedom means freedom to take part in self-
government, for the traditional liberal, it is the freedom to do whatever one wishes, pro-
vided that this does not include the violation of another's rights. For others, the goal of
freedom may have more philosophical or theological significance. Freedom may be
equated with self-realization, even personal salvation. Isaiah Berlin warned us about these
more "positive" formulations in his famous essay on negative and positive freedom. See
BERLIN, supra note 1, at 178-81. MacCallum's point, however, is that freedom has meant all
of these things, according to different conceptions, but that the concept in its broadest
sense subsumes all of these ideas.
Some disagree with MacCallum's formulation, and thus defend Berlin's claim that the
negative idea of freedom is more fundamental, arguing that there are some purely nega-
tive examples of freedom. John Gray argues, for example, that one can be free from cer-
tain obstacles even if one does not know what one wants to have, or to do or to be. See John
Gray, On Negative and Positive Liberty, 28 Pot.. Slim. 507 (1980), reprinted in CONCEPTIONS
OF LIBERTY IN VOLMCAL PHILOSOPHY 321, 328-35 (Zbigniew Pelczynski & John Gray eds..
1984). My OW/1 objection is the opposite: that there are some purely positive examples of
liberty in which one is free to do something even though one is not free from any particu-
lar constraint to do it. For example, I am free to twiddle my thumbs, or to walk to the re-
frigerator, or to do yoga in my room, even if there is no particular obstacle from which I am
free to do these things. Thus one can talk about being free to do certain things without
reference to an obstacle or a constraint—no constraint is directly relevant to the act under
the circumstances,
a Perhaps the most poignant and self-conscious coming-to-terms with distinct ideas of
freedom came during the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln noted that underlying the
conflict between North and South were two distinct conceptions of freedom. He said:
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the Ameri-
can people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in
using the same wont we do not all mean the same thing. . • . Here are two, not
only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name, liberty
7 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Sanitary Fair in Baltimore (Apr. 18, 1864), in THE Warr-
mos OF ABRAIIAM LINCOLN 120 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley ed., 1906).
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radically different things in various systems of political thought. 9 The
Framers undoubtedly had varying intuitions about the nature of free-
dom,n) but these relatively more ratified differences were obscured by
their more palpable disagreements concerning questions of the consti-
tutional structure of government. 11 Nevertheless, our ideals of political
liberty have always been grounded upon more foundational philo-
sophical intuitions, even when these foundations remain clouded by
questions of institutional structure.
The purpose of this Article is to bridge the gap between the
world of the philosopher and that of the political thinker or constitu-
tional lawyer by considering the philosophical foundations of our
modern ideals of liberty, and by tracing the emanations of these ideas
9 As the social philosopher and historian Carl Becker put it:
If one had to choose a single word to express the central meaning of both
the comntunist and the liberal ideologies, it would be the magic but illusive
word liberty." ... [A111 revolutions are made in behalf of liberty—liberty in
some sense, freedom from some sort of real or fancied restraint or oppres-
sion. Unfortunately, there are so many kinds of restraint, so many varieties of
oppression, that the word liberty means nothing until it is given a specific
content, and with a little massage will take any content you like. Liberty is al-
ways liberty rightly understood"—that is, liberty in the sense intended by the
person who happens to be speaking..
CARL L. BECKER, NEW LIBER11ES FOR OLD 3-4 (1941).
10 A voluminous corpus of scholarship over the past half century demonstrates that
freedom meant many different things to those of the revolutionary generation. Were the
Founders devotees of a natural law conception that equated freedom with law, rationality
and limited government? See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT
(1948); Edward S. Corwin, The Higher Law Background of Antoican Constitutional Law (pls. 1
& 2), 42 HARV, L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929). Or were they proto-liberals, defenders of
individual rights? See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL ThADEllON IN /Written (1955).
Were they latter-day adherents to a classic republican conception of freedom? See generally
BERNARD BAILYN, The IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 1IIE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); MI-
CHAEL" SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
11IE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1998). Or were their views a melange of all of these
ideas? See generally THOMAS L. !JANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988);
Joyce Appleby, Republicanism and Ideology, 37 AM. Q. 461 (1985).
it Were the differences between Federalists and Anti-Federalists generated by fundamen-
tally different ideas of the good society, or merely by questions of institutional structure? The
philosophical differences probably did not rise to the level of conceptual differences con-
cerning the meaning of freedom. Thus, the tendency to equate Anti-Federalist thought with
old-time republicanism, and Federalist thought with capitalist and liberal political ideals, is
more than an oversimplification—it is inaccurate. See generally TIE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Her-
bert" Storing ed., 1985). The two groups differed most profoundly on the question of the
compatibility of liberty with political centralization, but their conceptions of freedonLwere
not radically different. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOvUS ORDO SECLoRUM; THE INTELLEC-
TUAL ORIGINS OF 111E CONSTFIUTION, at	 (1985) (arguing that political debates were
fostered in part by a hazy and fluctuating political vocabulary).
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through constitutional history. It must be admitted at the outset that
the project is fraught with intellectual peril. Not only. does the phi-
losopher's interest in ultimate meanings diverge significantly from the
constitutional lawyer's quest to establish the appropriate institutional
conditions of liberty in the political system, but there often exists a
great discontinuity between the way philosophers and lawyers use the
same terminology. 12 Indeed, philosophers and lawyers often appear to
inhabit two different worlds altogether.
This Article traces five distinct "faces" of freedom in American
constitutional history, each of which reflects, though often imper-
fectly, a deeper conception of freedom. Together these five strands
make up the fabric of the constitutional tradition of freedom in
America. Part I examines freedom as a "positive" value: as the
affirmative right to take part in government, or, more generally, as
our collective capacity for self-government. 13 After exploring positive
freedom as a philosophical ideal, this Part traces the evolution of the
right to vote in America, the changing conception of representation,
and, more briefly, the decline of constitutional federalism. In addi-
tion, this Part explores the ineluctable tension between positive free-
dom as an individual value, and the two most significant commit-
ments of twentieth century constitutionalism: equality and the
centralization of legal authority at the national level.
12 For example, philosophers and lawyers use the terms "negative" and "positive" free-
dom to refer to what some believe are two fundamentally different kinds or aspects of
freedom. In its purest philosophical sense, to hold that liberty is a "negative" value is to
hold that it is nothing but the absence of constraint. In the political or legal sense, a com-
mitment to negative liberty usually indicates that the defender of this view is a liberal—i.e.,
that he believes in some form of the ideal of limited government. Certainly there is a con-
nection between holding a negative definition of liberty philosophically and being a politi-
cal libertarian: if one believes that the only relevant kinds of constraints are those imposed
by government, one can define freedom negatively and be a negative liberal. But the two
positions seldom accompany one another. Hobbes was perhaps the first philosopher to
define freedom in purely negative terms as the absence of constraint, yet the political sys-
tem he devised was the philosophical antithesis of liberalism. His Leviathan was the all-
embracing political order that stands in marked contrast to Lockean ideas of limited gov-
ernment. See generally THOMAS Hointcs, THE LEVIATHAN 223-427 (CR MacPhersOn ed.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1651). Conversely, two of the greatest defenders of limited govern-
ment, Kant and Mill, defined liberty in a positive sense—Kant, as the capacity for personal
autonomy; Mill, as self-individuation. Both Kant and Mill held that the mere absence of
constraint is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of freedom—i.e., that limited gov-
ernment is a condition of freedom, but personal autonomy or self-individuation require
something additional contributed by the individual.
IS See infra notes 18-90 and accompanying text.
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The second face of freedom, discussed in Part H, is the "negative"
ideal: freedom as the absence of government regulation." After explor-
ing the negative ideal in pure form, we survey its constitutional em-
bodiment in a tradition that runs from the natural law ideals of such
early cases as Calder v. Bull to the economic libertarianism of the Lochner
era. Here we see that democracy has had a leavening affect on negative
freedom. The Article argues that there is both more and less protection
of negative liberty today than in the nineteenth century—that the so-
cial "spaces" closest to the individual are more fully protected from a
wider array of social and political influences today, but that the zone of
individual activity is nevertheless more closely circumscribed.
Part III explores the progressive idea of freedom that took form
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 0 Progressives
sought to extend and perfect the negative idea of freedom by broad-
ening the negative liberal's conception of "constraint" to include
many more forms of private, as well as public, activity. They also held
that social and economic conditions could be as destructive to condi-
tions of individual freedom as could state regulation, or even more so.
Freedom, they argued, depends upon the existence of social condi-
tions that facilitate the individual's capacity for meaningful choice
under prevailing social conditions. The progressive ideal was charac-
terized by increased equality, skepticism regarding the classical liberal
distinction between public and private power, and a desire to limit the
sphere of individual choice in a manner that appears paternalistic to
those of a more libertarian bent.
The "self-individuating" conception of freedom, surveyed in Part
IV, links freedom to the discovery, development, and expression of
one's own unique self-identity. 16 The roots of the self-individuating con-
ception of freedom can be traced from Kant, Humbolt, Emerson, and
Mill, among others, to contemporary adherents of twentieth century
humanistic psychology. Freedom is tied to personal growth, psychologi-
cal health, and the happiness of the individual. Part IV argues that
modern constitutional ideals of privacy, personal autonomy, and self-
expression are emanations of a conception of freedom radically distinct
from earlier forms of negative liberalism. This Part ends by noting both
the promise and the danger of the self-individuating ideal of free-
dom—that it is the most individualistic of the various conceptions of
14 See infra notes 91-155 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 156-245 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 296-321 and accompanying text.
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freedom, but also the conception most likely to lose its connection with
the Political world upon which it depends.
Finally, Part V explores what we will call the "homeostatic-
communitarian" ideal of freedom, in which freedom depends upon
both a horizontal social structure that creates conditions of diversity-in-
balance between social, political, and economic groups and institu-
tions, and a vertical differentiation that accommodates community, in-
dividual participation, and civic responsibility. 17 The communitarian's
moderate conception of social diversity protects the liberal values of
social choice and the more democratic virtues of individual participa-
tion through the group, even as it safeguards social stability by provid-
ing a balance among competing groups. Part V argues that the homeo-
static-conmmnitarian idea of freedom transcends the negative-positive
distinction, as groups and associations serve both as a negative barrier
to oppression from above and as a positive outlet for individual expres-
sion from below.
The discussion of the constitutional development of these various
traditions is not intended to be exhaustive. This would be a daunting
task, and quite impossible in article form. Thus, particular cases and
developments are used here to illustrate the broader themes. In the
largest sense, this Article seeks to answer the following questions: How
have the contours and the measure of our freedom changed over the
course of American constitutional history? In what sense, and to what
extent, are we still a free people?
I. FREEDOM AS DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT: THE POSITIVE
CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY
A. Positive Freedom in Philosophical Thought
Any attempt to survey competing conceptions of freedom must
begin with a mainstay of recent political theory, the distinction between
"negative" and "positive" freedom. From Bentham on, philosophers
have used the terms positive and negative freedom to distinguish two
kinds, or dimensions, of freedom."3 The basic distinction, though not
17 See supra notes 323-376 and accompanying text.
la F. A. Hayek traced the negative/positive distinction back to Hegel. See HAYEK, supra
note 4, at 425 n.26. Bentham had actually used the terminology in drawing the distinction
some thirty years earlier, in 1776, in a letter to John Lind. See Dourn.As G. LONG, BENTHAM
ON LIBER'IT 54-55 (1977). Shortly after Bentham wrote, Kant made important use of the
terms in his moral and political writings. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS (1785), reprinted in Elm IcAL ruirosoilly 1, 12, 26 ( James W. Elling-
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the terminology, can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle.° In
1958, Oxford intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin published a now-
famous essay that breathed new life into the old distinction. He con-
trasted the opposed ideals of freedom that lie at the heart. of liberal-
ism and capitalism, on one hand, and various forms of Marxist. and
totalitarian political theory, on the other. 20
As Berlin drew the dichotomy, negative freedom is measured by
"the area within which the subject • .. is or should be left to do or be
what he is able to do or be without interference by other persons." 21
Positive freedom, in contrast, involves the following question: "What,
or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine
someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"22 More directly, the
"'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part
of the individual to be his own master."23 It implies more than mere
ton trans., 1983). Writing around the same time, Edmund Burke made offhand reference
to the same distinction. EmtuNn BURKE, WEER r SIIERUTS OF BitisTm, (1777),
reprinted in THE PORTAHLE CONSERVATIVE READER 3, 5 (Russell Kirk ed., 1982). One must
thus assume that, by the 1780s, the distinctiOn was already commonplace.
Isaiah Berlin restored the distinction to modern prominence in 1958. See generally
BERLIN, supra note 1. In this work, Berlin argues that. although there is a sense in which
positive freedom is a legitimate conception of freedom, there are grave political dangers in
associating freedom with the various positive conceptions. Most particularly, conceptions
of positive freedom lead down a slippery slope to various forms of totalitarianism. See id. at
178-81. Intellectually, positive freedom also tends to be confused with such other values,
wholly distinct from freedom, as equality, self-realization, and forms of collective self-
government, such as the republic devised by Rousseau, that are inimical to liberty as the
liberal understands it.
10 Aristotle wrote that there are two kinds of freedom that track the negative and positive
ideals: the freedom to live as one wishes and the freedom to take part in self-government.
ARISTO'ILE, PoLrncs, reprinted in 1111; BASIC WORKS OF Ams .rom.r. 1113, 1265-66 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941).
20 BERLIN, supra note 1, at 200-17.
21 Id. at 169. He goes on to write the following:
Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act un-
obstructed by others, If I ant prevented by others from doing what I could
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by
other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced,
or, it may be, enslaved.
Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 178. Berlin states the following:
But there is no necessary connection between individual (negative] liberty
and democratic rule [positive liberty]. The answer to the question "Who gov-
erns me?" is logically distinct from the question "How far does government
interfere with me?" It is in this difference that the great contrast between the
two concepts of negative and positive liberty, in the end, consists.
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non-interference, encompassing as well the affirmative capacity to ex-
ercise one's human capacities to achieve one's ends. For the "negative
liberal," there are many things that we are "free" to do, but that we are
nevertheless unable to do.24 In contrast, as freedom is increasingly
equated with the (internal and external) capacity to achieve one's
goals, it assumes a "positive" quality as well. 25 Because different con-
ceptions of positive freedom are important to all but the second face
of freedom surveyed here, we should take a moment to parse its vari-
ous meanings.
There is considerable ambiguity in the concept of positive free-
dom—much more so than its negative correlate. The term "positive
freedom" is actually used in three fundamentally different (if over-
lapping) ways by philosophers, lawyers, and others. In the most com-
mon political sense, positive freedom is simply the freedom to take
part in self-government, whatever this may entail in a particular politi-
cal system.26 Positive freedom has a second, more general conception
often employed by philosophers: the affirmative freedom to have, or
to do, or to be anything the actor might wish to have, do, or be."
Positive freedom in this sense requires not only the absence of con-
straint, but also the affirmative support or even the guarantee (by
others or by the state) to assist in the realization of one's goals. The
use of the term "positive right" in jurisprudential circles, distinguish-
ing such rights from merely "negative" rights, reflects this second
meaning: a positive right is an affirmative guarantee to some right or
Id. at177.
24
 Negative conceptions of freedom do not consider internal incapacities as impedi-
ments to freedom, whereas positive conceptions are more likely to view them so. See infra
notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing the negative liberal's narrow idea of con-
straint).
25 Charles Taylor calls negative liberty an 'opportunity" concept, in that it merely
opens an opportunity for successful action without guaranteeing the outcome of the act.
Sec Taylor, supra note 5, at 213.
26
 "Self-government" is an ambiguous term. It may mean simply that each individual
has a vote, as in modern representative democracy, or it may entail a right of direct par-
ticipation in government, as it did for the ancient Greeks—a right of every citizen to de-
bate and vote upon the laws, to administer government, and to adjudicate cases. In Rous-
seau's conception, self-government referred to the collective capacity of the citizenry to
reflect the "general will" of the state. Rousseau renounced both direct participation and
representative forms of government as inimical to genuine self-government, but many
have seen his system as profoundly tyrannical. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY (1984) (defending a direct participation conception); ROBERT A. DAPI[„ DE-
MOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) (describing a "polyarchic" model of democracy); DAVID
HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987) (surveying different models of democracy).
SCCCROCKER, supra note 6, at 10-11; cf. MacCallum, supra note 7, at 117.
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entitlement.28 Filially, philosophers use "positive freedom" in a third,
intra-personal sense, representing a condition of full personal auton-
omy, or even self-realization." To be positively free in this sense is to
act from appropriate sources of motivation—to act rationally, rather
than to be moved precipitously by passion."
In certain forms of political thought, particularly classical and
modern civic republican theory, these three senses of positive free-
dom often are interwoven in various ways. For example, some have
argued that one cannot live a fully autonomous life without possessing
a right to participate in politics; thus, the first, political sense of posi-
tive freedom is a necessary condition of the third, intrapersonal
sense.3t Autonomy may also depend upon a high degree of positive
freedom in the second sense; one cannot be autonomous without a
ss Most constitutional rights in the American system are "negative" in that they guaran-
tee that government will not prevent the achievement of some goal (becoming wealthy) or
the performance of some activity (expressing oneself). There is no guarantee of an
affirmative right to either of these things, of course. This distinction is illustrated by the
example of the abortion right. A woman has a negative right to an abortion in that states
are prohibited from criminalizing abortion. Sec Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). The
U.S. Supreme Court has declined to turn this into a quasi-positive right, holding that
women have no right to government assistance in the form of payment for the procedure..
Sec Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (upholding a state regulation that denied
Medicaid payments for nontherapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297. 316
(1980) (upholding a similar federal measure).
29 Charles Taylor has argued that "[clIoctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a
view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. On this
view, one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape
of one's life." Taylor, supra note 5, at 213; see alto BENN, supra note 5, at 199-212 (outlining a
similar theory); Gary Watson, Free AgEncy, 721 Nu,. 205, 205-20 (1975) (arguing that
autonomy requires that one desire the same objects of behavior that one values).
" Although this third idea of positive freedom is an intrapersonal concept, this idea
has influenced our interpretations of positive freedom in the first, political sense. Genuine
collective self-government is viewed to require restraints on the expression of popular im-
pulses. Checks and balances and the representative feature of government itself are con-
ceived of as "enlarging and refining" popular impulse, as the collective equivalent of unre-
strained volition in the action of the individual.
Some political thinkers sympathetic with the republican political tradition have ar-
gued that the in trapersonai sense of freedom used by modern thinkers is derivative of the
political sense. Indeed, Hannah Arendt argues that the Stoics, who gained influence
around the time of the demise of the Greek city-state, began to view freedom in this in-
trapersonal sense. Thus the defeat of freedom in its real, worldly, political sense caused
philosophers to retreat into the realm of the self and to begin to think about freedom
imrapersonally. See ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 3, at 438-60; see also M t-
en FoucAuLT, Tit t: CARE or me SELF 81-95 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1988)
(1984) (defending the same notion).
31 See BARBER, supra note 26, at 215-17; Pt IMP PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 125-51
(2001).
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guaranteed right to minimal income, housing, or a right to work.32
Filially, some civic republicans have maintained that genuine self-
government, positive freedom in the first sense, requires that each
individual who has a role in public deliberation must interact only as
an autonomous person—that the first sense of positive freedom de-
pends upon the exercise of positive freedom in the third sense."
Underlying these three senses of positive freedom is an even
deeper ambiguity: conceptions of positive freedom waver between
interpretations that emphasize the outcome of a particular act and
those that place priority upon the Moss or the character of the ac-
tion. 34 In other words, ideas of positive freedom often hover ambigu-
ously between an "achievement" concept and an "exercise" con-
cept.35 Positive liberty as an achievement idea requires that, for the
actor to be free, he must be successful in realizing the object of his
action, or minimally, he must have some realistic opportunity to do
so. The second conception of positive freedom falls closest to the
achievement idea, as does its legal corollary, the idea of a positive
right. In contrast, many communitarians and civic republicans have
defended an exercise version of the concept. 3° To be free is to be
able to exercise one's right to participate in politics (collectively) or
to exercise one's highest human capabilities (individually) by acting
autonomously. Although the exercise and achievement ideas cannot
32 See Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy. 1979 WAsn. U.
L.Q. 659,680.
" Accordingly, the constitutional system is viewed to have an important function in
"screening out bad or "distorted" preferences. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences and the Constitution, 84 Comm. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
34 Outcome-oriented conceptions of positive freedom are more utilitarian, in that an
act is free only if the actor is able to achieve the consequence sought. In contrast, process
views of positive freedom, like those of Kantian moral thought and process conceptions of
politics generally, value merely acting in a certain way. irrespective of consequences. In this
sense, these two interpretations of positive freedom share some of the characteristics of
consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories, respectively. Consequential no-
tions of positive freedom underplay the role of the actor and the moral quality of his ac-
tion, whereas non-consequentialist notions view an individual as 'Tree" even if he is not
able to achieve the object of his action.
35
 CROCKER, supra note 6, at 3-7.
36 See Taylor, supra note 5, at 213 (discussing freedom as "au exercise concept"). Barber
criticizes the liberal idea of freedom as ''stasis" as standing in stark opposition to the idea
of politics as activity, motion, will, choice, self-determination, and self-realization," the
positive ideals of freedom he defends. BAkricit, supra note 26, at 36; see also HELD. supra
note 26, at 71 ("A core element of freedom derives from the actual capacity to pursue dif-
ferent choices and courses of action ....").
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be disentangled completely from one another, 37 they nevertheless
point in very different directions, both philosophically and politi-
cally.38
Throughout Part I, positive freedom is used in the first, political
sense—a sense that emphasizes the capacity of the individual to exer-
cise his or her right to take part in the political process." A rough
37 To exercise positive freedom meaningfully requires that the individual have some
ability to influence the general course of affairs or to achieve his highest aims as an indi-
vidual. Thus, exercise of rights must be measured by the likelihood of success. To "achieve"
some end, the actor must play a role in the process—i.e., one must exercise one's capaci-
ties to achieve the end, rather than merely be given something. Nevertheless, there is a
different emphasis for those who hold that the actor is not really "free" tmless he is suc-
cessful in achieving his goal.
Because the ideas are interconnected, some progressives adopted a middle position: to
be free is-to have the "effective power" to achieve one's aims. Freedom as effective power
implies the capacity to achieve one's goals without requiring success in every case, It is having
the resources—physical, economic, and psychological—to achieve one's goals. Sec T.H.
Green, Liberal Legislation and Frredom of Contract (1888), reprinted in LIBERTY, supra note 7, at
21, 21-32; Dewey, supra note 6. at 41 ("[L]iberty ... is power, effective power to do specific
things."). More recent progressive liberals approximate the same idea. See jonN RAwts, A
ii WRY or JUSTICE 204 (1971) (distinguishing freedom from the value of freedom, which is
diminished when one lacks the resources of power to achieve one's goals).
39 The tension between the "achievement" and "exercise" ideas of positive freedom is
central to competing conceptions of the democratic process. The Greek theory of democ-
racy placed a greater emphasis upon the exercise ideal than we do today. This is the cen-
tral meaning of the viola activa [active life] in Arendt's The Human Condition. See ARENIYI,
Tut: HUMAN ConorrioN, supra note 3, at 7-17. The right to participate in the political
process was a mark of one's humanity, through which the individual became a full and
active member of the community. Positive freedom thus had an intrinsic value distinct
from the achievement of particular political ends. Thus. "[u]nder no circumstances could
politics be only a means to protect society ...." Id. at 31. Rather, "freedom is the essential
condition of what the Greeks called felicity, cudaimouia," or genuine happiness and well-
being. Id. In contrast, the modern democratic process is viewed instrumentally, as a means
for securing certain social conditions, rather than as an expression of freedom, individu-
ally or collectively. Utilitarian conceptions of politics view democracy as the most efficient
form of collective preference maximization. Liberals view democracy as a means to free-
dom, rather than an expression of freedom: democracy guarantees freedom when free-
dom is conceived as the equal distribution of some system of individual rights. Democracy
preserves freedom because it is unlikely that a majority will consent to limit rights that are
shared widely. Sec limn, supra note 26, at 43 (characterizing the instrumentalist view of
democracy as "protective democracy"). Instrumentalist views of democracy are consistent
with the utilitarian and materialist orientation of modern political thought, and with liber-
alism's emphasis upon freedom as a nonpolitical condition of the individual. Political par-
ticipation is viewed as not intrinsically valuable, but only as a necessary means to protect-
ing one's rights.
39 Positive freedom is used in the narrowest sense here, as a measure of the individ-
ual's role in electoral politics. Political positive freedom limy be given a broader meaning,
however, as any action by which the individual can change his society through organized
political activity. This would encompass the individual's right to associate with others for
the purpose of political activities and the right to express oneself freely. In a still broader
512	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:499
measure of individual positive freedom in the American political or-
der can be ascertained by considering the evolution of the right to
vote, by examining the changing nature of the relationship between
citizens and their political representatives, and by surveying the ex-
tent of political centralization, which is so inimical to positive freedom
in any sense of the idea.
B. The Right to Vote: From Positive Freedom to Civic Inclusion
The right to vote is the simplest and most direct expression of
positive freedom in the American political system. Although there
could be no more distinct commitment to positive liberty as a consti-
tutional value than in the recognition of a right to vote, the U.S. Con-
stitution itself does not explicitly recognize such a right. Indeed, not
until 1966 did the U.S. Supreme Court recognize a right to vote in
something approaching a broad constitutional sense. 40
 Before that,
the gradual extension of the right to vote occurred piecemeal, on a
group-by-group basis, through legislative and constitutional reform.'"
What is most striking about the development of the right to vote
throughout American history is that its growth has proceeded not
from a commitment to positive liberty or the value of political partici-
pation as such, but as a consequence of growing egalitarianism in
American politics. As an eminent constitutional scholar has put it,
"[e]lection-related rights display the special feature that the equality
with which they are made available, rather than the fact of their avail-
ability or absence, ordinarily proves decisive." 42
In contrast to modern sensibilities, the Framers' views of the
significance of the right to vote were tied closely to issues of personal
liberty—and in particular, to the old republican conviction that the
sense, positive freedom might extend to activities that are not, strictly speaking, "political"
at all—for example, the right to take part in community self-policing, corporate self.
governance, or university governance. In the broadest sense, the idea of positive freedom
could encompass every form of interpersonal activity by which the individual has some
effect on his or her normative world or social environment.
The concept of "positive freedom" is thus as malleable as the idea of the "political"
upon which it is based. At its furthest reaches, if "the personal is political," as some have
argued, then positive freedom in its broadest sense extends to every act by which the indi-
vidual is able to exert himself to change the conditions of his world.
10 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966) (recognizing the
right to vote as a fundamental interest protected by the Equal Protection Clause).
See generally ALEXANDER KEYssAR, THE RIG11"10 VOTE (2000) for a broad survey
of the development of voting rights.
12 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1062 (2c1 ed. 1988).
2004j	 Five Faces of Freed oar	 513
exercise of political liberty required a great degree of personal and
economic independence.° At the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion, these sentiments formed the principle that only the propertied
should be permitted to vote. In this vein, some of the Framers were
fond of citing Blackstone, who proclaimed that:
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard
to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so
mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of
their own. if these persons had votes, they would be tempted
to dispose of them under some undue influence or other.'"
Govurnettr Morris expressed precisely this view, shared by many, argu-
ing at the Constitutional Convention:
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will
sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should
not confine our attention to the present moment. The time
is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics
& manufacturers who will receive their bread from their em-
ployers. Will such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of
liberty? 45
John Adams and Alexander Hamilton concurred, and cited Harrington
and Blackstone in this regard°--and they might well have included
43 Seventeenth-century English republicans argued that "to live in a condition of de-
pendence is in itself a source and a form of constraint.. As soon as you recognise that you
are living in such a condition, this will serve in itself to constrain you from exercising a
number of your civil rights." QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 84 (1998).
These arguments, well known and widely accepted by eighteenth-century political think-
ers, gave aristocratic political inclinations a philosophical pedigree that persisted until well
after the American Revolution.
44 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *171.
43 JAMES MADISON, NMI'S OF DEBATES IN	 E. FEDERAL CONVENTION or 1787, at 402
(Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1920) (footnote omitted). Incidentally, for those who think that
this was all a subterfuge—that those who held this view were simply attempting to stave off
democracy by ensuring that the wealthy would maintain political power—it is worth noting
that Morris is arguing against the interests of the capitalists. Even conservatives such as
Morris feared that the republic would be undermined by economic interests. Thus, if
there was a strong measure of antidemocratic sentiment in this view at the time, it was
nevertheless a view equally wary of oligarchic influences.
46 These ideas have been developed at length in a number of important scholarly
treatments. SeejotiN Pt! ILLII' REID, Tut: CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN 'HIE AGE OF '111E, AM ER I.
CAN REVOLUTION 68-73 (1988); MtnruoN WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'EDE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 262-67 (1978); David Thomas Konig,Jtirisprudence and Social Policy in the New
Republic, in DEvisew LIBERTY 178,188-96 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1995).
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Montesquieu:17
 The fear that those without property might be subject
to coercion was so ubiquitous in the eighteenth century that even those
with more egalitarian sensibilities were ambivalent about expanding the
franchise. James Madison, for example, first vacillated on the point be-
fore ultimately adopting the view that, as between extending the vote to
those without property and giving those who held property an exclusive
franchise, the former was the lesser of two evils. 48
A distinct argument marshaled in favor of a limited franchise held
that only property,
 holders have sufficient interest in the preservation of
the nation. According to this "argument from interest," ownership of
land evinced a permanent attachment to the country, a connection to
the common interest, and even an investment in the future, all of
which non-freeholders lacked.49
 Another argument held that property
ownership gave one the requisite worldly experience and capacity for
making informed and intelligent decisions." If these arguments strike
its today as trumped-up philosophical justifications to limit the right of
suffrage to the relatively well off, it should be remembered that they
47 See Mot.vrEsquir.u, THE SPIRIT DE 111E Litws 160 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) ("In choosing a representative, all citizens in
the various districts should have the right to vote except those whose estate is so humble
that they are deemed to have no will of their own.").
48 At the federal convention of' 1787, Madison expressed the conventional opinion that
"the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty"
fearing that the landless would "either combine under the influence of their cortunon
situation" to deprive others of their property rights or "more probable, they [would] be-
come the tools of opulence & ambition." MADISON, SUPM note 45, at 403-04. By 1821,
however, he had changed his opinion. In the notes to a speech delivered in that year, he
wrote that it is better that those having the greater interest at stake namely that of prop-
erty & persons both, should be deprived of half their share in the Govt.; than, that those
having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived of the whole."
JAMES MADISON, Note to Speech on the Right of Suffrage, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 36,
40 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
49 George Mason made this argument, but deployed it in defense of a wide conception
of suffrage:
[E]very min having evidence of attachment to & permanent common inter-
est with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges.... [D]oes
nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment[?] Ought the mer-
chant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes
are to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters,
and unworthy to be trusted ... [?]
MADISON, supra note 45, at 403.
This justification may underlie the modern practice of excluding aliens from voting
and holding political office. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,648-49 (1973).
50 See NIADtsor supra note 45, at 403 (reproducing Govurneur Morris's statement that
Iclhildren do not vote. Why? [B]ecause they want prudence.... The ignorant & the de-
pendent can be as little trusted with the public interest.").
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were influenced by a long history of republican political thought that
associated landlessness with a state of economic servitude inimical to
political liberty."
After a long and apparently unresolvable debate, the Constitu-
tional Convention left to the several states the decision as to who
should have the right to vote. 52 Most of the thirteen colonies adopted
property requirements for suffrage, but all states that were admitted
after the original thirteen colonies uniformly rejected the illacksto-
nian logic. Every new state allowed the non-propertied to vote, and by
the 1850s, each of the original thirteen colonies had changed their
laws to follow suit. 53
Thereafter, the extension of the franchise took place largely by
constitutional amendment. The ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in 1870 gave the vote to black males," whereas the Nineteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1920, accorded the vote to women.55 A sec-
ond, thought less dramatic, wave of expansion came in the 1960s,
when the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibited the use of poll taxes
in federal elections, 56 and two years later, in 1966, the U.S. Supreme
61
 This view of the inverse relationship between freedom and dependence reflected
the not-too-distant memory of the practice of villeinage, which continued into the six-
teenth century in England. The English serf was politically and economically dependent
upon his superiors; he was viewed as possessing no "will of his own" in view of his economic
dependence upon the landholder on whose land he worked. The development of the
common law's protection of freedom, including the writ of habeas corpus and the creation
of tort rights against false imprisonment, reflected this recent history. See11-1. Baker, Po,
sonal Liberty Under the Common Law of England. 1200-1600, in THE OR/ :INS OF MODERN
FREEDOM IN THE WEST 178,184-201 (R.N.V. Davis ed., 1995).
Those Framers who were lawyers, including John Adams, understood the development
of the common law as a reaction to villeinage, and thus viewed personal and political free-
dom as inherently linked. One's status as a property owner gave one the requisite freedom,
interest, and capacity to take part in politics.
52 See MADLSON, SUPIYI note 45, at 401-06. U.S. CoNs•r. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides that "the
Electors in each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most nu-
merous Branch of the State Legislature." Because the State has the power to set the
qualifications of electors for state elections, it may do so as well for House and, since the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, Senate elections.
53 See Kr.vssnit, supra note 41, at 330-35 tbl.A.2.
54 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §
55 Id. amend. XIX. In fact, a number of states had already extended the right to vote to
women in the late nineteenth century. Wyoming was the first state to fully franchise
women in 1869. See KEYssAR, supra note 41, at 390 tbl.A.20. Many states permitted women
to vote under certain circumstances. or in certain matters (for example, school board and
municipal elections) beginning with Kentucky in 1839. Id. at 387 dd./kJ 7.
66 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1964. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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Court, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, extended this prohibition
to the elections of state officials. 57 In Halper, the Court rejected the
last vestiges of the argument from interest when it concluded that a
one-dollar-and-fifty-cent poll tax could not be justified on grounds
that it ensured voters "will be interested in furthering the State's wel-
fare when they vote."58
 After limpet; there could be no barriers to vot-
ing based on the political or economic incapacity of any individual or
group.59
 Finally, the modern expansion of voting rights culminated in
the early 1970s. In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a federal ban on literacy tests, reasoning that historically
such tests had been used to exclude racial minorities.° A year later, in
1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment guaranteed the vote to all citizens
age eighteen or older. 61
If this line of developments served the purposes of equality by
expanding the circle of political inclusion, a second line of cases
served to equalize voting power within this circle. Beginning in 1962,
in Baker v. Can; the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a principle of "one
person, one vote" in instances where demographic patterns or legisla-
tive changes resulted in vote dilution across voting districts. 62 Al-
though the decision seems obviously correct to modern liberals for its
57 383 U.S. at 668-69.
" Id. at 674 (Black, I., dissenting).
When I have raised the question, most of my constitutional law students would sooner
relinquish their right to vote than their right to operate a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, they
support the states' right to collect driver's license fees, but reject the states' interest in
collecting voting fees. If the stale can charge a fee for a privilege students are more reluc-
tant to give up, why not for the less important privilege? Perhaps these students do not
believe the right to vote is important enough to warrant a charge to those who may have
difficulty paying for it.
59 Sec id. at 670. Indeed, liberal constitutional theorists ultimately turned the argument
from interest on its head, arguing that excluding the economically disadvantaged skewed
the democratic process by ensuring that political outcomes would illegitimately favor the
wealthy. See JOHN HART ELI, DEMOCRACY AND D !Sit UST 136-45 (1980).
6° Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,132-33 (1970). The Court rejected the argument
from capacity. even "capacity* interpreted broadly as the ability to read. See id.
al U.S. CoNsT. amend XXVI..
62 See 369 U.S. 186,237 (1962). In Baker, voters challenged the apportionment of repre-
sentatives to the General Assembly of Tennessee. Voters in urban districts claimed that they
were systematically under-represented by a sixty-year-old apportionment statute that allotted
representatives on the basis of outdated demographic patterns. Specifically, because of
movement from rural to urban areas between 1901, when the statute was enacted, and the
late 1950s, there were proportionally fewer state residents in rural districts, with a corre-
sponding increase in urban population. Consequently, urban districts were under-
represented, whereas rural districts enjoyed proportionally greater strength at the polls.
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democracy-enhancing effecis, 63 at the time, some feared that. Court
intervention would undermine positive liberty by pacifying the elec-
torate. In this vein, Justice Felix Frankfurter drew upon the more an-
cient republican themes of civic virtue and active citizenship, con-
tending in his dissent that recourse for the malapportionment could
only come from "an informed, civically militant electorate:" Admon-
ishing the members of the Court for their "umbrageous disposition"
in delegating to themselves the role as guardians of democracy, he
argued that "[i]ii a democratic society like ours, relief must come
through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of
the people's representatives:65
For the Greeks, the exercise of political liberty marked our dif-
ferences as individuals; 66 for the citizen of modern mass democracy, it
evinces our commonality. As a moral and political value, the right to
vote today is far more intimately connected to ideas of inclusion and
personal worth than to the participatory and achievement-oriented
values associated with having a real voice in politics. Those who cele-
brate these developments point to the sacral nature of political inclu-
sion. As Judith Shklar observed, when we vote "[wile are taking part in
a serious and personally significant ritual." 67 Lani Guinier took this to
mean that "[w] 'tether or not our side wins, the ritual affirms our
63 To the decision's defenders, the imbalance in the apportionment scheme seemed
resistant to change through political Means, because, as a result of a constitutional catch-
22, the political process could only be altered by a minority who would be unwilling to
divest themselves of power. Sec ELI', supra note 59, at 116-25 (arguing for the constitutional
validity of Baker because of its "representation reinforcing" effects).
64 Baker, 369 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id, at 267-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In subsequent cases, the Court found that
the right to proportional representation prohibited variations in voting patterns chosen to
facilitate the representation of diverse geographical and economic interests. See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980)
(holding that disproportionate representation does not prove discriminatory intent in
voting plan).
66 As Arendt characterized the Greek attitude:
To belong to the few "equals* Fin the Greek city state] meant to be permitted
to live among one's peers; but the public realm itself, the palls, was permeated
by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish him-
self from all others .... The public realm, in other words, was reserved for
individuality; it was the only place where men could show who they really and
inexchangeably were.
ARENDT, Tits: HUMAN CONDEMN, supra note 3. at 41.
LANI GUINIER, TIM TYRANNY O1-"lilt? MAJORITY, at xiii (1994).
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membership in America?" Somewhat more jaundiced, Judge
Learned Hand put it this way:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them,
which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should
miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. Of
course I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote
determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls
I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a
common venture. If you retort that a sheep in the flock may
feel something like it; I reply, following Saint Francis, "My
brother, the Sheep."69
C. The Decline of Representation
A second measure of positive freedom is the extent to which the
individual citizen has the opportunity to take part directly in govern-
ment by holding political office. Positive freedom can thus be viewed
as inversely proportional to the political distance between citizens and
their representatives. The greater the number of political offices
open, the greater the sense and reality of participation, and therefore
of positive freedom, both among those who may run for office and
among those who do not."
At the time of the ratification debates, there were two general
conceptions of the function of political representation: one tracking
the exercise idea of positive freedom, the other adhering to a more
instrumental conception. In other words, representatives act as politi-
cal proxies for their constituents, radiating their will and tying them
to the process of government. In this exercise concept, representa-
tives serve not simply to secure the chosen ends of their constituents,
but also act for them, and in doing so disclose the identity and express
the will of the constituents. In contrast, in the instrumental concep-
tion, representation serves simply to achieve the best or most just re-
sults, substantively, in the eyes of the representatives.
69 Id.
69 LEARNED HAND. TuE BILL or Riot cis 73-74 (1958).
79
 Of course, even this principle is self-limiting. At a point, too numerous a representa-
tive branch becomes chaotic and unproductive, and fails to facilitate a sense of positive
freedom simply because each individual representative lacks any significant power. Thus,
the goal is to find the appropriate middle ground.
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The vast difference between the two conceptions is reflected in
the views of some of the Anti-Federalists, on one hand, and such Fed-
eralists as Alexander Hamilton, On the other. The Anti-Federalists fa-
vored a process or exercise conception of representation. Although the
average citizen would not participate in politics directly, as in the an-
cient city-state, representation would serve to reflect the mores and
interests of the citizenry as a whole as if they had personally taken
part in political deliberation. As the Federal Farmer put it, "a fair and
equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions
and views of the people are collected in such a manner as they would
be were the people all assembled."71 Brutus described this ideal with
even greater clarity:
The very term, representative, implies, that the person or
body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who
appoint them—a representation of the people of America, if
it be a true one, must be like the people. It ought to be so
constituted, that a person, who is a stranger to the country,
might be able to form a just idea of their character, by know-
ing that of their representatives. They are the sign—the
people are the thing signified.72
Although this "re-presentative" theory of representation is not
completely divorced from political results—the proper distribution of
representatives across classes serves to protect the citizenry and to en-
sure that its interests are met—these results are a byproduct of the
proper distribution of power across classes. In contrast, Federalists
such as Alexander Hamilton maintained that representation serves
only an instrumental and deliberative role—that the outcome of the
71 LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, VII, Dec. 3t, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIS1', supra note 11, at 73, 74.
72 Essay of Brutus, III, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in ME ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 11, at 122, 124. Anti-Federalists sought to ensure that a representative expression of
popular will would be present as a corrective to government. Thus, some Anti-Federalists
went so far as to suggest that representation should reflect the distribution of social and
economic classes throughout society. The Federal Farmer argued that different classes of
society must be counterbalanced by giving the "aristocratical, democratical, merchantile,
land] mechanic" orders, among others, a distinct role in the representative body. LETTER
FROM THE FEDERAL. FARMER, supra note 71, at 75. Melancton Smith, reminiscent of Aris-
totle's reliance on a balance of power between the aristoi and the demos, argued that "the
Constitution should be so framed as to admit this [aristocratic] class, together with a
sufficient number of the middling class to controut them." Metancton Smith, Speech offune
21, 1788, in Ti.t; DERAILS. AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF E STATE OF NEW
YORK (1788), reprinted in THE AN 'El- FEDERALBT, supra note II, at 338, 342.
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political process is the chief criterion by which to judge the legitimacy
and efficacy of the process itself. At the New York ratifying convention,
Hamilton argued that the "true touchstone" of public confidence is
ensured not by the number of representatives but by the outcome of
the deliberation—by "a train of prosperous events, which are the result
of wise deliberation and vigorous execution." In this respect, he ar-
gued, large bodies are much less competent than small ones."7s
In the long run, Hamilton's outcome-oriented conception has won
the day. The reduction in available political positions in the representa-
tive branch relative to the number of those represented has proceeded
apace from almost the time of the framing of the Constitution. During
the debates leading to the ratification of the Constitution, Anti-
Federalists pointed out that in the Continental Congress, there were
two hundred senators and nearly two thousand representatives from
thirteen colonies with a total population of between three and four mil-
lion,74
 This meant that there were fewer than two thousand constituents
to every representative at the time of the American Revolution. The
delegates to the Constitution set the proportion of representatives to
constituents at no more than one to every 30,000, 75—a dramatic reduc-
tion in representation. After the first census in 1790, the number of
representatives was set at 106 (the census indicated a population of just
over 3.9 million inhabitants in the United States). 76
 This resulted in a
ratio of roughly one representative for every 37,000 persons. Through-
out the nineteenth century, the relative number of representatives to
constituents declined continuously. In 1912, the number of representa-
tives was set at 435, the same number as today.77 Progressive reformers
73 2 JONATHAN ELLIOLT, Tut: DEnxits IN THE SEVERAI. STATE: CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF '111E FEDERAL. CONSTrIVIION 254 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1836).
As the instrumental conception of representation became more accepted, the number of
positions available to citizens could be limited. Indeed, the Hamiltonian conception of
representation does not clearly reflect the public will, because it requires merely that rep-
resentatives, through the deliberative process, reach the "best" results—whether or not
they reflect the public will.
74
 See Essay of Brutus, III, supra note 72, at 127.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
76 H.R. REP. No. 61-1911, at 8 tbl. (1911).
77 See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We've Outgrown? An Ar-
gument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 25 Cowm. J.L. & Soc. Pitons. 157,
157-58 & 11.2 (1992); James K Glassman, Let's Build a Bigger House: Why Shouldn't the Num-'
ber of Congressmen Grow with the Population?, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1990, at D2; James K.
Glassman, Wityjust 435? After SO ream, This May Be the Time to Increase the Number of Members
of the House, ROLL CALL, June 11, 1990, at 1.
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later successfully sought passage of a bill that capped the House mem-
bership at that number. 78
Today, with a population of about 280 million in the United States,
the ratio of representatives to constituents is now one to nearly 650,000,
indicating a roughly twenty-fold reduction in the voting power of the
average citizen from the date of ratification. If representation had kept
pace with the 1790 ratio, there would be roughly 7000 representatives,
rather than 435. 79 Conversely, if the current proportion of constituents
to representatives had prevailed in 1790, at the dawn of our nation's
history, the original apportionment would have extended to no more
than a total of five or six representatives.
Of course, this is just part of the problem. When one considers
that the rate of re-election for incumbent members of Congress is
currently around ninety-four percent, 8° it is evident that the average
citizen's chances for direct participation at the national level are vir-
tually nil. 81 At state and local levels, the prospect for participation is
somewhat greater. There are about 7500 positions nationally as state
representative or senator. 82 Even the state figures are illustrative of the
problem, however. Though the states were conceived in the original
constitutional plan as analogous, in sonic respects, to small republics
in which representation could be more direct and "face to face" than
at the federal level, the current level of representation is thinner in
most states than it was at the federal level in 1790. For example, Cali-
76 The number was formalized in 1929 by Congressional act. Act ()finite 18, 1929, ch.
28, 46 Stat. 26 (1929) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2000)).
79 With current United States population of roughly 280 million, a ratio of one repre-
sentative for every 37,000 constituents would require more than 7000 representatives.
00 Rates of re-election for Congressional incumbents hovered around ninety percent
until 1996. when they began to exceed ninety-four percent. In 1996, of 384 House elec-
tions, incumbents retained 364 seats and more than half won by over twenty percent of the
vote. Eric O'Keefe & Aaron Steelman, The End of Representation: How Congress Stifles Electoral
Competition, POLY ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 20, 1997,
http://www..cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-279.html . The trend continued in the 2002 election
when, out of 435 House members, only sixteen incumbents were defeated—eight by other
incumbents thrown out of their districts by redistricting, and four by non-incumbents in
the party primaries. In only four instances did a non-incumbent challenger beat an in-
CUMbeni in the general election. DICK MORRIS, Orr WITH THEIR H EADS 228 (2003).
41 Because the current ratio is one representative for every 650,000 constituents, and
because over ninety percent of incumbents are re-elected, the odds that any given citizen
will be elected to office are one in several million. Indeed, one has a better chance of win-
ning the lottery than of being elected to federal office.
82 Nationally, there are 1971 state senate seats and 5411 state representative seats.
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CURRYNT NUMBER or LEGISLATORS, TLIRMS OY
OFFICE AND NEXT ELECTION YEAR, at littp://www.ncsLorg/programs/legman/
aboutimunollegisium (Dec. 2003).
522	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 45:499
fornia, with a population of approximately thirty million, has a house
membership of eighty seats and a senate of only forty.°
Thus, even when state and local representation is counted, realis-
tic opportunities of the average citizen for political participation, ei-
ther as candidate or in some tertiary capacity, are remarkably scant.
This greatly attenuates whatever sense of connection and involvement
the average citizen might otherwise feel when choosing his represen-
tatives. Anti-Federalists were fond of noting that, under the represen-
tational scheme that existed in the colonies at the time of the Revolu-
tion, a representative might know, or at least recognize, every one of
his constituents. In contrast, today there are few constituents who
would recognize their representatives.
D. Positive Freedom and Political Centralization
Positive freedom can he measured by a third criterion as well.
Not only has the relative power of the individual vote diminished as
the distance between citizen and representative has dramatically in-
creased, so too has the relative domain over which it has any
significance. The power of the vote has diminished due principally to
a number of sweeping constitutional developments that have marked
twentieth-century legal history in the United States. This Section only
touches generally upon these developments because an extended sur-
vey is beyond the scope of this Article, and because they have been
well-covered elsewhere.
Most important among these developments are the decline of
federalism and the rise of political and economic nationalism. The
old Jeffersonian idea that the states provided citizens with a forum for
political expression, 8' and even the more recent liberal idea that the
states would serve as "laboratories" in which to test diverse programs
and policies,° have both faded under the crush of centralization that
88
 In other words, despite a population ten times that of the United States 'in 1790, Cali-
fornia has about three-quarters the number of representatives as were in the entire U.S.
I-louse of Representatives in 1790. Sec E. DolsoN WILSON & BRIAN S. Ell BERT, STATE or CAL.,
CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATURE 80 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
califleg.htrnl.
Jefferson referred to Virginia, and not the United States as a whole, as his "country."
See DAvin N. MAYER, TILE CONS'ITIVI1ONAL THOUGIIT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 185-221 (1994)
(discussing Jefferson's conception of limited federal power and state autonomy as a feature
of republican constitutionalism).
e6 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262. 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.. dissenting)
(chastising conservative justices for using the Lochner economic due process right to prevent
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dramatically accelerated with the New Deal. Centralization has been
facilitated, as a matter of constitutional law, by a greatly expanded in-
terpretation of the commerce power, 8° by more aggressive use of the
spending power, 87 and by the decline of the Tenth Amendment and
related claims of state sovereignty. 88
Moreover, the rise of the administrative state has served to insu-
late from electoral pressures what. has in effect become a fourth
branch of government. Increasingly, Congress has made broad dele-
gations of quasi-legislative power to unelected bureaucrats in a range
of important areas, including education, workers' safety, consumer
affairs, banking, the environment, energy, taxes, immigration, high-
way safety, and health. 8° The growth of the administrative state is typi-
cally viewed as a tradeoff—the citizenry forgoing indirect political
control in return for technical expertise, efficiency, and coverage
(necessary because Congress lacks the knowledge, resources, and time
to meet the growing need for administrative management of the di-
verse areas of modern industrial life). But there can be no doubt. that
the administrative state represents the antithesis of any conception of
government that values positive liberty. This conclusion is reinforced
by the recognition that, underlying the imperative for expertise and
efficiency, there is another motive that. animates the delegation of
administrative authority—a motive that is the most despairing of the
prospects for self-government. Because democratic agreement can
never be reached on the vast array of issues that are ultimately dele-
gated, these decisions are left to unelected administrators. As the devil
is always in the details, delegation is a dodge to the increasingly insu-
perable difficulties of reaching democratic consensus in the highly
centralized modern state.9°
experimentation at. the state level). Here, the progressives on the Court sought to advance
states' rights against limits imposed by notions of old negative liberalism.
86 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118-23 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1. 36-40 (1937).
87 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-93 (1937). But see South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-12 (1987) (limiting use of the spending power).
88 See TRIBE. 5/Ipra note 42, at 378-97.
R9 Sec Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 limtv. L.
Rrv. 1667. 1676-88 (1975). Theodore Lowi argues that policy making has become the
function of a three-way bargaining process between unelected administrators, a few inter-
ested politicians, and representatives of the affected industries. THEODORE]. EOM,
END OF LIBERALISM 55-97 (1969).
88 This critique of the administrative state is shared by both libertarians and defenders of
liberal democracy. See FRIEDRICH A. HAVER, THE ROAD SERFDOM 80-96 (1944) (arguing
that delegation results in breakdown of the rule of law); Low', supra note 89, at 125-56.
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Finally, the expanded role of the judiciary, particularly in consti-
tutional jurisprudence, represents yet another significant way in
which the power of the vote has been diminished, particularly with
respect to state laws. Ironically, over the course of the latter two-thirds
of the twentieth century, patterns both of judicial deference and of
judicial intervention have undermined positive liberty in American
political life. Judicial deference to federal authority; as evidenced by
the expansion of the commerce power, has diminished the autonomy
of the states, leaving little beyond the reach of federal power. At the
same time, judicial intervention on constitutional grounds in a widen- .
ing swath of state law matters represents a significant limitation to val-
ues of positive liberty as reflected in the rights of citizens to enact
state laws that. reflect their distinctive attitudes and mores.
Contemporary liberals generally do not lament the expansion of
federal power, the growth of the administrative state, or the interven-
tion of federal courts; indeed, they typically welcome these develop-
ments. They view with distrust the positive libertarian's concern for
local autonomy, and consider his fear of judicial intervention and na-
tional centralization to be a throwback to states' rights conceptions
associated with cultural parochialism and the disenfranchisement of
minorities. Certainly these developments were part of the legacy of
positive freedom in our nation's history. Nevertheless, the liberal dis-
misses the value of positive freedom at his own peril, for in the world
of politics, in contrast to the domain of philosophy, the negative and
positive freedom of the individual are not so easily disentangled.
II. FREEDOM AS LIMITED GOVERNMENT: THE NEGATIVE IDEA
A. The Dilemma of Negative Freedom
No tradition has exercised a greater symbolic influence upon the
political imagination of Americans over the course of the last two cen-
turies than that. which connects liberty to the idea of limited govern-
ment and, more generally, to the philosophical conviction that free-
dom is none other than the absence of constraint. There is, however,
a great deal of difference between these two ideas. Herein lie the
seeds of the dilemma of negative freedom.
"[T]he absence of externall Impediments," Hobbes maintained, is
all that we mean by "Liberty." 91 A man is free with respect to those
91
 HOBECS, supra note 12, at 189 (emphasis added). Hobbes's conception of freedom
influenced modern political thought because it offered a materialist conception of free-
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activities "which by his strength and wit he is able to do, and is not kindred to
doe what he has a will !o."92 This is a "negative" conception of liberty, in
the sense that what it means to be free is that one is not coerced or
constrained. Negative freedom is a "residual" idea in the sense that
the zone of "free action" is what is left over among the range of one's
possible actions after excluding all coerced or constrained acts. Berlin
described the extent of one's negative freedom as coextensive with
the area of non-interference by other persons . 93 But what is to count
as a "constraint" or an "interference?" The character of one's "nega-
tive liberalism" depends almost entirely upon how broadly one
defines constraint.
Negative liberals of all varieties follow Hobbes in arguing that.
only external conditions constrain: One is not "unfree" by virtue of
lack of capacity to perform an act. 94 Even with this significant
qualification, however, there is a great deal of dispute about which
kinds of external conditions should be considered to be constraints.
Generally, defenders of a negative conception of freedom fall into two
groups: the first adheres to a Hobbesian physical conception of con-
dom that could be incorporated into positivist forms of political thought. Hobbes's idea
was value-free; whether an act is "unfree" depends upon whether the actor is physically
constrained from performing it. Indeed, the virtue of Hobbes's conception is that persons
are "free" or "unfree" in exactly the same sense as inanimate objects—as a dammed river,
which is unfree to run its course. Freedom is the capacity for motion.
92 Id. at 262. This definition is radically opposed to definitions of freedom that flowed
from the Stoic tradition down through the Scholastics that required "free" acts to be ra-
tional, and which Hobbes criticized. See id. at 127 ("The Definition of the Will, given com-
monly by the Schooles, that it is a Rational! Appetite, is not good."). Hobbes's conception
drives a wedge between the rational and the volitional facilities of man and holds that acts
are free if they are voluntary, even if they are not rational.
93 BERLIN, supra note 1, at 169-70.
94 This is perhaps the last line of demarcation distinguishing negative and positive
conceptions of freedom. Physical infirmities, various forms of character defects and mental
incapacities (stupidity, lack of motivation, weakness of will) along with intra-psychic condi-
tions (internal compulsions, irrational aversions) do not diminish the freedom of an agent
to perform an act, but merely affect his ability to do so. As Berlin stated, "It is not lack of
freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale." BERLIN, supra note 1, at 169 n.2.
There is general concurrence among philosophers about this. See id. at 169 (11)ncapacity
to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom."); S.I. Bent & W. L. Weinstein, Being Frre to
Act and Being a Free Man, 80 MIND 194,197-98 (1971) (arguing that there is an important
difference between being disabled and being unfree); Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom,
in COERCION at 30,38 ( J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (stating that a
man with no legs is free to dance even if he is unable to, as long as no one is hindering
him); Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 404-05 (arguing that incapacity marks the relationship
between an actor and the action, but not between an actor and another person, which is
necessary for social unfreedom).
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straint; the second, following a tradition associated with Locke, con-
ceive of unfreedom in moral, political, or juridical terms.
Neo-Hobbesians conceive of freedom and unfreedom in physical
terms: unfreedom is a physical relation between an agent and an ob-
stacle characterized by the obstructed movement of the agent. 95 To
qualify as a constraint on freedom, an obstacle must physically limit
(i.e., prevent or make very difficult) a particular act. Whether an
agent is prevented from leaving the country by a natural disaster that
has blocked his or her exit, or by confinement in a prison, the result is
the same: the agent is tillable to leave and is therefore "unfree." 98
This picture of freedom, however, turns out to be both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive from the standpoint of political theory.
Physicalist conceptions of constraint are over-inclusive because there
are a myriad of forms of physical constraint—for example, the motor-
ist snowed in to his or her driveway, the person who has locked him-
self or herself out of his or her house—that are not instances of politi-
cal unfreedom.97 Neo-Hobbesian conceptions of freedom, however,
are also radically under-inclusive from a political standpoint because
there may be many instances where a person is not physically unfree,
but where his or her activity should be politically protected. The per-
son threatened with a fine or imprisonment for exercising a funda-
mental right is not, in the strict sense, physically unfree to exercise his
or her right, but this legal impediment to action should still be con-
sidered a constraint on political liberty. 98 In the end, physical concep-
95 Hon BES, SUM note 12, at 261-62.
96
 Neo-Hobbesians tend to be conceptual philosophers interested in the idea of free-
dom in its most general sense. See CHRISTINE SWAN'IUN, FREEDOM 95-100 (1992) (defining
constraint in physical terms; issues of freedom and justice are distinct). Similarly, W.A.
Parent argues that it is perfectly natural to say that a blizzard rendered an individual un-
free to perform an act. William A. Parent, Some Recent Work on the Concept of Liberty, 11 Am.
Pun_ Q., 149, 159; cf. David Miller, Constraints on Freedom. 94 E-nitcs 66,71-72 (1983) (ar-
guing that someone locked in a room may be free or unfree depending upon the moral
culpability of the person who locks the door).
97 In other words, theories of negative liberty that emphasize the physical dimensions
of constraint do not tell us under what conditions the State should relieve the individual of
the burden of unfreedom. The indigent man may be unfree to eat at the Ritz and the
hungry worker may be unfree to find meaningful and remunerative work, as the hiker is
unfree to forge the overflowing river, but it does not necessarily follow that they are enti-
tled to assistance from the State. Indeed, physical conceptions of negative liberty generate
a much larger sphere of "unfree" behavior than any government could ever cure.
98 Consequently, physical conceptions of unfreedom do not square with the concep-
tual heart of libertarian theory, because they cannot explain how legal sanctions physically
constrain the acts they make illegal. Even laws that attach a punishment to certain activities
do not make these activities physically impossible. Hobbes was unable to reconcile his in-
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dons of freedom tell us little about what kind of political system we
ought to have.
In contrast to a physical conception of constraint, neo-Lockeans
maintain that freedom contains an irreducible moral dimension. The
strictest of these conceptions holds that "unfreedom," at least in the
political sense, requires a deliberate human act that violates the rights
of the subject. 99 Thus, neo-Lockean ideals about freedom depend
upon a pre-existing scheme of rights that shape the contours of their
definition of constraint. An actor will not be considered unfree in the
politically relevant sense unless he or she has been prevented from
acting, and this prevention violates his or her rights.too
There are general philosophical objections, however, to purely
normative ideas of rights. If normative conclusions about whether a
right has been violated depend in part upon intuitions concerning
what it means to be unfree, the neo-Lockean cannot answer the ques-
tion about. what it means to be unfree without first drawing upon
tuition that laws limit freedom with his physical conception of freedom. He argued that
laws constrain, but only because they impose an external limit on human action. Hostnis,
supra note 12, at 263-64. But, of course, laws do not constrain in the physical sense. To
maintain his physical conception of unfreedom, Hobbes argued that threats cannot be
considered constraining because fear, not the external condition imposed by the threat,
prevents one from acting. Id. at 262-63. But fear of prosecution, rather than a physical
barrier imposed by the law, prevents a person from acting in contravention of the law.
99 Hayek wrote that
"restraint" ... presupposes the action of a restraining human agent. In this
sense, it usefully reminds us that the infringements on liberty consist largely
in people's being prevented from doing things, while "coercion" emphasizes
their being made to do particular things  ITlo be precise, we should
probably define liberty as the absence of restraint and constraint.
HAYEK, supra note 4, at 16-17. Berlin also argues that unfreedom implies coercion and that
Icloercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in
which I could otherwise act." BERLIN, supra note 1, at 169; see also Gert, supra note 89, at 32.
This dispute regarding terminology haS profound implications for political theory. For
example, Neo-Lockeans insist that freedom can only be limited by deliberate acts that vio-
late the rights of others, leading to their conclusion that impersonal social and economic
forces cannot be considered "coercive." The man who cannot find a job at a meaningful
wage is not "unfree" as long as the reasons for Isis failure are the result of impersonal 111:11 ,
ket forces.
100 This has influenced contemporary libertarian conceptions of coercion. For exam-
ple, Nozick believed that coercion involved an individual being physically prevented by
another agent from doing something he has a right to do. Sec Robert Nozick, Coercion, in.
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440,441-45 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
For those of more progressive inclinations ; a person can be "coerced" by being manipu-
lated, enticed, or otherwise caused to act by untoward social forces. See John Lawrence
Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. Raw. 631,661-69 (1994) (comparing theories of coercion
and exploitation).
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some antecedent conclusion that a right has been violated.un In sum,
although we might think that a theory of rights should be informed
by a deeper conception of the nature of freedom, neo-Lockeans re-
verse this: they require a conception of rights as a prerequisite to a gen-
eral theory of freedom. This threatens to embroil these ideas in a vi-
cious circularity, or minimally, to leave unanswered deeper questions
about the meaning of freedom.
Herein lies the dilemma of negative freedom. By following the
Hobbesian road, philosophers consign their theories of freedom to
political irrelevance. 02
 The Lockean road, in contrast, not only re-
quires that one relinquish the positivist's quest for a value-free
definition of freedom, but threatens a vicious normative circularity as
well. Hobbesian conceptions tell us something about the nature of
freedom, but with little relevance to our political ideals, whereas neo-
Lockean ideas are relevant to political and legal theory, but only by
presupposing what it means to be politically unfree in the first place.
If Hobbesian conceptions of freedom go nowhere while Lockeans
beg the big questions, some recent negative liberals have attempted to
avoid the horns of the dilemma by forging an intermediate position.
Most notoriously, in Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin maintained (in a
footnote) that negative freedom is a conceptual hybrid, partly empiri-
cal and partly normative, which requires us to evaluate the answers to a
101 Negative liberalism depends upon intuitions regarding the physical nature of un-
freedom—the actual constraint involved when locked in a room or hindered from passing
over land—but the notion also relies on a subtler appeal to a system of rights. Libertarian
economist Ludwig von Mises claimed that it would be "inconvenient" to regard natural or
civil laws as limiting freedom—provided that such civil laws merely prevent ''anti-social
acts." He defined anti-social action as action characterized by aggression and fraud. Con-
sequently, government action that does more than prevent forcible aggression and fraud
restricts freedom by violating the rights of those restricted. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN
AC'EION 281 (3d ed. 1963). Von Mises influenced a subsequent generation of economists
and philosophers, including F.A. Hayek. See generally HAYEK, supra note 90.
102 Ian Carter, whose brilliant attempt to develop a metric of freedom constitutes the
most well-conceived physical conception of freedom to date, admits as much at the end of
his book:
[lit is still possible that those who have had the patience to follow my whole
tram of thought from the beginning to the end of the book will feel the result
to be something of a let-down. Are the inspiring arguments of the noblest of
our liberal forefathers in favour of the ideal of freedom to be cashed out into
nothing more than the possibility of performing various physical movements?
Has something not been lost along the way?
CARTER, Supra note 2. at 288. To reply—yes, this "something" is the importance of distin-
guishing between different kinds of bodily movements: those associated with free expres-
sion versus those associated with twiddling our thumbs.
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number of inquiries: how serious is the constraint; how difficult is it to
overcome; do alternatives exist and are they attainable; was the con-
straining condition caused by a wrongful and direct act of another per-
son, or indirectly as a function of general social or economic condi- •
tions; how important was the goal of the act to the actor's purposes;
and how great a reduction in the ex ante options available to the actor
does the condition represent. 103 The "versatility" of the hybrid concep-
tion of freedom permits its adherent to defend any number of posi-
tions along the left-right political axis. Yet this position has been criti-
cized by those on the left. and on the right for embracing a halfway
position that. calls into question whether the defender of these views
really qualifies as a true negative liberal. 10"
B. The Libertarian Ideal in American Constitutional History
Political conceptions of negative freedom in their most robust
varieties have been cast in two forms: as implementing a system of lim-
ited government, 105 and as protecting a consistent scheme of individual
103 BERLIN, supra note 1, at 177 n,l.
1" Charles Taylor, for example, argues that this "halfway" position is as normatively-
laden as the positive conception that Taylor defends. See Taylor, supra note 5, at 218-20.
Some have questioned whether Berlin is really a negative liberal. Sec GRAY, supra note 7, at
39 (suggesting that such considerations as whether other meaningful choices exist, the
nature or importance of the person's act, and the moral quality of the action that prevents
the act—for example. whether it violated the person's rights, or was intentional—are ir-
relevant front the standpoint of a strict negative conception of freedom). Thus, hybrid
"negative" ideas of freedom are broadly consistent with progressive political ideals.
105 The notion that there are inherent limits on government action is not an invention
of the liberal age. Some have traced the idea as far back as Roman law. Bruno Leoni ar-
gued that Roman law embodied a "rule of law" idea, that there were inherent limits to
legislative authority. See BRUNO LEON', FREEDOM AND 'IDE LAW 85-87 (1961). lie main-
tained that Roman legislation generally affected only what today we would call "public
law"—constitutional, administrative, and criminal matters—whereas the jus dvilis or pri-
vate law was left largely untouched by statute. Id. at 82-84. When statutes were passed, it
was with the prescription that if they violated a law, they would not have effect. Id. at 85-86.
Certainly we find the idea of limited government in its juridical form by the thirteenth
century in Europe. Lord Acton called Aquinas "the first Whig" because of Aquinas's basic
tenet that sovereign authority, in whatever form it took, was inherently limited by stan-
dards of justice imposed by the natural law. The first great English common-law conunen-
fatal. Henrici de Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century that
the king himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to
the law, for the law makes the king. Let the king, then, attribute to the law
what the law attributes to him, namely dominion and power, for there is no
king where the will and not the law has dominion „
HENR1C1 DE BRACTON, 1.1E LEG1BUS ET CONSUEFUDiN1BUS ANGLuit 39 (Sir Travers Twist
ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1878).
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rights.m Strictly speaking, these are distinct ideas, with more radical
forms of negative liberalism conceptualizing freedom as a function of
limited government. 107
 Nevertheless the two ideas, limited government
and individual rights, have gradually merged so that today liberals tend
to hold that government is limited only by rights.
Negative liberal theories of the "classical liberal" or "libertarian"
variety can be located along a continuum that defines the permissible
scope of government power.m8
 At the far extreme are various "minimal
In his wonderful discussion of the development of these ideas, Corwin notes that
Bracton believed there could be no relief to the individual whose rights the king violates,
other than prayer and divine justice. Corwin, supra note 10, at 174-75.
we Philosophical conceptions of rights in their modern form did not emerge until the
seventeenth century in the rationalist political thought of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pu-
fendorf. See generally HUGO 61101111S, DE LURE BE1,1,1 AC Pike's LIBRE TRES (Francis W. Kel-
sey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625); SAMUEL A. PuEENDour, DE JuRE NvruRAE ET
GEN'HUNI (Minerva 1967) (1759). These ideas influenced Locke and, a century later, the
American revolutionaries.
Ideals of limited government and those of individual rights differ regarding presump-
tions of the legitimacy of state power. Advocates of limited government hold that the
authority of government is confined to a limited sphere, thus any exercise of power that
transcends that sphere is illegitimate. In contrast, modern theories of individual rights
hold that government authority is more or less ubiquitous except for limited areas of per-
sonal autonomy carved out by individual rights. In limited government models, there is a
presumption against the legitimacy of government action—the government must prove
that any exercise of authority is within its limited powers. In individual rights conceptions,
government authority is presumed legitimate unless it can be shown to violate a specific
in dividual  righ t.
107
 There is an interesting analogue to the difference between these two ideas in the
American constitutional debates. James Madison opposed adoption of the Bill of Rights, not
because he was an enemy of the idea of individual rights, but because he recognized that a
shift in emphasis from limited government to individual rights would lead to an expansion
of government power. Madison intended the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to insure that
the adoption of the Bill of Rights would not shift the burden to opponents of government
power. He feared that those who wished to expand government power would argue that the
only limits on government are shaped by the individual rights protected in the Bill of
Rights. He recognized that the "internal" limits of the various federal powers are far more
restrictive of federal power, than are the "external" limits imposed by various rights. See
Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten
Lessons. in Tit': Btu. or RIGINS 419, 422-27 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
108
 Leonard Read began to use the term libertarian" in the 1950s, to distinguish his
views front those of increasingly egalitarian forms of modern liberalism. David Boaz. Intro-
duction to THE LIBERTARIAN READER, at xiii (David Boaz ed., 1997). Today libertarian and
classical liberal thought often are conflated, perhaps because each falls further to the
"right" on the political spectrum than contemporary liberal thought. Although there is a
good deal of agreement between the two schools of thought, libertarianism is still distinct
from classical liberalism. For example, libertarianism is far more individualistic than classi-
cal liberalism. See Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in A COMPANION 'IX) CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 291, 293-94 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1995). Another differ-
ence is that classical liberals are not opposed to "morals legislation," i.e., using state police
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state" libertarians, such as the young Robert Nozick, who believe that
the only role for government is to protect personal and property
rights.m Next along the spectrum are theories encompassing the views
of most "neo-conservative" economic thinkers, which hold that gov-
ernment power should be used not only to protect rights, but to rem-
edy collective action problems left unresolved by the free market." 0
Further still along the continuum we find the softer libertarianism of
John Stuart Mill, who held that there exists a sphere of individual
autonomy, marked off by individual actions that do not directly harm
others, that should remain beyond the coercive reach of state and soci-
ety.'" Finally, closest to the liberal mainstream are those forms of classi-
cal liberal thought that. assume, or defend, a broader conception of the
power to protect moral order. In contrast, libertarians (and modern (progressive) liberals)
oppose morals legislation. Locke argues that "freedom is not ... a liberty for emu one to
do What he /iSa." ,101IN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); see also Dworkin, supra note 2, at 181-204 (arguing that
conservative liberals favor regulation of morals but not the economy, whereas progressive
liberals favor the opposite); DAvin AJ. RICLIARDS, SEX, DRUGS, 1)EA111, AND -111E LAW gas-
site (1982) (arguing that a commitment to freedom requires respecting the personal
choices of individuals in all these areas).
09 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND U'ILIPIA 26 (1974) (describing the
"night-watchman state of classical liberal theory" as a minimal state "limited to the func-
tions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement
of contracts"). Nozick later abandoned this position. See ROBERT NOZICK, Tut: EXAMINED
LIrE 286-87 (1989) ("The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seri-
ously inadequate ....").
II° See 141ILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25-32 (1962); RicitARD A. POS-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-86 (4th ed. 1992).
ID Mill wrote that
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to oth-
ers. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Joi ,' Swim' MILL, ON Lumen' 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed.. Hackett Publ'g Co., 1978)
(1859). Mill's conception of the role of government is more expansive than that of mod-
ern libertarians. Mill argued, for example,. that the state had a role in regulating condi-
tions of the working man in a manner that would have offended the Lochned maces. Addi-
tionally, and perhaps most importantly, heargued for a radically different conception of
trade. Rather than viewing all trade as a part of the realm of the private, a function of
freedom of contract between buyer and seller, Mill recognized the broader public effect of
trade-related activities. Thus, though Mill argued that the government should usually leave
trade free from regulation, it was not because trade falls within the realm of the liberty of
the individual as such. Rather, free trade met broader utilitarian goals. Where utility re-
quires, however, government can intervene. See id. at 93-96.
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police power of the state—specifically, one that encompasses the power
to enact "morals legislation." 112
Although robust conceptions of negative liberty have always ex-
erted a powerful symbolic influence upon our politics and constitu-
tional case law, American constitutional history bears little evidence of
a sustained commitment to any systematic conception of negative lib-
erty. Beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court's antebellum period,
there were sporadic judicial attempts to limit legislative power, both at
the state and federal level. These early cases, however, usually con-
cerned boundary conflicts between state and federal power, and be-
tween the three branches of government, rather than the protection
of individual liberty as such. 113 When the Court did address questions
of individual rights, there was little it could do as against the states, be-
cause the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states until well after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 114 and little it did
do as against federal power. In fact, from 1803, when the Court de-
cided Marbury v. Madison, until Dred Scott v. Sandford, in 1856—over
112 Seel-1101%1AS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1223-1348 (8th ed. 1927).
Cooley's treatise was the most influential source on constitutional law at the end of the
nineteenth century). The judges during the Lochner era would have imbibed these ideas as
students and practitioners before coming to the Court.
In Lochner u New Yoth, the case that came to represent the acme of American constitu-
tional libertarianism. the Court nevertheless ass d that states have a broader police
power than today's libertarians would recognize. See 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). The Lochner
Court conceded that these -police powers"--Cooley's term-- -relate to safety, health, mor-
als and the general welfare of the public." Id. Whereas Mill defended the right of the indi-
vidual to be free of government interference bi such personal decisions as drug use, pros-
titution, or gambling, the Lochner Court would certainly have supported government
intervention in these areas. Sec id.
113 See. e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427-37 (1819) (holding
that, in a conflict between a state and the federal government, the state may not tax fed-
eral property); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-62 (1816) (holding
that, in conflicts between state and federal courts, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion requires not only that federal law be supreme over state law, but also that federal in-
terpretations of federal law supercede state interpretations); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 174-80 (1803) (holding that. in conflicts between the Supreme Court and
Congress. the Court may strike congressional acts that improperly expand the jurisdiction
of the Court).
None of these cases was about individual rights. Ironically, the Marbury Court con-
cluded that Congress lacked the power to extend the Court's own jurisdiction to protect
vested legal rights beyond constitutionally imposed limits. See5 U.S. at 179-80.
1 " Barron v. Baltimore held that the Bill of Rights was never intended to apply as against
the states. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-51 (1833). The incorporation of these various rights
against the states took place on a piecemeal basis, through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See TRIBE, supra note 42, at 77244.
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half a century—the Court did not invalidate a single federal act." 5
Dred Scott represents the only instance before the Civil War in which
the Court invoked a provision of the Bill of Rights to strike down a
federal law on constitutional grounds. 16 The case was the first to use
the doctrine that would later be called "substantive due process,"
holding that slave holders had a property right in their slaves pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 7 Yet. it. is more
than ironic that the first recognition of a negative right against the
federal government involved the denial of the most basic rights to lib-
erty for an entire group of people.
During the antebellum period, constitutional challenges to state
laws were more frequent, even though there were limited means of at-
tack from a federal constitutional standpoint." 8 During this period,
arguments occasionally were predicated upon general notions of natu-
ral justice without any specific textual suppor0 9 Most prominently,
Justice Samuel Chase's opinion in Calder v Bull, in 1798, claimed that
"[a]n act of the legislature (for f cannot call it a law), contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact" cannot stand. 12° Yet even
115 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING or AMERICA 28 (1990); Thins, supra note 42, at
24-29.
II° 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-52 (1856).
3 ' 7 Dred Scott was the first of three incarnations of substantive due process; the second
and third were the Lochner era "economic due process" and the privacy em "personal due
process." See BORK, supra note 115, at 32 (criticizing the Dred Scott decision and the oxymo-
ronic notion of substantive due process). The doctrine has been criticized by moderates
and liberals. See Ewe, supra note 59, at 14-21 (concluding that the clause was only intended
to ensure fair procedures). Constitutional historians have argued that due process was
initially viewed as a procedural, rather than substantive, guarantee. See Edward S. Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 370-74 (1911)
(claiming that the Due Process Clause was originally intended to ensure that the state fol-
low certain procedures before depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property).
118 See CORWIN, supra note 10, at 58-115 (recounting the extra-textual challenges to
laws based upon notions of "natural justice," vested rights, or republican conceptions of
government); LAWRENCE M, FRIEDMAN, A HIS'MRY OF AMERICAN LAW 230-257 (1985)
(surveying the protection of property front state law up to about 1850); Ammo H. KELLY
rr Al., THE AMERICAN CONS'ITEUTION 178-99 (1991) (discussing the prevalence of vested
rights and Contracts Clause claims in the Marshall court).
119 A number of recent conunentators have argued that the Framers intended that
judges enforce notions of natural rights and justice, regardless of specific textual basis. See,
e.g.. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L REV. 703, 706-17
(1975); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. I. Rix. 843, 854-65 (1978); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cu t. L. Rev. 1127, 1167-76 (1987).
120 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). The case involved a law that had the effect of re-
writing provisions of a will. The Court rejected both a Contracts Clause challenge and a
challenge predicated upon natural rights. The colloquy between Justice Samuel Chase and
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here, Justice Chase voted with the Court to uphold the law in ques-
tion. 121
 More frequen4 the Court, invoked the Contracts Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, one of the few rights provisions that applied to the
states in this era, to strike down state laws that invalidated pre-existing
contracts. 122
 Even this clause was limited in scope, and the number of
decisions predicated upon it is relatively sma11. 123 Of course, litigants
could attack state laws t inder the provisions of the state constitution,
but state constitutional protection of fundamental rights was varied and
often held out no more hope than a challenge under the Federal Con-
stitution. 124
The Civil War and the emancipation of African-Americans led to
a more individualistic conception of personal freedom, one that is
reflected in the fundamental constitutional inversion brought about
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 125 Where republican principles dur-
justicefames Iredell, who argued for a strict constructionist view of the role of judges, has,
nevertheless, become noteworthy for airing the theoretical differences between these two
opposed positions.
121 Id. at 394.
122 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 10, cl. 1 provides that No state shall ... pass any Bill ... im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts ... .* See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,138–
39 (1810) (holding that a State could not constitutionally rescind land grants to subse-
quent good faith purchasers). This is perhaps the best-known case in which a state law was
invalidated on Contracts Clause grounds. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the
eminent English legal historian Henry Sumner Maine proclaimed the Contracts Clause
to be the bulwark of American individualism against democratic impatience and Social-
istic fantasy." SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, l'OP U LA R GOVERNMENT 243 (Liberty Classics
1976) (1885). One author has argued that the Contracts Clause was the basis for the in-
validation of more state laws during the nineteenth century than all other constitutional
provisions combined, with the exception of the Commerce Clause. BEN_]AMtN FLETCII ER
WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF 'n t: CONSTITUTION, xiii (1938).
123
 The reason for this is that the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the provision ap-
plied only to laws passed subsequent to a contract, but that laws could prospectively affect
contract obligations. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213.269-70 (1827) (up-
holding a state bankruptcy law passed before a contract was made that purported to pre-
vent a party from seeking the shelter of bankruptcy); see also KELLY Er AL., supra note 118,
at 186-90 (describing early application of the Contracts Clause); Timm, supra note 42, at
613-19 (same).
124 See Co R WIN, supra note 10, at 58-115; Knorr L. HALL, Tit e MAGIC MIRROR 103-05
(1989); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 89-116 (1975).
125 The principal inversion is reflected in that the federal government, traditionally
seen as more distant from the individual than state government, wits increasingly relied on
to protect the individual from state government. Federal authority, both judicial and legis-
lative, expanded to accomplish this new task. But this expansion required a rejection of
the central tenet of libertarian thought—that government was the chief limit on freedom.
A more subtle shift in thought followed—that freedom had less to do with limited gov-
ernment than with the protection of the individual. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment
shifted our emphasis to a more progressive conception of freedom that equated freedom
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ing the antebellum period linked freedom to a limited federal gov-
ernment and to the close association of the individual with his own
state, the post-Fourteenth Amendment understanding reversed all
this. At this point the transition from the "limited government." model
to the "individual rights" model of negative freedom began to take
root in American conceptions of liberty. Nevertheless, personal free-
dom was still conceived along the older lines—largely as the eco-
nomic rights of contract and property: 126 But these rights would take
on a meaning less connected to purely political or economic activity
than they had under the earlier understanding.
After the U.S. Supreme Court's failure in the Slaughter-House
Cases, in 1872, to give the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment its intended application as the fount of
the new liberty,'" judges found a substitute in the Due Process
Clause. 128 The constitutional embodiment of "economic due process,"
central to the Lochner era, made its first appearance in Justice Joseph
with individual flourishing, rather than with limited government, See WILLIAM E. NELSON,
Tin; FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 151-200 (1988) (discussing judicial consequences of the
political inversion brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment); William E. Nelson, The
Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century Amer-
ica, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513,525-47 (1974).
"6 Bruce Ackerman argues that the postwar emphasis upon individual rights of con-
tract and property was the result of a deeper understanding of freedom initiated by the
Thirteenth. Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments:
Given Reconstruction, it was perfectly appropriate for courts to insist that the
nation was now conunitted to the guarantee of fundamental rights in a deeper
way.... The Emancipation Amendment, for example, was understood, first
and foremost, in legal terms that relied on the language of property and con-
tract.... But if freedom of contract and the right to own private property dis-
tinguished the black slave from the black freedman, did they not also serve
more generally to distinguish slaves from freedmen of all races?
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 100 (1991).
This argument is similar to Orlando Patterson's thesis that social conceptions of free-
dom have always developed as a response to slavery—to the fear of slavery, or to its imposi-
tion, See ORLANDO PATEERSON, FREtloom, at xiii (1991).
127 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,77-80 (1872), The decision rendered the Privileges and
Immunities Clanse of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified just five years earlier, a virtual
dead letter. The Clause provides that No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ...." U.S. CoNs•r.
amend. XIV, § 1. Just as a State was prohibited from preferring its own citizens to those of
other states by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to prohibit a State front similarly discriminating among its citizens. See
TitntE, supra note 42, at 548-53.
128 Due process would become synonymous with the right of the individual to hold
property, to make contracts, and to alienate one's labor for a wage. See CoRwirs , supra note
10, at 116-68; HALL. supra note 124, at 226-46.
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Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases. 129 In 1889, the Court
struck down on due process grounds a state law that delegated the
authority of establishing railroad rates to a commission)" Within a few
years, the vaunted "freedom of contract" of the economic libertarian
had become a part of constitutional doctrine. 131
 Lochner v. New York,
decided in 1905, echoed justice Bradley, and Adam Smith before him,
when it proclaimed that "[t]he general right to make a contract in re-
lation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment ...." 1" In striking down a state law
that limited bakers to sixty hours of work per week, and to ten hours of
work per clay, the Court stated that "Wile right to purchase or to sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there
are circumstances which exclude the right."'"
The Court's conception of freedom of contract, though couched
in terms of economic rights, is circumscribed by a Hobbesian notion of
constraint. Despite progressives' claims that workers were constrained
by social and economic circumstances to accept low-paying jobs that
required long hours of work, often in dangerous conditions, the Court
found that the "requirement" that bakers work longer hours was not
imposed by "physical force," and so was not a constraint. 134 Workers'
freedom is not limited by the social and economic conditions gener-
ated by an impersonal market, even if these conditions made life
difficult)" Thus, the classical liberal conception of constraint pre-
129
 Sec Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Bradley argued that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the "funda-
mental ... right to follow such profession or employment as each one may choose.' Id.
(Bradley, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stephen Field quotes Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations at length in a footnote: "'The property which every maim has in his own labor ... is
the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.'" Id. at
110 (Field, J., dissenting).
13° See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1889).
' 81 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578. 593 (1897) (striking down a state law that
would prohibit citizens from purchasing insurance from companies not registered to do
business in state, on ground that it interfered with citizens' freedom of contract).
1 " 198 U.S. at 53.
in Id.
134 Sec id. at 52.
136 This position was attacked by progressive reformer E.L. Godkin, who insisted,
What I agree to do in order to escape from starvation, or to save my wife and
children from starvation, or through ignorance of my ability to do anything
else, I agree to do tinder compulsion, just as much as if I agreed to do it with
a pistol at my head.
SANDEL, supra note 10, at 189-90 (quoting E.L. Godkin, The Labor Crisis, 105 N. Am. lbw.
177 (1867)).
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served the old Hobbesian tension that permitted its defenders to main-
tain that, whereas the threat of a fine enforced against an employer was
a "constraint" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, social
conditions that required an employee to accept dangerous work at low
pay, motivated by the need to keep his family alive, was not."9
Although the Lochner era (roughly 1897 until 1937) often is touted
by its defenders and excoriated by its critics as a period where libertar-
ian ideals dominated constitutional decision making, the Court's eco-
nomic libertarianism was actually sporadic, limited, and inconsistent.
Although the Court struck down a maximum hour law in Lochno; it.
upheld a similar law for factory workers twelve years later." 7 Although it
struck down some minimum wage laws and laws prohibiting "yellow
dog" contracts (contracts imposed by employers on employees requir-
ing that employees not join a union), other aspects of the employer-
employee relationship, such as safety conditions, remained within the
power of state regulation."8 Whereas laws that required state
certification to enter certain professions were occasionally struck
down—two notable cases involved, ice dealers and pharmacists 199—state
laws requiring licensure for other professions were never in question.
In sum, the doctrine of freedom of contract. was never interpreted so
broadly that it served to shield the bargaining process between workers
and employers from any form of state regulation. The fate of a particu-
lar law often appears to have depended not so much on whether it
regulated some aspect of the employment contract, as do a myriad of
136 Hobbes argued that laws constrain, but that acts motivated by fear (or perhaps eco-
nomic exigency) are not constrained. See HOBBES, SUPra note 12, at 262-63. General eco-
nomic conditions cannot "constrain' if constraint must always involve the intentional act of
a personal agent, as many libertarians and others maintain. See HAYEK, supra note 4, at 12.
Accordingly, the owner of the bakery in Lochner was "constrained" by the threat of a fine if
that fine violated his right to contract, but the worker was not similarly constrained be-
cause his situation was the result of general economic conditions.
"7 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; sec Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 434-36 (1917) (over-
ruling Lochner by upholding law limiting work day for both sexes to thirteen hours, and
guaranteeing overtime pay after ten hours); sec also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412. 421-23
(1908) (upholding a maximum hour law for women on paternalistic grounds that women
needed to be protected from harsh working conditions).
m Sec Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 160, 180 (1908) (finding federal legislation pro-
hibiting discharge of employee for union membership violates the Commerce Clause);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (finding state legislation prohibiting yellow-dog
contracts violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Coppage also
held that the state objective of equalizing bargaining power between employer and em-
ployee was an impermissible use of the democratic process. 236 U.S. at 14-16.
"9 See New State Ice.Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932); Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114 (1928).
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laws, but on whether the motive for the law was to redistribute wealth
or power in some overt manner. 140
Moreover, the libertarian influence was strongest in the employ-
ment context. Not once during this period did the Court entertain
the notion, so central to theoretical libertarianism, that states could
not regulate private morals. 141
 And even when there were constitu-
tional challenges to various forms of federal morals legislation, they
were cast not as a necessary vindication of individual rights, but rather
as a challenge to the limitations of the commerce power—and even
these challenges failed."2 Nor were paternalistic laws, eschewed by lib-
ertarians because they substitute the states' judgment for that of the
individual in matters where only individual interests are at stake, 143
140 The Lochner Court made this explicit in asserting that states' interests were limited
to those of the police power—protecting health, safety, and morals of the community. 198
U.S. at 53. The Court found that the "health" justification for the law (the protection of
the public from illnesses caused by overworked bakers) was a pretext for an attempt to
equalize bargaining power between employer and employee, an impermissible end. See id,
at 61; see also Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17-18 ("HI t is ... impossible to uphold freedom of con-
tract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those
rights.... (S)ince a state may not strike (these rights] down directly it is clear that it may
not do so indirectly .... The police power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot
be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it ....").
141
 For example, in Alugler v, Kansas, the Court upheld as a proper exercise of the
State's police power a law prohibiting the use of personal property to make liquor. 123
U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887). Whereas earlier cases had upheld bans on the sale or distribution
of alcohol, Alugler struck at the heart of the zone of privacy by holding that the State could
reach even the act of fermenting liquor for one's own use. What is striking about the case
is that the Court attempted to square its reasoning with some conception of a zone of pri-
vacy (though an incredibly impoverished one):
... the State may control the tastes, appetites, habits, dress, food, and
drink of the people, our system of government, based upon the individuality
and intelligence of the citizen, does not claim to control him, except as to his
conduct to others, leaving hint the sole judge as to all that only affects himself.
Id. at 660. The language illustrates the malleability of ideas of zones of privacy and per-
sonal autonomy. By broadening the idea of what constitutes harm to others (for example,
to include offense or emotional upset), or by asserting that personal activity may result in
social consequences (for example, that drinking one's own liquor at home may result in
the commission of some crime), virtually any personal activity can be subject to state regu-
lation. Ultimately, the Court left it to the state to draw the line between self-regarding and
other-regarding acts. See id. at 662-63.
142 See Hoke v. United States. 227 U.S. 308, 322-26 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act,
which made it a federal crime to transport women across state lines for immoral pur-
poses); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding law prohibiting interstate
transport of lottery tickets).
''s See MILL, supra note 111, at 12. Each individual Is the proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering
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ever seriously questioned. Laws prohibiting sodomy, adultery, fornica-
tion, polygamy, abortion, gambling, and the use of narcotics—many of
which existed in a largely unbroken tradition from common-law
times—were never invalidated during this period.'"
There was no protection, during the Lochner era, for other rights
central to the libertarian ethic. With the exception of two cases in the
1920s recognizing the rights of parents to have their children taught a
foreign language 145 and to send their children to private school,"6
there was little protection for personal, or non-economic, liberties.
Freedom of expression fared no better. In fact, throughout the nine-
teenth century, there was little protection for freedom of speech. 147
This tradition of benign neglect ended in 1919 when, for the first
time in its 130-year history, the Court entertained various challenges
based upon the First Amendment's protection of freedom of
speech—and rejected them. 198 The 1920s and 1930s may be the dark-
est period of constitutional history from the standpoint of the protec-
tion of free speech and association. 146 Those who raised First
Amendment defenses to laws that made it a crime to advocate
each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest." Id. Mill noted the highly accelerated tendency of modern societies to
impose their conception of the proper way to live on others, See id. at 12-14. He concluded
that "kJ he disposition of mankind ... to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a
rule of conduct on others is so energetically supported by some of the best and some of
the worst feelings incident to human nature ...." Id. at 13.
144 0f course, it is difficult to separate the "moralistic" from the "paternalistic" motives
for laws, as many laws appeal to both sentiments. For example. laws prohibiting gambling,
drug use, prostitution, and abortion have both a moral and a paternalistic aspect, in that
the conduct is discouraged in part to protect the participants themselves. Classical liberal
ideology tends to be more motivated by moralistic than paternalistic concerns, but there
were no constitutional barriers to paternalistic legislation at the time. Even by 1835, when
Tocqueville published Democracy in America, he noted the tendency, later called soft despot-
ism, of egalitarian democracy to produce "an immense protective power which is alone
responsible for securing their enjoyment and watching over their file ... laud which]
daily makes the exercise of free choice less useful and rarer land] restricts the activity of
free will within a narrower compass ...." ALEXIS Dr, TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMER-
'GA 692 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Classics 2000) (1835).
146 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down state law prohibiting
the teaching of any modern language other than English).
146 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down state law re-
quiring parents to send their children to public school).
147 See generally DAVID M. 'URBAN, Fttrr SPErrat IN ha FORGOTEEN YEARS (1997).
148 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding conviction under
the federal Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing pacifist literature to draftees).
149 See ZECIIARIA/I ClIAFFEEJR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 108-40 (1941);
Thomas A. Lawrence, Eclipse of Liberty: Civil .Liberties in the United States During the First World
Wm; 21 WAYNE I,. RES. 33, 87-112 (1974).
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pacifistic, anarchistic, or socialist causes, 150—or even to attend meet-
ings hosted by groups that advocated such causes (even when the de-
fendant had opposed the group's plafform)t5I—were denied First
Amendment protection. Whatever underlying philosophical principle
justified the inconsistent protection of freedom of contract in the
employment context, it did not extend to the related associational
right of persons to come together for personal or political purposes.
If we were to ask now why the Lochner Justices displayed what ap-
pears, from a modern liberal or libertarian standpoint, to be such an
inconsistent attitude toward personal zones of negative liberty, several
overlapping answers present themselves. The cynical answer, of course,
is that they were simply doing the bidding of the power elite, reflecting
its interests by adopting a conception of freedom that was consistent
with the demands of the propertied. Considering that the Court up-
held most progressive legislation, however, the record does not support
simple cynicism. Moreover, cynical answers in politics always overlook
the fact that, except in exceptional circumstances, defenders of particu-
lar theories entertain them genuinely, whatever subsequent. generations
may think of their views. The better answer is that. the Lochner Justices
were not libertarian—they were "conservatives" in the modern sense of
the word: they opposed government intervention in the economy even
though they were willing to recognize a role for government in the per-
sonal sphere. 152
155 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (upholding conviction for
circulating leaflets opposing invasion of Soviet Russia after World War I); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (upholding conviction of Eugene Debs, Socialist Party
leader, for a speech advocating socialism and opposing the war); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (upholding conviction and ten-year imprisonment under
the Espionage Act for publication of newspaper articles opposing U.S. entry into World
War I); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had written the major-
ity opinions in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs, dissented in Abrarns, arguing that "nobody can
suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without
more, would present any inunediate danger [to the nation]." Abrarns, 250 U.S. at 628
(Holmes. J.. dissenting).
151 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (upholding conviction under
the California Criminal Syndicalism statute for attending a Conununist Labor Party meet-
ing). In Whitney, the appellant had sponsored a moderate platform to work for change
through the existing political system, but that platform was defeated in favor of a more
radical platform, and she remained at the convention. Id. at 365-66; see also Gidow v. Peo-
ple of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (upholding conviction of business manager of
Conununist Party newspaper).
152 In contrast, modern liberals oppose government intervention in the personal
sphere, but welcome it in the economic world. See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 181-204 (pro-
viding a philosophical discussion of these differing tendencies); see also E.J. DIONNE, JR.,
WHY AMERICANS DATE Poulacs 259-82 (1991) (giving an interesting popular treatment
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If we now ask the deeper question—why should "freedom" extend
to a range of (economic) activities that so obviously affects others, but
not encompass more, personal (non-public) activities—the answer gets
considerably more complicated. Any complete answer would have to
include the tendency of classical liberals from Bentham on to freight
their conceptions of liberty with such other values as material prosper-
ity and social progress.' In addition, it would have to mention the lin-
gering Calvinist preference for economic over more personal forms of
self-assertion. 15" But accompanying and underlying these reasons is yet
another: nineteenth- and twentieth-century free market liberals have
always insisted that political freedom cannot exist independently of a
broad zone of economic liberty—at least not, in the long run. 155 The
of the rift between modern-day conservatives and libertarians); HAVER. supra note 4, at
397-411 (presenting a classic self-defense of the economic libertarian).
I" Liberty thus bad a utilitarian appeal to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
classical liberals, and to modern neo-conservatives as well. Freedom, material prosperity,
growth. and progress are all viewed as coefficient values. The idea of 'efficiency" is simply
an index of utility, measured by the capacity of an economic system to facilitate the distri-
bution of commodities at the lowest possible cost.
There is a tenuous relationship, in later classical liberal thought, between conceptions
of natural rights and utility as strands of liberal thought began to diverge from their
Lockean and natural rights foundations. See DOE HALEVV, THE GROWIll Or Primosoent-
cm. RADICALISM passim (Mary Morris trans., Beacon Press 1955) (1929). Justifications for
liberty were increasingly placed on utilitarian grounds, rather than on notions of natural
rights. See L.T. HOMIOUSE, LIBERALISM passim (Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (1911) (discuss-
ing the transformation from natural rights to utilitarian to progressive conceptions of
freedom). Bentham's dismissal of rights as "nonsense on stilts" presaged the eventual rift
between libertarians and utilitarians. JEREMV BEN IMAM. ANARCHICAL FALLACIES, reprinted
in 2 THE WORKS or JrREstv Bu•ninsi 489 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962)
(1843). Modern libertarians generally accept that there is a kind of "teleological conse-
quentialism" in their conceptions of rights, in that the protection of rights is broadly con-
ducive to human happiness, but they reject strict utilitarian approaches to moral reason-
ing, which are obnoxious to any system of natural rights. See RANnY E. linwqrer, THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 23 (1998); TIBOR R. MACIIAN, INDIVIDUALS AND ThEIR Rtrarrs
120-21 (1989). Perhaps the most important reason for this conflict is that utilitarianism
permits the trading off of utility between individuals in a way that maximizes net utility, but
requires the violation of rights. See genemily jj.C. SMART& BERNARD 111 11.1,IAMS, UTILITARP
ANIMA: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
154 See MAX WEEER, MK PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT or CserrAttsm 98-128
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1920).
155 In fact, this is the central theme of the two most important libertarian works of the
twentieth century. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 7-21; HAVER, supra note 90, at 13,88-100.
Harrington held that the chief consequence of a wide distribution of property was the pro-
tection of political liberty. Compampotcs HARRINGTON, THE COMNIONAVEM:III or OCEANA
(1656), reprinted in ME CONIMONWEAI:111 OF OCEANA AND A SysTusi OF Pouncs I. 12-13,
33-38 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992), with Locxr, supra note 108, at 66 (arguing that the chief
end of government is the protection of property). Modern libertarians accept both of these
542	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 45:499
	 -
old Harringtonian idea that political power had to be checked by
property, and that the overawing political control of economic rela-
tions meant the end of any real political freedom is, most likely, what
lay behind the intellectual motivations of the LochnerJustices.
Indeed, one can imagine a judge from this era asking the oppo-
site question: How it is that we, who increasingly conceive of freedom
as self-determination—the capacity to direct our lives in the direction
we choose—are so willing to be taxed and regulated in the sphere of
activity that will determine many of our opportunities and define so
many of our lives' purposes? If the classical liberal commitment to
negative liberty was ultimately halfhearted, emphasizing economic
liberty at the expense of the personal, so too, they might point out,
are our own conceptions of self-determination, which accent the per-
sonal at the expense of the economic dimensions of human life.
In an extended sense, the jurisprudence of each of the next
three faces of freedom draws upon the negative ideal of freedom. To
this extent, we have not completed our discussion of negative liberty.
Yet, each of the three succeeding conceptions of freedom offers us
something considerably more, and something undeniably less, than
the simple antipathy between freedom and government interference.
III. THE PROGRESSIVE REFORMULATION OF LIBERTY
A. The Progressive Idea ofFreedom
In an address to Congress in January 1944, President Franklin Roo-
sevelt announced that "Me have come to a clear realization of the fact
that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence:156
 Quoting from an English case of Blackstone's era, lie
declared that "necessitous men are not free men," 157 adding that
Ipleople who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dicta-
torships are made: 158 He went on to enumerate a list of new freedoms
that should supplement those of the now "inadequate" Bill of Rights.
These freedoms include "Whe right to a useful and remunerative job,"
"[t]he right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
propositions: political and economic liberty are mutually reinforcing, but once economic
liberty is lost, the loss of political liberty is not far behind.
156 COR WIN, supra note 10, at 4 11.3.
157 Id. (quoting Vernon v. Beiliell. 2 Eden 100, 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762)). jus-
tice Benjamin Curtis repeated the sentiment almost a century later. Russell s Southard. 53
U.S. (12 How.) 139. 152 (1851).
158 COR WIN, supra note 10, at 4 11.3.
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recreation," "the right of every business man, large and small, to trade in
an atmosphere free from unfair competition and domination," "[t]he
right of every family to a decent home," "the right to adequate medical
care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health," "the right to
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, acci-
dent and unemployment," and "IA he right to a good education: 159 in
these few lines, we see the full flowering and political apotheosis of the
progressive conception of freedom. 16°
Four essential themes are central to the progressive conception
of freedom. First, progressive conceptions draw upon all three posi-
tive conceptions of freedom discussed in Part I, though different vari-
ants often emphasize one or another of these. Second, the progressive
is highly skeptical of the "ready-made" conception of a pre-social self
sometimes associated with classical liberalism, 161 arguing instead that
human choices are largely or wholly the product of social forces.
Third, whereas negative liberals contrast freedom with physical or legal
constraint, the progressive views interpersonal domination and social
dependence as the primary limits on both individual freedom and po-
litical liberty. Finally, underlying each of these other ideas, progressives
offer a theory of freedom that is thoroughly brigaded with egalitarian
ideals. This stands in marked contrast with the conviction, running
159 Id.
160 The "progressive" tradition is usually traced to the 1880s in England. American
progressive thought began ten to twenty years after this. BECKER. supra note 9, at 148-51
(defending the intellectual premises of progressivism); HALL, supra note 124, at 267-85
(tracing the impact of progressive reform on the legal culture); SA N DEL, supra note 10, at
201-49 (discussing the social history of progressivism).
Progressivism is usually conceived as a "middle way" between more radical forms of so-
cialism on the left, promulgated by Marx and others from the 1840s, and the laissez-faire
liberalism of the right. Progressives were thus attacked from both sides as representing an
unprincipled modes vivendi between the two radically different systems of politics. Progres-
sives often have stressed that theirs is not merely a "middle way." See .lor IN DEWEY, LI nERni-
ism AND SOCIAL AcrioN 48-49 (1935). Dewey claimed that liberalism emphasizes intelli-
gent direction of social action, and that therefore the only alternatives are conservative
"drift and casual improvisation, or the use of coercive force stimulated by unintelligent
emotional and fanatical dogmatism." Sec id. at 50, 51; see also Dworkin, supra note 2. at 196
(concluding that the liberal "chooses a mixed economic system—either redistributive capi-
talism or limited socialism—not in order to compromise antagonistic ideals of efficiency
and equality, but to achieve the best practical realization of the demands of equality it-
self"); BECK ER, supra note 9, at 96-98 (recounting the attacks he endured from the left and
the right).
161 See DEwn% supra note 160, at 39 (describing the classical notion of a "ready-made"
self).
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through both classical republican and liberal thought, that freedom
and equality of condition are mutually antagonistic values.i 62
"Weak" versions of progressive thought, associated with welfare
liberalism, accept the negative liberal's definition of freedom as the
absence of constraint, but argue for a significantly broadened
definition of constraint-one that includes social conditions, eco-
nomic inequalities, and even personal incapacities. 163
 Most versions of
progressive thought even go further, by defending a conception of
freedom that is positive in the sense that freedom means more than
non-constraint (requiring, in some cases, the affirmative assistance of
others), and also in the even stronger sense that freedom is connected
to specific goals that place normative constraints on the appropriate
ends of human action. Weak progressivism shares with other strands of
162 Eighteenth-century politicians and political thinkers agreed that values of liberty
and material equality were in deep tension. When thinkers of the time praised equality,
they were praising the equality inherent in Jefferson's natural aristocracy, the classical lib-
eral's equality of opportunity. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 70-71 (suiting that for most
Americans, equality did not mean social leveling, but simply an "'equality, which is adverse
to every species of subordination besides that which arises from the differences of capacity,
disposition, and virtue . ").
Disdain for substantive conceptions of equality can be seen in the work of Rousseau.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE: ON '111E ORIGIN OE INEQUALITY (1755), reprinted itt
THE SOCIAL. CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, supra note 4, at 31, 110 ("Political distinctions
necessarily produce civil distinctions."). Rousseau was the first to analyze the way in which
society generated inequality, yet would likely find anathema Ronald Dworkin's claim that
equality requires that individuals not benefit over others as a result of their inborn indi-
vidual differences. Compare hi. at 111 n.* ("Distributive justice would oppose this rigorous
equality of the state of nature ... [so that persons should] be distinguished and favored in
proportion to the services they have actually rendered."), with Dworkin, supra note 2, at
199 ("The liberal ... finds the market defective principally because it allows morally irrele-
vant differences, like differences in talent, to affect distribution, and he therefore consid-
ers that those who have less talent ... have a right to some form of redistribution ....").
163 The progressive who adopts a weak version of positive freedom may be seeking to
update the negative liberal tradition by adapting the basic impulse of liberalism—the free-
ing of individual energy from social constraint—to modern conditions. Liberal social con-
ditions were seen as necessary to foster the release of individual creative energy" neces-
sary for growth and prosperity, as well as for freedom. Sec James Willard Hurst, The Release
of Energ. in LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OE FR EEDONI IN 111E: NINETEENTH CENIURY UNEEED
STATES (1956). reprinted in AMERICAN LAW AND 'tilE CONSTEIVTIONAL ORDER 109, 111
(Lawrence M. Friedman and Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978); see also FlomiousE, supra note
153, at 73.("[Society's progress] is natural only in this sense, that it is the expression of
deep-seated forces of human nature which come to their own only by an infinitely slow and
cumbersome process of mutual adjustment.	 The heart of Liberalism is the understand-
ing that progress is ... a matter of	 the liberation of living spiritual energy."). The
broadened conception of constraint, which entails a wider role for state intervention,
places the weak progressive on a collision course with classical liberal theory, but the pro-
gressive still can clahn to be consistent with the spirit of the liberal tradition.
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the liberal tradition the view that there are no internal or normative
limits on what an individual may choose—that there is no inherent
ordering of life's goals that makes some choices more worthy than
others. In contrast, strong progressives defend a teleological concep-
tion of freedom that posits certain human ends as particularly impor-
tant to the attainment of human potential in its fullest manifesta-
tion. 1 64
One of the first philosophers of progressive thought was the Eng-
lishman T.H. Green, whose writings date from the 1880s. 165 "[The]
ideal of true freedom," Green announced, "is the maximum of power
for all members of human society alike to make the best of them-
selves."166 A half century later, John Dewey echoed this theme: "Lib-
erty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities
which take place only in rich and manifold association with others
...."167 The contemporary progressive-comnutnitarian Charles Taylor
164 To use the phraseology of MacCalluin's triadic formula, negative liberal theories of
freedom have a narrow conception of constraint, MacCallum's y variable, and a wide con-
ception of the z, or "goal," variable. In contrast, weak progressives tend to expand the y
variable to include other constraining conditions. Strong conceptions of positive freedom,
and of progressive thought, place normative limits on the z variable. They rule out of
bounds certain courses of activity that they deem irrational or immoral. In this way, posi-
tive ideas in general, and progressive ideas in particular, are distant descendants of a more
rationalistic conception of freedom that flows from Plato, through Stoic thought to the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages, to modern thinkers such as Hegel. The tradition is radi-
cally at odds with the predominantly British empiricist conception of freedom running
from Hobbes to modern day positivists. See MacCallum. supra note 7, at 102.
to Green's brand of liberalism departS in significant ways from the philosophical as-
sumptions of earlier liberalism. See Green, supra note 37, at 21. Whereas much nineteenth-
century liberalism is closely linked to the positivism and utilitarianism defended by Ben-
tham and Mill, Green and other early progressives were idealists influenced most deeply by
Hegel. See ALAN PATIEN, HEGEL'S IDEA OF FREEDOM 16-27,104,139,151-52 (1999) (dis-
cussing both Hegers metaphysical ideal of freedom and its application to a philosophy of
rights). If the heart of the positivist tradition is value skepticism and the disjunction be-
tween law and morality, then the idealist's rejection of positivism led them to a normative
and affirmative idea of freedom that connected freedom to a theory of self-realization.
Politically, it also committed liberal idealists to a more interventionist state. See HOIMOUSE,
supra note 153, at 63-66 (discussing the "organic" conception of liberty defended by ideal-
ists such as Green and others); id. at 74-87 (examining and defending their rejection of
the social atomism of earlier liberals).
166 Green, supra note 37, at 22-23. Green states that freedom is "a positive power or
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying." Id. at 21. This "positive
power" implies both the internal capacity to seek and to achieve such ends, and the sup-
port of external institutions to assist the individual in this pursuit.
' 67 jonN DEwrx, TuE PUBLIC AND I'IS PROBLEMS 150 (1954). In self-fulfillment or self-
realization, progressives find the central value of the liberal tradition. The underlying value
fostered by liberty or political liberalism is the release of human energies, the achievement of
individuality, the deepest fulfillment of the person. See HOBIEOUSE, supra note 153, at 73.
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follows in this tradition, writing that "the meaningful sense of 'free'"
involves "being able to act on one's important purposes:go Self-
fulfillment, self-realization, and the attainment of each individual's
fullest potential are ideas central to the strong progressive liberal tra-
dition—ideas drawn from the republican "holistic" or "top-clown"
conception of political liber 40 69
Nevertheless, there is a deep and brooding ambiguity inherent in
these ideas of self-fulfillment and achievement of "one's important
purposes"—an ambiguity that splits the liberal tradition and, with it,
progressive theory. Is the potential that each individual must fulfill
one that he or she chooses for himself or herself, and for which he or
she is the final arbiter, or are these "purposes" and "potentialities" ob-
jectively given?"° If each individual is his or her own judge about life's
proper goals, then what about the individual who chooses the life of
addiction, debauchery, or self-debasement?l"l Conversely, as Berlin
]68 Taylor, supra note 5, at 227.
168
 Whereas weak progressivism requires a program of affirmative entitlements, strong
progressiviim links freedom to the individual capacity to choose appropriate ends, and to
choose them for their propensity to foster the human good. The strong progressive ideal
of freedom draws upon the holistic ideal of political liberty central to the classical republi-
can tradition: freedom is an attribute of the entire person—to be "free" is to be a free man
or woman, an equal member of a self-governing political community, and thus, personal
autonomy flows from the right to take part in government. As Quentin Skinner puts it, the
first assumption in this "neo-Roman" conception of freedom is that individual freedom is
"embedded within an account of what it means for a civil association to be free," SKINNER
supra note 43, at 23; see also PET-rrr, supra note 31, at 121-51 (arguing for a conception of
resilient negative liberty deeply influenced by the republican idea that individual liberty
depends upon collective liberty).
In contrast, modern liberalism defines freedom atomistically—as an attribute not of
the civil association as a whole, or even of the person, but only of particular acts. See Berm
& Weinstein, supra note 94, at 201-11. For the liberal, "free" persons and "free" societies
are constructions built up out of the aggregate number of free acts. See CARTER, supra note
2, at 23-31 (defending the idea of "overall freedom"). For the positive liberal, in contrast,
the freedom of a particular act is intimately linked to wider considerations of political jus-
tice and of one's place in a free polity.
170 In other words, are there specific moral goals toward which human action should
be aimed, or an inborn potential toward which we gravitate? Teleological conceptions of
human potential, such as those of Green and Taylor, run counter to more sociological
interpretations of human behavior that hold that there is no "human nature," innate hu-
man purpose, or telos. Green and Taylor share an "essentialist" conception of human na-
ture, viewing the "highest purposes" of human behavior as limited, and individuals
"wrong" in choosing their ends as not truly "free" or autonomous. See Thylor, supra note 5,
at 228 ("[C] an we not say of the man with a highly distorted view of his fundamental pur-
pose ... that he may not be significantly freer when we lift even the internal barriers to his
doing what is in line with this purpose .. ?").
171 Weak progressives reject any teleological conception of human nature: there are no
"internal" limitations on what a person may choose to do with his life, only the "external"
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and others have pointed out, the opposite view is still more precari-
ous: if the determination of life's purposes is left to others who may
second guess what each of us chooses, then "freedom" is defined by
reference to someone else's conception of the good. 172 Strong pro-
gressives, including Green, Dewey, and Taylor, had to come to terms
with this deeply troubling qualification upon their ideas of freedom,
and its anti-liberal consequences.'"
Although the "weak progressive" does not share this problem,
because he or she rejects the strong progressive's teleological concep-
tion of freedom, 174 even the weak progressive's ideal of freedom is
strongly redistributive.'" In contrast to the view, held by neo-
flobbesian thinkers on both the left and right, that the quanta of
freedom in society can never be altered but only transferred from one
person to another, 1 " progressives argue that total social freedom can
limits itnposed by the recognition of others' rights. Like Hobbes, they assert that freedom
has more to do with the voluntariness of actions titan with the rationality or goodness of
these acts. See HOBBES, supra note 12, at 127-28. For libertarians and weak progressives,
normative considerations enter into our definition of freedom only to set limits to individ-
ual behavior for the purpose of protecting others. This makes each individual the final
arbiter of what it means to be "self-fulfilled" or "self-realized.*
172 BERLIN, supra note 1, at 181 ("This demonstrates (if demonstration of so obvious a
truth is needed) that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes
a self, a person, a man. Enough manipulation of the definition of man, and freedom can
be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes. Recent history has made it only too
clear that the issue is not merely academic.").
173 Some progressives have been forthcoming about the degree of constraint necessary
to achieve a more equal distribution of positive freedom. Sec RoussEnu, supra note 4, at
195 (arguing that those who fail to observe the general will shall be compelled to do so,
and thus "will be forced to be free"); Green, supra note 37, at 22 ("Mo submit is the first
step in true freedom"): cf. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 208 ("The liberals of the first half of
the nineteenth century correctly foresaw that liberty in this 'positive' sense could easily
destroy too many of the 'negative' liberties that they held sacred, They pointed o u t that
the sovereignty of the people could easily destroy that of individuals.").
174 For the weak progressive and the negative liberal, freedom means the absence of
constraints to pursue any legally open course of action that the individual may choose.
Nevertheless, the weak progressive's concept of freedom is still "positive" in that he or she
has a much broader conception of constraint (including social and economic conditions,
and internal incapacities), and in that he or she defends affirmative entitlements as a
means to guaranteeing the achievement of freedom.
176 Progressives hope that if conditions are equalized, overall freedom will be in-
creased. Proving this theory requires that freedom be measured in some manner. Some
scholars have attempted to create a mathematical index of the measure of freedom in
particular societies. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 86-92,269-73 (describing these efforts).
But see Dworkin, supra note 2, at 189 (arguing that liberty is not quantifiable); Onora
O'Neill, The Most Extensive Liberty, 80 Nutt:. ARISAIMIAAN Soc'y 45,47-52 (1980) (same).
170 See STEINER, supra note 2, at 52 (defending what he calls "the law of the conservation
of liberty," i.e., that the total share of freedom in society can never be increased or de-
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be expanded by adjusting (or equalizing) societal conditions to pro-
mote greater freedom of choice among individuals. 177 Progressives
generally acknowledge the need for a system of laws to redistribute
social and economic constraints—not only to achieve the necessary
equalization of conditions, btu also for paternalistic purposes. Pro-
moting human choice means not only creating opportunities for the
average individual, but also closing off certain options—those that are
deemed destructive of human freedom in the long run. Green sug-
gested that the goal of progressive legislation should be to "maintain
the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is
impossible.""8 Following Mill, the goal of human freedom is seen as
the refinement of our choice-making capacities. Unlike Mill, however,
this refinement requires the active intervention of authorities to pro-
mote the appropriate external social conditions within which choices
can he made. Green and other progressives argue that individual
choices may be limited when they are, in the long run, destructive of
the individual's own freedom or well-being. The extreme example is
that of the individual who enters a contract for self-enslavement." 9
From this paradigm instance, however, progressives argue that many
choices destructive to the individual's health or well-being may he lim-
ited on paternalistic grounds.m
creased). But arc Chandran Kukathas, Liberty, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 108, at 534, 539 (criticizing Steiner's views).
Robert Hale, one of the most profound thinkers of the legal realist school, pointed
out that a transfer of power from the owners of capital to the workers, or to government,
"neither add [5] to nor subtract [s] from the constraint which is exercised." Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State (1923), reprinted in Am ERICAN LE-
GAL REALism 101, 108 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). He nevertheless defended
these changes as a means of democratizing power.
177 See Green, supra note 37, at 21-22 ("When we measure the progress of a society by
in growth in freedom, we measure it by the increasing development and exercise on the
whole of those powers of contributing to social good with which we believe the members
of the society to be endowed; in short, by the greater power on the part of the citizens as a
body to make the most and best of themselves.").
178 Id. at 25.
179 See MILL, supra note 111, at 101 (arguing that contracts involving substantial inden-
tured servitude should be voided on grounds that they eliminate the individual's future
options and choices).
18L) See, c.g.,Jori FEINBERG, HARM 'ID SELF 24-25 (1986) (discussing the justifications for
and against paternalism); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 VALE
U. 763, 780-86 (1983) (defending paternalistic [Units in contract law by distinguishing
between disappointment and regret, with only the latter justifying paternalism). If paternal-
istic intervention is justified on grounds that it increases the individual's future liberty, there
appears no stopping point to interference. Can we prevent the individual from smoking
because he or she will then be free to make more choices during the increased life expec-
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The progressive's mistrust of the individual's capacity to define
his or her own purposes, along with the resulting defense of a pater-
nalistic conception of the stale, arc reinforced by the modern concep-
tion of individual personality as a social construct. 181 As such, our
choices are viewed characteristically as the products of social forces,
rather than as an exercise of genuine individual autonomy. in the ex-
treme versions of this view, no choices are truly authentic, and gov-
ernment intervention is justified not, only to prevent the individual
from making bad choices, 182 but, more radically, to "construct" indi-
viduals to make better choices and thereby to be better citizens. 183
We have come now to what is the single deepest source of tension
in modern liberal theory. The strong progressive's penchant for de-
fending a paternalistic conception of the state, and for speaking in
terms of "false consciousness," "adaptive preferences,' and the like, 184
tnncy he can now expect to enjoy? Does the principle require outright compulsion—for
example, forcing someone to exercise in' order to extend their own life? See. Gerald
Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971), 1E-
printed in I'll ELosoniv or LAW 230, 231 ( Joel Feinberg & HVIIL111 Gross eds., 1980).
181 See PHILIP CUSIIMAN, CONSTRUCTING 'ME SELF, CONSTRUCTING AMERICA 26-33
(1995) (arguing that different social conditions generate different forms of neurosis and
psychosis, and that "mental illness" is not a static concept across cultures); Ian Hacking,
Making Up People, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM 222, 222-36 (Thomas C. Heller et
al. eds., 1986) (arguing that our sense of self is constituted by our social labeling of behav-
ior); J.B. Schneewind. The Use of Autonomy in Ethical Theory, in REcoNsTiturriNG
MAW, supra, at 64, 64-75 (deconstructing the idea of individual autonomy).
182 Sec Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Oil. 1.. Rt:v. 1129,
1173 (1986) (defending paternalism on these grounds, but acknowledging that this view of
the individual 'raises the spectre of tyranny").
183 Modern progressives have merged these themes with classical republican ideas. Mi-
chael Sande] sees the purpose of republican government as the making of individual citi-
zens who are capable of self-government, as the republican conceives it. MictiAri, J. SAN-
DEL. LIBERALISM AND 'HIE LIMITS or JUSTICE 175-83 (1982). The search for a "public
philosophy" thus becomes the quest to determine both principles of government and
models for human individuality. SANDEL, Mph? note 10, at 24. But see Steven G. Gey, The
Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 894-97 (1993) (criticizing
republican theory for its potentially individual-annihilating conception of politics).
184 Modern feminists have adopted Marx's idea of "false consciousness." See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 103-04 (1989).
The proletarian defense of the right to property is paralleled by women's defense of a
male-dominated social structure. Similarly, social scientists and philosophers have used the
term '`adaptive preferences" to describe the tendency of individuals to discount the attrac-
tiveness of things they have little hope of achieving while overvaluing those things that
they have, but which objectively may not be of much value. SeeJoN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
SIRENS 150-53, 157-58 (1979). Cass Snnsteiu has employed this terminology exten-
sively in his writings. Sec Sunstein, sup? note 182, at 1146-51 (describing a number of spe-
cies of adaptive preferences).
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stems from skepticism regarding the status not only of individual
choices, but of the reality or authenticity of the "self that lies behind
these choices.I 85 Because liberalism has always been justified in terms
of the rights of individuals to make basic choices about their own
lives, and because this right to make choices for ourselves is predi-
cated upon our capacity for free choice,I 88 left unchecked, the pro-
gressive's skepticism of individual choice is subversive of liberalism
taut corta. 187 A "liberalism" without individual choice is not liberalism
in any sense of the idea.
In seeking a middle way between the Scylla of radical subjective
individualism (for example, that no one may second guess the life
choices of the drunkard or the prostitute) and the Charybdis of
authoritarianism, progressives have had to reconcile freedom with
paternalism, personal autonomy with the belief that personalities are
socially constructed. Some have stated frankly that the "autonomy" of
decisions must be judged by their ethical consequences—that if the
choice is -bad" in the eye of the beholder, it is suspect.I 88 This, of
course, is no theory of autonomy at all. It concedes a realm of "free
choice" as long as the individual is making the "right" choices. This
position is indistinguishable from authoritarianism.
Another approach follows the old republican themes of domina-
tion and dependence, concluding that only some individual choices
are suspect: those that resulted from personal dependence and, what
These notions subvert conceptions of individual choice predicated upon the auton-
omy of the chooser.
188 Two strains of liberal thought, one originating with Kant and the other with the
romantic tradition, justify the right of the individual to make choices on the autonomy or
authenticity, respectively, of these choices as manifestations of the "real" self. &a John Law-
rence Hill, Mill, Freud, and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of Liberty,
26 SEroN HAIL L. Ri.v. 92 passim (1995) (comparing three conceptions of human person-
ality and evaluating their implications for the liberal ethic of choice); see also John Law-
rence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and Hu-
manism, 80 MARQ. L. Rev. 289 (1997) [hereinafter Ha Law and the Self] (discussing the
philosophical and psychological traditions of the self and its implications for rights, com-
modifi cation, and equality).
186
 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a "right" was not thought of as
simply a kind of "claim" on others, as we think of it today, but instead as an active moral
quality of the person. One had a claim on others to forebear from certain kinds of injurious
acts, or to provide assistance, in virtue of this moral quality, which was itself linked to a
person's capacity for free will. This notion of a right was central to Grotius's ideal of rights,
and influenced much of the rationalist political tradition of that era.
187 Sec Hill, Law and the Self, supra note 185, at 373-90 (arguing that liberalism without
a coherent conception of a choosing self is unthinkable).
BA See Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1158-66; see also MACKINNON, supra note 184, at
106-25 (suggesting that the idea of women's "consent" is a male constructed fiction).
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amounts to the same thing for many progressives, political subordina-
tion."9 Because "dominion over things is also imperium over our fellow
human beings,""° choices that are made under conditions of social or
economic subjugation are inherently suspect."' Thus, the progressive
argues, personal subordination is defused and autonomy restored by
ensuring some measure of material equality." 2 In sum, equality, or a
system of positive entitlements that ensures a measure of equality, is
necessary to self-realization or personal autonomy. Carl Becker
summed up this central political impulse of progressivism:
The essential problem of liberal democracy, therefore, is to
preserve that measure of freedom of thought and of political
action without which democratic government cannot exist,
and at the same tune to bring about, by the social regulation
of economic enterprise, that measure of equality of posses-
sions and of opportunity without which it is no more than an
empty form," 3
The concern for equality unites all of the subsidiary themes of
progressivism. Minimally, progressives hold that freedom requires a
strong measure of material equality. 1 g4 Sonic go further and actually
199 For progressives, feminists, and others influenced by civic republican ideals, there is
an intimate connection between personal subordination and political disenfranchisement—
the personal is political. So MAcKt0000, supra note 184, at 126-54 (analyzing sexuality under
conditions of subordination).
19° Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovorignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), reprinted in
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 176, at 109, 113.
191 For example, feminists have sought to limit woolen's choices to enter into surrogate
contracts, arguing that reproductive choices reflect women's self-image, which itself is
formed wider conditions of patriarchy and dominance. In sum, they argue that women
choose what they are told to choose because of a lifelong process by which certain opportuni-
ties are opened and others denied, reinforcing women's validation of personal identity
through reproduction and child raising. Sec NANCY CHODORUW, THE REPRODUCMON
MOTHERING passim (1978); MARThA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25-32, 72, 81-82
(1990) (arguing that surrogate contracts should be voidable for these reasons).
192 In this respect, the goals of the egalitarian and of the positive libertarian are the
same. The equalization of bargaining power between employer and employee removes
constraints to effective choice. Michael Sandel uses the term •'voluntarism" to describe the
philosophy of the early progressives that the proper goal of a liberal society is to create
conditions for effective choice. SeeSANDEL, supra note 10, at 189-97.
BEcitrit, supra note 9, at 112.
194 Hobhouse proclaimed that "liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and
squalid result." HOISHOUSE, supra note 153, at 48. More recently, John Rawls argued that
there is an important distinction between freedom and the value of freedom—freedom
without equality of resources and opportunity simply does not have much value. See RAwt,s,
supra note 37, at 204.
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equate freedom with equality. Ronald Dworkin typifies this more ex-
treme tendency: "'What does it mean for the government to treat its
citizens as equals? That is, I think, the same question as the question
of what it means for the government to treat all its citizens as free
." 195 The "liberal," as Dworkin defines him, is someone who holds
that government must treat each citizen with "equal concern and re-
spect." 196
 Although an ambiguous aspiration on its face, it ultimately
justifies traditional liberal mainstays such as freedom of expression
and religion, 07
 and also more progressive ideals, including aggressive
redistribution of wealth, 198
 affirmative action , 1 99 and a proscription on
most forms of morals legislation. 20 Because liberty is defined in refer-
ence to oppression, and oppression is a function of social constraints,
liberty is necessarily related to social inequality. Thus, John Dewey
wrote that:
The direct impact of liberty always has to do with some class
or group that is suffering in a special way from some form of
constraint exercised by the distribution of powers that exists
in contemporary society. Should a classless society ever come
into being the formal concept of liberty would lose its
significance, because the fact for which it stands would have
become an integral part of the established relations of hu-
man beings to one another. 2411
195 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 191.
198 Id. at 198.
197 See id. at 335-72.
198 See id. at 192-96 (arguing that liberals will prefer "redistributive capitalism or lim-
ited socialism"). John Dewey wrote; The only form of enduring social organization that is
now possible is one in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled
and used in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the indi-
viduals that constitute society." DEWEY, supra note 160, at 54.
199 Ronald Dworkin, Bakke's Case: Arc Quotas Unfair?, in N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 10,
1977, reprinted in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 293,293-315 (justifying racial
quotas in the name of equality, and making moral distinctions between racial discrimina-
tion and benign racial classifications).
200 See id. at 193-94.
"I DEWEY, supra note 160, at 48 ("[L]iberty is always relative to forces that at a given
tune and place are increasingly felt to be oppressive. Liberty in the concrete signifies re-
lease from the impact of particular oppressive forces; emancipation from something once
taken as a normal part of human life but now experienced as bondage.").
Progressive commentator Robin West echoed this theme. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRES.
SIVE CONS'ITFUTIONALISAI 135 (1994) (noting that the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause supports the idea that freedom should be understood as lib-
erationist," rather than libertarian," including the liberation from hunger, from slavery,
from poverty, from sexual abuse, from patriarchy, and from racism itself. 'Liberty,' on this
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Although we cannot. hope to critique fully the progressive theory
of freedom here, one overarching concern is noteworthy. The prob-
lem can be framed in a number of ways—for example, that the quest
for equality may eclipse liberty fully, that the emphasis upon the
state's role in preventing private forms of dependence threatens to
consume privacy and family autonomy, that little remains of the area
of negative freedom of the individual. Nevertheless, these all boil
down to a fundamental question: Is there any sphere of individual
choice that lies beyond the reach, of the state or society? At best, pro-
gressives offer an "organic" conception of individuality that views each
of us as an interdependent part of a greater whole. But at worst, they
dismiss as "fictional" the essential aspects of the core person central to
earlier forms of liberal thought.
What remains, in progressive thought, of the person? Given their
post-structuralist conception of personality, progressives often dismiss
such concepts as individual responsibility, personal merit, and active
individual self-ownership. 202 Perhaps the most striking example of this
attitude is the suggestion by some progressives that individuals have
no right to reap the benefits of their own natural talents and virtues,
Ronald Dworkin states that. t is obviously obnoxious to the liberal
conception, for example, that someone should have more of what the
community as a whole has to distribute because lie or his father had
superior skill or hick." 203 He concludes that "those who have less tal-
ent, as the market judges talent, have a right to some form of redistri-
bution in the name ofjustice. "204
view, requires liberty from bondage, whether that bondage be the result of state oppres-
sion, state meddling or private action.").
292 By "active individual self-ownership," I mean a view that each individual has power
over his own life and circumstances, and can remake himself independently of prevailing
social images. lb be fair, many progressives value the image of the creative self—John
Dewey wrote that he thinks we need more "rugged individualists," not fewer. Nevertheless,
the progressive is dubious of the power of the individual over his own world, or even his
own character. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83
GEo. L.J. 1711, 1721 (1995) (suggesting that "bnierit is what the victors impose"); Richard
Delgado, "Rotten Social Backgiva ad': Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Envi-
mnmentai Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEtz. 9. 9-90 (1985) (arguing against traditional concep-
tions of responsibility and for a criminal law defense for victims of social inequality).
2O3 Dworkin, supra note 2. at 195.
204 Id. at 199. At the inception of the progressive era, T.H. Green wrote that "we rightly
refuse to recognise the highest development on the part of an exceptional individual or
exceptional class, as an advance toward the true freedom of man, if it is founded on a re-
fusal of the same opportunity to other men." Green, supra note 37, at 22. Thus, what began
as a call to tear down barriers to equal opportunity has become a demand for the redistri-
bution of the differences that distinguish us as individuals.
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Needless to say, one cannot imagine a more anti-Lockean senti-
ment. But this is not simply a call for economic redistribution. Rather,
the vision of such extreme progressives stands as a rebuke to tradi-
tional notions of individual self-ownership. After all, if even such per-
sonal capacities as talents, virtues, and dispositions are not immune
from the process of social expropriation, is there any aspect of the
individual that remains sacrosanct, thus placed beyond the reach of
the social?
B. Progressive Constitutionalism
The progressive period of modern constitutional law is usually
dated from 1937, a year significant for several reasons. First, in 1937
President Roosevelt attempted to "pack" the U.S. Supreme Court with
an additional six Justices (for a total of fifteen), who would presuma-
bly uphold the New Deal legislation. The plan was rejected by the
Senate, but not before Justice Owen Roberts's famous "switch in time
that saved nine."205 Roberts's "switch" took place in West Coast Hotel Co.
v, Parrish, important in its own right for rejecting a LochneFstyle due
process attack on a minimum wage law.206 Parrish thus signaled the
end of the Lothner era.2°7 The same year, the Court also decided NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., upholding extensive federal legislation
that granted workers the right to organize a union and established a
board to oversee labor negotiations. 208 The case is significant not sim-
ply for the substance of the law it upheld, but because it accepted a
broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would usher in an
era of federal oversight and control of the economy. 209 These deci-
205 Roberts, who in his previous seven years on the Court usually had voted with the
Lochner conservatives to defeat a number of progressive federal programs, sometimes by a
five to four margin, switched sides in the middle of the Court-packing controversy. BARRY
Cusmu RE111INKING IDE NEW DEAL COURT 45-46 (1998). Sec generally William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"Plan, 1966 Sue. Cr. REV.
347.
2°6 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). The law upheld was in-
distinguishable from one the Court struck down a year earlier by a five-to-four majority
that included Roberts. See id. at 386-87; Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587, 603-07 (1936).
207
 Parrish explicitly overruled Adkins o. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Parrish,
300 U.S. at 400; see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) ("The
course of decisions in this Court since [Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas) have
completely sapped those cases of their authority.").
2°8 301 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1937).
2°9 See id.; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONS'EITUTION AND '111E NEW DEAL 225-33 (2000)
(describing the stunning ramifications of this expansion of the commerce power).
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sions reflected the progressives' redistributive conception of liberty,
heralding Roosevelt's era of "new freedom," by ensuring that the fed-
eral government would have a central role in restructuring economic
relations within society.
The consequences of the switch in judicial philosophies were
profound. Perhaps the single most important implication of the New
Deal philosophy was that to guarantee personal freedom, all eco-
nomic activity, no matter how insubstantial or "personal," had to come
within the control of federal power. The case that most stands out in
this respect is Wickard v. Filburn, decided by the Court in 1942. 210
Breathtaking in its implications, WickaM is to economic legislation
what Mugler v. Kansas, decided by the Court in 1887, is to morals legis-
lation—it represents the antithesis of any conception of "economic
privacy."211 Wickard did not involve the regulation of a large industry,
nor even an attempt to manage the local effects of a small business. 212
Rather, it upheld a fine imposed against a farmer under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act for the production of wheat for use at home that
exceeded the federally mandated production limits. 213 The Wickard
Court concluded that any productive activity, even within the home,
had economic consequences to the economy as a whole if the aggre-
gate effects of such activities were considered across a similar class of
actors. 2 t 4 Virtually any private activity, economic or otherwise, is
reachable following similar reasoning so as to justify government
regulation . 215 These developments appeared to confirm the libertar-
20 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2" SCC Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887).
212 See 317 U.S. at 114-16. In earlier cases, the Court had held that Congress could not
regulate the production of coal or the sale of poultry. Carter V. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 297, 300-04 (1936) (declaring mining precedes commerce, and thus is not "com-
merce" within the meaning of the Commerce Clause); Schechter Poultry Corp. V. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 543-50 (1935) (holding the intrastate purchase and resale of poultry
to neighboring businesses cannot be regulated under the commerce power). In contrast,
the law upheld in Wickard even regulated "Ultra-household" activities. See 317 U.S. at 128.
213 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-17. The implications are particularly far reaching given
that it was the federal government, and not simply a state, whose reach extended into the
household of the farmer who sought to grow more wheat to make bread. Of course, from a
libertarian standpoint, any government interference, state or federal, would be anathema. .
214 See id. at 127-29.
21s
	
is because virtually every private activity can be found to have some economic
effects. Indeed, this reasoning in Wickant threatens the distinction between economic and
personal liberties, a central tenet of progressive thought. Imagine the aggregate effects of
decisions to utilize contraception, or to have abortions. Assuming that the birth rate would
have an effect on interstate commerce, these 'private" choices of individuals could be ag-
gregated to justify government regulation.
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ian warning that social and political freedom is not compatible with a
significant degree of social and economic planning. 216
The demise of Locomen style due process rights signaled a general
shift in judicial attitudes away from intervention in favor of recogni-
tion of legislative supremacy. As a result, judges faced the problem of
reconciling this deference with the traditional American commitment
to a countermajoritarian conception of rights: what was left of the
idea that rights exist to serve as checks upon, and limits to, the demo-
cratic process? A constitutional philosophy emerged to respond to
this question, with its basic tenets announced in 1938, in a famous
footnote in United States v. Carotene Products Co.2" The Carotene Products
footnote offered an intuitively simple solution, suggesting that demo-
cratic outcomes could be limited only for the sake of democracy it-
self. 218 Countermajoritarian rights serve to ensure that political out-
comes are genuine expressions of the democratic process, reflecting
all classes and interests. Rights do not limit, but rather perfect, the
political process.
The two constitutional values that serve most to reinforce democ-
racy, each beloved by progressives in their own right as measures of
positive freedom, are access to the political process and equality. 219
Courts should intervene to protect these values, in order to protect
democracy itself. Thus, the subsequent course for the 1950s and 1960s
was set; in these decades, Court decisions would expand the fran-
ehise,220
 eliminate discrimination against discrete and insular minori-
ties in the political process221 and in society generally,222 and give far
218 See generally 1-ImaK , supra note 90.
217
 304 U.S. 144, 152 u.4 (1938).
218 See id. Seidman argues that the Carotene Products footnote emerged from the at-
tempt to balance, on one hand, "value skepticism" and legislative supremacy" and, on the
other, judicial intervention and equality. Louis Michael Seidman, Pub/ic Principk and Private
Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE
1006, 1034 (1987); see also SANDEL, supra note 10, at 47-50 (discussing the footnote).
218
 The footnote provides, in part, that legislation which restricts those political proc-
esses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation"
should be subject to more exacting judicial scrutiny." Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 152
n.4. See ELY, supra note 59, at 75-104 (constructing a general "process-based" conception
of constitutional rights along the lines set forth in the footnote).
220 See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of voting rights).
221 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641.658 (1966) (upholding provision in
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohibits "English only" literacy tests); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding other provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965).
222 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding application
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to neighborhood restaurant); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
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greater protection to those substantive rights required as a condition
of democracy—particularly, freedom of speech. 223
This emphasis upon political access and social equality dovetailed
with another central tenet of progressive thought: the inter-relationship
between social equality and political power. Where classical liberals de-
fended a strict separation of the public and the private, and held that
government should remain neutral as among private interests, progres-
sives argued forcefully that political power both shapes and reflects so-
cial relations and conditions. 224 Guaranteeing wider political access
thus reinforces social equality, as those groups that traditionally had
been disenfranchised could use the law to better their social condi-
tions. Furthermore, a guarantee of greater social equality would give
the previously disenfranchised the economic and social capital to exert
greater political influence.
The softening of the earlier line between the social and the politi-
cal is central to the underlying rationale of Brown. v. Boon! of Education,
decided by the Court in 1954, often considered the most important
decision of the twentieth century. 22' In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, which
Brown overruled, the Court upheld a state regulation that required
whites and blacks to sit in separate railroad cars. 226 The Plessy Court as-
serted that "the underlying fallac[ies] of the plaintiff's argument [con-
sist] in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority," and in the assump-
tion that "social prejudices may be overcome by legislation."227 The
Court thus reasoned that there was no political inequality, because
whites were as limited as blacks in that neither could sit in the others'
cabin. Moreover, any social inequality was simply the result of personal
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to mo-
tel located near interstate highway); see also Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (proclaiming section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Con-
gress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment").
223 See ELY, supra note 59, at 105-34 (applying his "representation reinforcing theory"
to the constitutional protection of free speech).
224 There was a significant overlap between progressive and legal realist theory in this
respect. Whereas progressives attacked the social injustice inherent in the ways that social
status conditions political power, realists attacked the legal formalism that supported the
public-private distinction. See Hale, supra note 176, at 101-08; Cohen, supra note 190, at
112-14.
225 See 347 U.S. 483, 490-95 (1954).
225 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. 552 (1896). overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
227 Id. at 551. The Court concluded that "[ih f one race be inferior to the other socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane." Id. at 552.
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attitudes, perhaps on the part of blacks themselves. 228 The Court rea-
soned that the Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended
to ... enforce social, as distinguished from political equality." 229
It was exactly these premises that Brown rejected. The Brown
Court noted findings by one of the lower courts that "'[slegregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental ef-
fect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law .... A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of
a child to learn.'"230
 Here we see all of the essential elements of the
progressive paradigm: law structures social attitudes and these atti-
tudes are internalized by the individual, resulting, in this case, in a
liberty-limiting incapacity. Of course, these effects can be restructured
by reshaping the law itself—in a way that promotes social equality.
Overall, however, progressive attempts to connect the political
with the social in order to create a broader range of negative and
positive individual rights have met with limited success. On one hand,
the "state action doctrine," which embodies the negative liberal prin-
ciple that the Constitution does not reach private activity,23 i has been
softened in a number of ways over the past century; particularly on
issues of equality. 232 As a result, courts are able to protect individual
rights from interference in areas once thought to be private and be-
yond the reach of the Constitution. 233 On the other hand, the Court
has rejected progressive attempts to constitutionalize certain social
228 See id. at 551 (asserting any "badge of inferiority ... is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it").
229 Id. at 544.
23° Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
231 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("[Clivil rights, such as are guaran-
teed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts
of individuals, unsupported by State authority ...."). The only provision of the Constitu-
tion that reaches private activity directly is the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 34
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus, only where the state supports or encourages the rights-
violating conduct of private individuals, or acts directly to violate a right, does the Consti-
tution apply.
232 For example, the Court has held that, where private property serves a public function,
or where the state directly or indirectly subsidizes a private facility, the owners of the property
are subject to constitutional constraints on behavior that violates the rights of others. See, e.g.,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding owners of private
restaurant within public parking garage subject to Equal Protection Clause); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (declaring owners of a "company town" cannot constitution-
ally deny visitors their free speech rights).
233 But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03
(1989) (observing failure to intervene by state social services personnel does not consti-
tute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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and economic interests by connecting them to political rights. One of
the most intriguing and audacious examples of such an attempted
expansion of rights can be seen in Justice Thurgood Marshall's dis-
senting opinion, in 1973, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.234 Rodriguez involved a challenge to a state financing scheme
for primary and secondary schools, in which educational funding for
particular districts was determined in part by the amount of property
taxes collected in that district,. The plan had the obvious effect of al-
locating more money per student to schools in wealthier districts. 235
Challengers of the scheme, who were ultimately unsuccessful, argued
that a fundamental interest in education warranted the equal distri-
bution of funds across districts. In dissent, Justice Marshall attacked
the formalistic distinction between "fundamental interests," protected
tinder the strict scrutiny standard, and other rights afforded less pro-
tection,236 arguing that certain social and economic goods are essen-
tial to good citizenship and to the effective exercise of political rights.
Rather than protect only those rights specifically enumerated in the
Constitution:
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to
which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on in-
terests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus be-
tween the specific constitutional guarantee and the noncon-
stitutional interest draws closer, the non constitutional interest
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scru-
tiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory
basis most be adjusted accordingly.237
Justice Marshall's "nexus" approach would have drawn a wide variety
of social and economic goods—food, shelter, education, health care—
into the "constitutional net," by connecting them to political values
protected as constitutional rights. 238
2" 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, j., dissenting).
233 See id. at 11-13.
2s6 In essence, Marshall was attacking the Court's reliance on what he considered to be
a formalistic distinction between rights and non-rights. See id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing "the Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis").
237 Id. at 102-03 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
238 The majority pointed out the untenability of such expansion of constitutional pro-
tection as a kind of mductio ad absurdum of the appellees and Marshall's argument. See id. at
37 ("[Tjhe logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for
instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the
basics of food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that
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Although the Court recognized the mutual inter-penetration of
social and political conditions and thus extended the guarantee of
equality in some contexts, it was never a wholeheartedly "progressive"
Court, even during its most "liberal" period in the late 1960s. Most
importantly, it rejected progressive attempts to constitutionalize a
spate of positive welfare rights. After some initial concessions in the
late 1960s—striking down state residency requirements for receipt of
welfare benefits239 and non-emergency medical benefits at public hos-
pitals, 24° and striking down a law that cut off welfare payments to co-
habitating mothers24 t—in 1970 the Court decided that it would not
use any form of heightened scrutiny to evaluate the adequacy of wel-
fare payments. 242 These cases indicate that, although a state must dis-
tribute welfare benefits in an even-handed manner if it adopts a
benefits program, there is no fundamental right to welfare itself. 243 In
sum, these developments signal a commitment to equality, rather than
to positive entitlements as such.
Roughly a decade later, as if to fortify the traditional line between
negative and positive rights, the Court rejected challenges to state and
federal Medicaid programs that limited payments for abortion serv-
ices. In 1980, in Harris v. McRae, the Court clarified that a negative
right to be free from government interference in the abortion deci-
sion does not accord a woman "a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected
the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the
political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First
Amendment.").
Commentators have defended such a broad conception of welfare rights by linking them
to the political process. See Michelman, supra note 32, at 677 (arguing that effective participa-
tion in politics requires "health and vigor, presentable attire, 1and1 shelter not only from the
elements but from the physical and psychological onslaught of social debilitation").
239 Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that one-year residency re-
quirement infringed upon "fundamental right of interstate movement").
24°
 Merril Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1974).
241 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
242 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
243
 Although "the Court in Dandridge did not directly address the claim that welfare is a
'fundamental' interest" that would require strict scrutiny review, the Court implicitly found
that it was not such an interest by reviewing the challenged statute under the less-stringent
"rational basis" test. GEOFFREY R. Slum: rr AL., CONSITrUTIONAL LAW 887 (2d ed. 1991).
Subsequently, the Court has generally deferred to state legislatures on a range of issues
involving adequacy of payment and qualifications for receipt of welfare benefits. See, e.g.,
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (upholding program authorizing percent-
age-based reduction of welfare payments).
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choices."244 The Harris Court accepted a broader conception of con-
straint that encompasses social and economic conditions, consistent
with more moderate forms of liberalism, but rejected the contention
that individuals have a positive right to assistance in overcoming these
conditions. Justice Potter Stewart stated that "although government.
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her free-
dom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indi-
gency falls in the latter category."245
By the 1980s, this line of reasoning became a hallmark of the
Court's jurisprudence, reflecting its self-perception as a centrist. lib-
eral institution.
SELF-INDIVIDUATING LIBERALISM
A. The Self in Liberal Thought
The most "individualistic" strand of modern liberal thought is
described here as "self-individuating liberalism"—individualistic in the
sense that it directly links freedom to the discovery, development, and
expression of each individual's unique self. If the ultimate aspiration
of modern political theory since the Enlightenment is the progressive
liberation of the individual from all manners of social oppression to
allow the full expression of individual human potential, then the most
recent phase of American liberalism clearly reflects this heady ideal.
Self-individuating liberalism implies that there is a core individ-
ual self that exists prior to, and independently of, social influences,
and that must be discovered, developed, and expressed. This concep-
tion of the self is distinct from the hazier notions that characterized
classical liberal thought. 21° The classical liberal conception of the
244 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S 464.469 (1977) ("The Con-
stitution imposes no obligation on the states to pay the pregnancy-related medical ex-
penses of indigent women ....").
245 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
248 The "self" of classical liberal thought takes two forms. The more philosophical idea,
traceable to Kant, is an entirely abstract, formless conception of the self. Kant's core non-
menal self is the abstract choosing subject, prior to, and independent of, all empirical
characteristics. For Kant, what is essential to our self-identity. the abstract rational will, is
not what makes each of us unique and particular as individuals. Thus, for Kant, the core
aspects of our identity are common to all rational beings. See generally ImrstnNuct. KANT.
CrtruquE or PURE REASON (F. Max Muller trans., The MacMillan Co. 2d ed. 1934) (1781).
Comtnunitarians have criticized this view because it detaches self-identity from communal
attachments and beliefs that, according to communitarians, are central to personal iden-
tity. See SANDEI., SUP? note 183, at 175 (critiquing Rawls's idea of identity, which itself fol-
lows this Randall tradition).
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self—as an entity that exists essentially intact prior to social
influences—was necessary in social contract theory to legitimize the
individual's original consent to enter the social compact, and was es-
sential to justify free market liberalism. 247 The classical liberal self ex-
isted as the secular expression of the immortal soul; it was unique to
the person, and associated in theological and political thought with
the human capacities of reason and free will. 248 Classical liberals
viewed the self as pre-social, but not as contra-social, as the self would
become in self-individuating liberalism. For Kant, for example, al-
though man might be antisocial by disposition, he was nevertheless
drawn to society by the quest not just for material security but for so-
cial distinction—ultimately, this quest led to self-improvement. 249 For
the classical liberal, social influences served to refine the self, whereas
for later defenders of self-individuating liberalism, these same
influences were potentially self-annihilating.
In its conception of individual selfhood, self-individuating liberal-
ism is still further removed from progressive thought, which holds
that our identities are formed largely, if not wholly, by social forces.
The second conception of the self derives from religious tradition, and is secularized
in Locke, Burke, and the early liberal tradition. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES 01" Hl SELF
49 (1989); Hill, Law and the Self supra note 185, at 294-329 (outlining the legal conception
of the core self and its development throughout intellectual history).
247
 In liberal theory, the individual possesses an identity and moral worth as an individ-
ual that exist independent of his or her relationship with, and his or her instrumental
value to, society generally. In classical liberal theory, the individual is morally and episte-
mologically prior to his or her social relationships. The existence of this individual is nec-
essary in social compact theories, for the already-formed individual enters society; this self
is necessary to free-market economic conceptions as well. For example, intervention in the
market to shape preferences is rejected because an individual's choices are one's own.
Preference shaping is regarded as a form of psychological violence analogous to brain-
washing by liberals who hold some conception of the core self.
246 See Hill, Law and the Self, supra note 185, at 322-29 (discussing rationality and will as
attributes of the self); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self,
105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 959, 968-69 (1992).
249 Kant referred to this as the "unsocial sociability of men." Immanuel Kant, Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan At tylOSC, RERLINISCH MONNISSCHRurr, Nov. 11, 1784, at
385, reprinted in Pouncm. Witrrotos 41, 44 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed., 1991). He
writes that
[m]an has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more like
a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. But he also has a
great tendency to live as an individual, to isolate himself, since he also encoun-
ters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in
accordance with his own ideas.
Id. Thus, the drive for power and status drives him to live with others "whom he cannot
bear, yet cannot bear to leave." M
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For those who defend some conception of a unique core self, the
progressive's view that the self is simply a product of the social sphere
represents the deepest kind of error: confusing the inner world of the
individual with the external influences that seek to overwhelm it.
Modern liberalism reflects a basic ambivalence between these two op-
posed conceptions of freedom and personal identity. Modern liberals
often are torn between the quest for an authentic self and the pro-
gressive's admonition that the self is like an onion—we may peel away
and analyze the layers of social influence, one by one, but there is
nothing at the center. 254
A great deal is at stake here for liberal political theory. If there is
something like an authentic self, then we can view freedom as time ca-
pacity of the self to reflect and express its deepest impulses. Liberty in
its internal sense is then equivalent to the capacity of each individual
to discover and develop what he is most. deeply and authentically.
Freedom in the external, social, and political sense is maximized by
the creation of social conditions that permit. each individual to reflect,
develop, and express this core individuality. 251 Conversely, if there is no
core self representing an internal Archimedean point, no frame of rep=
25° This ambivalence is reflected particularly in feminist thought. Defending authentic-
by as the only conceivable basis for freedom, Ruth Colker argues as follows:
I believe that we have an authentic self because assuming that we do not have
an authentic self makes no sense to me. For example, through our feminist
work, we try to peel away social influences that limit our authenticity or free-
dom. If we are successful in our attempts to peel away those influences, what.
would he left? It only makes sense for me to assume that what would be left
would be our authentic selves.
Ruth Calker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity,
68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 220 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACK1NNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED (1987)).
Other feminists hold that personalities are socially constructed all the way to the core.
lAncKINNoN, supra note 184. at 40.
2S1 Writing in 1911, L.T. llobliouse summarized the spirit of the liberal tradition in
terms reminiscent of a faith that freedom and progress can be measured from a certain
Archimedean standpoint, which is the emergence of choices that conform with our deep-
est sense of self, our deepest needs:
The progress of society like that of the individual depends, then, ultimately
on choice.... [Society's progress] is natural only in this sense, that it is the
expression of deep-seated farces of human nature which come to their own
only by an infinitely slow and cumbersome process of mutual adjustment.
The heart of Liberalism is the understanding that progress is ... a matter of
... the liberation of living spiritual energy.
Iltnniousx, supra note 153, at 72-73. Further, Illiberalism is the belief that society can
safely be founded on this self-directing power of personality ...." Id. at 66.
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erence by which to measure the authenticity of individual choices, then
what. is there to distinguish authentic choice from "pre-programmed"
socially conditioned desires? Indeed, if personality is socially con-
structed, what principled objections remain to proposals for "shaping
preferences" or conditioning human choices—at least to the extent
that such conditioning is motivated by benevolent concerns?252
The self of this third strand of liberalism is the last bastion of in-
dividuality in modern political theory, It is all that stands in contem-
porary liberal theory between freedom, as it. has generally been un-
derstood since the seventeenth century, and the self-appropriating
tendencies of an increasingly centralized, rationalized, and equalized
sociopolitical system.
B. The Development of the Tradition
The evolution of our ideas of the self is a fascinating story, with
origins in Stoic and Christian thought, from which modern ideas of
rationality, free will, and responsibility for self took shape. 255 Beginning
in the eighteenth century, however, two oft-opposed strands of thought,
one originating in Kant and the other in Rousseau, began to develop
side by side, with both authors self-consciously drawing their political
theory from a certain conception of individuality. Whereas Kant's ideas
eventually led to the liberal association of freedom with personhood,
Rousseau's connected freedom and selfhood.2" The rationalist tradition
252 In the benevolent totalitarianism of Huxley's Brave New World, everyone is pro-
grammed to want what their role in society requires. Although the society described is not
overtly "coercive," and all are ultimately cared for by the social apparatus, we recoil at this
vision by virtue of our intuition that something deeper is encroached upon in such a
scheme. See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW \Voecn (1932). For a serious proposal
for a behaviorist utopia society, see generally B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN TWO (1948).
253 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 246 (providing the best recent treatment of the in-
tellectual history of our ideas of the self); Hill, Law and the Self supra note 185 (describing
philosophical foundations and legal consequences of a conception of the self).
214 See George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35,48 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998) (drawing the distinction between personhood, which is "impersonal,"
and selfhood, which is unique to the person). Personhood justifies prioritizing the right
over the good; it reflects a dignity interest of the person to be treated as a rational human
being, equal with all others. Selfhood, in contrast, is particular, giving each person his or
her unique self-identity, his or her unique attachments and commitments. Liberal theory
based on theories of personhood views personal autonomy as the highest individual value.
See RAwls, supra note 37, at 252-56,513-20. In contrast, theories based upon selfhood
view the capacity to reflect the self's unique attachments and preferences, rather than
those inculcated by social preferences, as the premier virtue of authenticity. See IsmAn
BERLIN, THE Rows OF ROMAN'ElCISM 21-45 (Henry Hardy ed., 1999) (describing the de-
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reflected in Kant's theories justified freedom by reference to our capac-
ity, as (potentially) autonomous beings, to make rational choices and to
carry them out. The internal aspect of freedom was found in the con-
cept of autonomy, and the external aspect in our right to individual
self-determination• 255 This noble conception of human personality has
deeply influenced the liberal tradition, but it has been criticized as well.
Detractors have portrayed this concept of the person as merely a de-
tached choicemaker, an empty consumer of commodities and experi-
ence, a ghost-like subject whose existence is entirely antecedent to any
empirical identity. 256
Rousseau's views, which influenced the romantic tradition of late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe, were largely a re-
sponse to Kant's conception of the person. 257 Whereas Kant's ideal of
autonomy emphasized the universal capacity for human reason and
the ascetic propensity of the rational will to resist or overcome non-
rational (emotive) motivations,258 romantics and other successor wadi-
velopment of these rival traditions); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OE ACTH ENTICEIN 55–
80 (1991).
255 See KANT. supra note 18, at 41; Kant, supra note 249, at 45 (arguing that the realiza-
tion of the "greatest freedom* requires "a continual antagonism among (society's) MC111-
hers, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom
in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others"); see also Immanuel Kant, On the
Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice', BERLINISCH
MONATSSCHRIVT, Sept, 1793, at 201, reprinted in Pot.rricAL WRITINGS, supra note 249, at 73,
73-87 (discussing the political implications of his moral theory).
256 Kant's idea of the core self, which he referred to as the "transcendental appercep-
tion of unity," is beyond any empirical description. It is formless and without quality. Psy-
chology may study the empirical "me," made up of my personality and characteristics, but
the self, the 1," lies behind this. It is the empty rational will. See generally KANT, supra note
246. But see SANDEI„ supra note 183, at 7-11,13; Margaret Jane Radii, Marifet-Inalienability,
100 HARV. l,. Rcv. 1849,1897-98 (1987) (discussing the Kamilla self and its "dark side,"
the tendency to conceive of all external things as conunodifiable). One author, comparing
Kant's thought with certain Eastern philosophical ideals. concluded that Kant "knew per-
fectly well the utter futility of any attempt to explore the nature of such a quality-less soul,"
and called the Pure Ego of Kant a "dim barren abstraction 11." KOOVOR T. BrilANAN, YOGA:
A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION 59 (1937).
2" See grnetal4Roussmu, supra note 162; JEAN-JANuts ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762); see also BERLIN, supra note 254, at 21-45 (discussing the
romantic movement and its opposition to the enlightenment); BERTRAND kussw., A His-
-um, or WESTERN Punsisomv 675-84 (1972) (describing development of romantic move-
ment).
256 For Kant, the exercise of autonomy required that reason, rather than emotions,
serve as the source of motivation for actions. See BERLIN, supra note 254, at 68 ("Kant hated
romanticism. lie detested every form of extravagance, fantasy ... exaggeration, mysticism,
vagueness, confusion. Nevertheless, he is justly regarded as one of the fathers of romanti-
cism—in which there is a certain irony.").
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dons viewed authenticity as the apex of personal liberty. 259 Authenticity
is the condition of acting from innate and uniquely personal sources
of motivation; it is to act from the "true self," rather than to follow ex-
ternal social influences. 260
 The quest for authenticity therefore re-
quires the rejection of social conformity in every form. This core idea
of a unique and authentic self through which the individual finds
freedom, self-expression, happiness, and even health, influenced
American transcendentalism of the mid-nineteenth century (particu-
larly the works of Emerson), 261 certain forms of existentialism,262 and
the "psychological humanism' of such twentieth-century social think-
ers as Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow.263 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, romanticism influenced the liberalism of John Stuart Mill. 264
The romantic tradition revolted most pointedly against the ra-
tionalism of Kant and against the modern age generally. In many re-
2" See RUSSELL, SUM note 257, at 677-78; TAYLOR, supra note 254, at 25-29.
28° Charles Taylor argues that the idea of authenticity derives from an older idea that
humans have an inherent knowledge of the difference between right and wrong, and are
not simply socialized into an understanding of moral categories. Authenticity "displaces the
moral accent" and emphasizes the idea that to be ourselves, we must listen to that "inner
voice." Authenticity implies that we are beings with "inner depths" that must be plumbed to
discover .
 who we are on the most fundamental level. The emphasis on authenticity repre-
sents a "massive subjective turn of modern culture." TANTOR, supra note 254, at 26.
261 See infra notes 268-284 and accompanying text (discussing Emerson and the paral-
lels with Mill's thought).
262 The existentialists also emphasized the importance of living authentically and ana-
lyzed the trays in which we seek to escape our authenticity in everyday behavior. See julIN-
PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NcrIIIINGNESS 47-70 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956) (discussing
"bad faith," i.e., the putting on of inauthentic patterns of self-expression).
262 The modern idea that psychological health requires that one be oneself rather than
attempt to imitate or to be "someone else," was central to the psychological humanism of
Abraham Maslow. Maslow defended a theory of self-actualization which held that individuals
could realize themselves fully by being true to their 'inner nature." See ABRAHAM H. MAstow,
TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 4 (2d ed. 1968) (proposing that as our inner nature 9s
permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy.... If this essential core of
the person is denied or suppressed, he gets sick sometimes in obvious ways, sometimes in
subtle ways, sometimes immediately, sometimes later."). Although true psychological health
requires that we be able to express our identities, these selves need to be protected. See id.
("This inner nature is not strong and overpowering and unmistakable .... It is weak and
delicate and subtle and easily overcome by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong attitudes to-
ward it.'); see also ERIK H. ERiasoN, DIMENSIONS OF A NEW IDENTITY 99-112 (1974) (examin-
ing the roots of the contemporary individual's "identity crisis"); Emil FROMM, ESCAPE FROM
FREEDOM 141-79 (1942) (examining Nazism and communism as collective efforts to escape
individual freedom by the individual's submerging himself in a group).
264 See infra notes 272-284 and accompanying text (discussing Mill's conception of lib-
erty).
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spects, romanticism was an antidote to the Enlightenment. 265 Roman-
ticism valued the emotional and discounted reason, emphasizing aes-
thetic over ethical concerns, experience over logic, spontaneity and
creative energy over system and order, the natural over the artificial
and the particular over the genera1. 266 In its various guises, romantic
thought rebelled against modern society and the stultifying confor-
mity it wrought. Left-wing romantics heralded the possibilities of radi-
cal self-creation, In contrast, conservative romantics, particularly in
Germany and England, defended tradition and culture from cos-
mopolitanism, valuing the communal virtues of the Volk over the uni-
versalist conceptions of human rights that follow from Kant's views. 207
Romantics on both the left and right regarded industrialization and
the conformity and bureaucratization it breeds with utter contempt,
but for slightly different reasons. Conservative romantics feared that
conditions of industrialization would disrupt organic cultural tradi-
tions and fracture communal ties. Left-wing romantics viewed these
same conditions as a threat to individuality and as the source of soul-
withering conformity. In this vein, Emerson proclaimed that 'lithe
centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the
soul,"268 and Mill lamented that. "society has now fairly got the better
of individuality. "269
Two core beliefs derived from this combined tradition influenced
the self-individuating strand of the liberal tradition: first, the absolute
uniqueness and inviolability of the self, along with the authority with
265 The Romantic movement was deeply anti-rationalist. Sec TAYLOR, supra note 246, at
393-418. Describing one early romantic, Berlin writes that "the whole of the Enlightenment
doctrine appeared to him to kill that which was living in human beings." BERLIN, supra note
254, at 43.
266 Bertrand Russell quipped that the romantic was "moved to tears by the sight of a
single destitute peasant family, but would be cold to well-thought-out schemes for amelio-
rating the lot of peasants as a class." RUSSELL, supra note 257, at 676,
267 The German social thinker Johann Gottfried Herder is most closely associated with
this right-wing romantic tradition. See BERLIN, supra note 251, at 57-67 (discussing Herder's
influence and ideas). This tradition influenced the conservative and communitarian Eng-
lish romantics of the nineteenth century, such as Carlyle, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. Some
have found in these ideas the seeds of modern populism—and even of fascism. Sec ISAIAH
BERLIN, The Romantic Revolution: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought, in The SENSE OF
REALITY 168,168-93 (Henry Hardy ed., 1996); Isaiah Berlin, The Apotheosis of the Romantic
Will: The Revolt Against the Myth of an Ideal World, 27 LI:TITRE ITALIANE 44 (1975), reprinted in
THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 207,207-37 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
266 RALPII WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES (1841), reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES, AND POEMS, at 148,159 (Robert D. Richardson, Jr. ed., Ban-
tam Books 1990).
269 MILL, SUM note 111, at 58.
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which it informs our choices; and, second, the deep tension that it
viewed to exist between the individual qua individual, and society.
Perhaps the two greatest philosophical defenses of this conception of
the individual and its implications for liberalism are Emerson's Self-
Reliance and chapter III of Mill's On Liberty, entitled, "Of Individuality,
as one of the Elements of Well-Being."27°
Near the beginning of Self-Reliance, Emerson defends the absolute
moral authority of our deepest impulses, in words that defined the
transcendentalist conception of individuality:
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for
you in your private heart is true for all men,—that is genius.
Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal
sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost, and
our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of
the Last judgmen L 271
In a similar vein, Mill argued that true freedom requires each indi-
vidual to interpret experience firsthand, for himself, noting the con-
clusions of tradition, but not being bound by them:
[l]t is the privilege and proper condition of a human being
... to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for
him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly
applicable to his own circumstances and character. The tra-
ditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent,
evidence of what their experience has taught them ... [but]
their experience may be too narrow, or they may have not
interpreted it rightly. 272
The cultivation of this individuality is our first duty 273 and, for
Mill in particular, the pursuit of individuality is the same as the quest
for self-developmen 074 M ill connects self-development to the
270 Est ERSON , supra note 268. at 148-71; MILL, supra note 111. at 53-71.
271 EMERSON, supra note 268. at 148.
272 MILL, supra note 111, at 55.
273 See id. at 56 ("Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed in
perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is Mall himself.").
274 See id. at 61 ("[I]ndividuality is the same thing with development, and ... it is only
the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human
beings ...."). This emphasis on individual development and the tendency to equate
uniqueness with development spawned the romantic "cult of genius," by which a measure
of one's genius was his difference from other men. Cf. LESLIE PAUL TH IELE, FR IEDR ICH
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refinement of our choice-making capacity. He was among the first to
suggest that choices arc not merely passive "preferences," but. repre-
sent an active quality through which persons define and develop
themselves. Twentieth-century psychiatrist Bruno Bettelheim once
said that a strong ego is not the cause of committed choices, but is the
result.275 In this, he echoed Mill, who maintained that:
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exer-
cised only in making a choice. He who does anything be-
cause it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no practice
either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental
and moral, like the nmscular, powers are improved only by
being used.276
Both Emerson and Mill conceived of self-development not as put-
ting on social layers, but as growth from the inside out, consistent with
who each individual is at his core. In this spirit, Emerson proclaimed,
"[i]nsist on yourself; never imitate. Your own gift you can present
every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation;
but of the adopted talent of another you have only an extemporane-
ous half-possession • . • . Every great man is a unique." 277 Similarly, in
chapter III of On. Liberty, Mill wrote that "[Wittman nature is not. a ma-
chine to be built after a model, and set. to do exactly the work pre-
scribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on
all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it.
a living thing. "278 Mill demonstrated an awareness of the ways in which
society shapes the individual, but held, nevertheless, that there is a
unique set of impulses that are the individual's own, and which may
be distinguished from those social influences that can potentially
overwhelm the self:
A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the
expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and
modified by his own culture—is said to have a character.
NIFIZSCIIE AND 'HIE POLMCS ov '111E SOUL 28-48 (1990) (analyzing Nietzsche's view of
individuality).
275 R01.1.0 MAY. LOVE AND WILL 199 (1969).
276 MILL, supra note 111, at 56.
277 EMERSON, supra note 268, at 168.
278 MILL. supra note 111, at 56-57.
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One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no
character, no more than a steam engine has a character. 279
The conception of freedom developed by Emerson and Mill,
among others, and inherited by later traditions, straddles the distinc-
tion between positive and negative freedom. Emerson and Mill were
both drawn to essentially libertarian conclusions: they defended a free
market and an extensive zone of personal privacy, 28° they were wary of
the creeping egalitarianism of the age, 281 and they, like Kant, saw pa-
ternalism as the mark of the decline of individuality. 292 Yet their inter-
nal conception of freedom is also positive in an important way. Free-
dom requires more than the negative liberal's non-restraint; it
requires that each individual act from the deepest wellsprings of indi-
viduality. Moreover, the idea of self-development involves a kind of
self-mastery; in the sense that one must overcome the internal inertia
that stands in the way of self-becoming..m Thus, negative social liberty
279
 Id. at 57.
280
 Emerson wrote that the less government we have the better,—the fewer laws, and
the less confided power. The antidote to this abuse of formal Government is, the influence
of private character, the growth of the Individual ...." RALPH WAIno EmEttsoN, Politics, in
ESSAYS, SECOND SERIES (1844), reprinted in Ska.EcrED ESSAYS, LECTURES, AND POEMS, supra
note 268, at 248, 257; see also Mn.t., supra note 1 1 1, at 94-96 (defending the free market,
within certain limits).
281
 Emerson openly praised "the Spartan principle of calling that which is just, equal;
not that which is equal, just." EMERSON, supra note 280, at 251 (internal quotation omit-
ted). Mill saw the equality of the mass culture as an even greater threat to individuality
than oppression. See supra note 111, at 67. He despaired that "[Ilhe greatness of
England is now all collective; individually small." Id. Indeed, Mill, like Tocqueville before
him, found the greatest vice of democracy to be the way in which it equalizes differences in
personal inclination and capacity. See id. at 58; TocquEvu,LE, supra note 144, at 572-603,
667-702.
282 Mill argued that the state has no right to limit the freedom of a competent adult
simply for his or her own good, but only to prevent harm to others. See MILL, supra note
111, at 9 ("That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral,.is not a sufficient warrant."). Emerson also rejected pater-
nalism, and concluded that we are "timorous. desponding whhnperers" who are "afraid of
truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and afraid of each other." EMERSON, SUM note
268, at 164.
283 One commentator argues that Mill's conception of freedom is "positive" in four
senses: (1) it requires a kind of self-mastery, (2) it requires not only the absence of exter-
nal constraints, but the presence of internal powers, (3) self-development is not a value-
free concept, and (4) impediments to freedom may be internal, as in weakness of the will.
G.W. Smith, J.S. Mill on Freedom, in CONCEMONS Or LIBERTY IN POIXEICAL PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 7, at 182,190, excerpted in Social Liberty and Free Agency: Some Ambiguities in Mill's
Conception of Freedom, in J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY IN Focus 239,247-48 (John Gray & G.W.
Smith eds., 1991).
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was a necessary condition to the more basic, positive freedom of self-
unfoldment. Kant, Emerson, and Mill all agreed that the best way to
promote self-individuation was to follow the negative liberal path of
non-interference in the life of the individual, rather than to enlist the
affirmative assistance of the state.
Nevertheless, although Mill did not embrace widespread state
intervention, later (progressive) thinkers found in his thought. the
justification for a wider role for the state. Perhaps the deepest ambi-
guity in the legacy of Mill's liberalism is his attitude to society and, in
particular, to the way social influences are destructive of individual
freedom. It is difficult to square Mill's libertarianism with his convic-
tion that social influences, rather than political constraint, are de-
structive of individual liberty. Paradoxically, Mill's libertarianism leads
to the progressive response to the problem of individual freedom. 2N If
the individual must be protected not simply from coercive govern-
ment intervention, but from a wide variety of social obstacles to free-
dom, then certainly a greater degree of government involvement will
be necessary to foster individual freedom. To the extent that this in-
volvement requires more constraint on individual action, it leads to
the diminishment of the sphere of personal freedom.
Self-individuating liberalism thus belies a dual, ambivalent charac-
ter. It is libertarian in spirit, to a point, but there is always a softer side
that sometimes seeks refuge in paternalistic solutions—a side that
holds that the individual occasionally must be protected front the vicis-
situdes of social life and from the consequences of his own decisions.
C. The Constitutional Embodiment: Privacy, Autonomy, and Expression.
Three political values dominate the discourse of self-individuating
liberalism, and each has an important function in the discovery, devel-
opment, and expression of the self. Privacy provides the self shelter
from the storm; it gives the nascent self the breathing space to develop,
and the developed self a personal realm to exist as it is, free from the
284 For this reason. many libertarians look upon Mill's work with ambivalence. For ex-
ample, the conservative economist and social thinker Thomas Sowell argues that Mill's
thinking is utopian, but that he was always restrained by more conservative "provisos"—the
means by which to achieve these utopian ends. Mill utilized libertarian means to achieve
more utopian ends. fie was. in certain respects, the godfather of modern progressive
thought, even as he sought to defend a soft libertarian conception of' the state. See ThomAs
Soww., A C01011(•1' Visioms 108-12 (1987).
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prying eyes and corrosive influences of society. 285 Autonomy, or self-
determination, is the condition by which the individual is able to direct
his own life; it is valued both as an expression of individual choice—we
value self-determination intrinsically, as the sine qua non of living
freely—and for its active capacity to foster self-development Finally,
self-expression is, as one commentator has put it, "not the whole of
freedom, but its soul.n288
 Broadly defined, self-expression is the active
capacity of the individual to project one's self into the social and politi-
cal worlds. It is thus the complement to privacy. Through self-
expression, in all of its myriad facets, the personal truly becomes the,
political.
The protection of privacy as a constitutional value began in 1965,
with Griswold v. Connecticul,287 yet the tradition of privacy in American
legal history goes back to the common law. 288 In tort law, recognition
285
 Modern privacy "function [s] to shelter the intimate," and is thus the ''opposite not
of the political sphere but of the social." ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON, SUM note 3, at
38..Arendt underscores the irony of associating the concept of privacy, of shelter and the
asocial, with true freedom, which she conceives as an active willingness to begin noble
projects and to carry them through In the sight of other men." See id. at 50-58, 175-81.
286 Kateb, supra note 254, at 53.
287 See 381 U.S. 479.485 (1965).
208 For example. Blackstone states the following:
For the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of
mankind, as they are members of society, and stand in various relations to
each other, they have consequently no concern with any other but social or
relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or
vinous in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and he
does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of
human lam. But if he makes his vices public, though they be such as seem
principally to affect himself, (as drunkenness, or the like) they then become,
by the bad example they set, of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it
is then the business of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of
publication is what alters the nature of the case.
1 BLACKS'IONE, supra note 44, at *124. The idea of the private presages the later distinction
between self-regarding and other-regarding behavior to the extent that it is concerned
with "social or relative duties," but it is also a concept dependent upon the place of the
occurrence.
Blackstone's conception of privacy was closely bound up with property rights, rather
than with a more generalized right of autonomy. Yet the older idea of privacy, inherent in
the conunon-law protection of the personal domain, suggests a concern with personal
sovereignty and self-determination. The home was a place where state or society had a
strictly limited role. See David Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America, in
LAW AND AtittattcArt Hismtv 203 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971), excerpted
in AMERICAN LAW AND use CONS'ITTISITONAL ORDER, Sitpro note 163. at 53, 61 (discussing
one typical case from New England in 1714 when a town official dispersed a public crowd
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for violation of privacy interests dates from late nineteenth century,
after Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published a famous article
on the subject in the Harvard Law Review. 299 Many years later, as a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis would invoke "the right to be let
alone" in one of the most famouS dissents in Court history. 2" But by
the time the concept of privacy was recognized in Griswold as a genera!
constitutional principle, it had such a general common meaning that
the notion of privacy as a protectable right was criticized as vague. 291
Three ideas, each reflected in the reasoning of the Griswold decision,
interpenetrated the idea of privacy. First, its oldest connotation was
associated with private p/aces—with the protection, in particular, of
activities that took place in the home. 292 A second idea involved the
protection of certain forms of personal association. In Griswold the
protected association was the marital relationship, but the idea subse-
quently expanded to cover other intimate relationships. 293 Finally, pri-
vacy was broadly defined hi some cases as akin to a right of personal
autonomy within a Millian zone of non-imterference. 294
The right to privacy received its most libertarian interpretation in
Justice William Douglas's concurring opinion, in 1973, in Roe v.
Wade.295 Douglas seemed to have Mill's three classes of freedoms 296 in
that was drinking after the Sabbath had begun, but did not intervene when they moved to
an individual's home).
299 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
290 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29' See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 1410, 1424-25
(1974) (suggesting that a better term for the value the Court was protecting in Griswold
and Roe v. Wade was "autonomy"); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and
Intimate Decision, 64 SAL. L. Rev. 1447, 1448 (1976) (arguing that "privacy" protects three
distinct values, not one),
292 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that "notions of privacy" protect the "sa-
cred precincts of the marital bedroom" hors searches for contraceptives).
293 Id. at 486 (describing marriage as "a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred"); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S, 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the privacy right "is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion").
294 See Henkin, supra note 291, at 1424-25 (suggesting that this was the Court's inter-
pretation); Comment, supra note 291, at 1447 (discussing cases in which privacy is inter-
preted as a form of personal autonomy).
295 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in both Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 209-21 (1973)).
296 These were "first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of con-
science in the most comprehensive sense," second, the "liberty of tastes and pursuits, of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like ... so long as
what we do does not harm [others]," and,' third, the "liberty ... of combination among
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mind when he announced that the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment included " [flirst . . ..the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and personal-
ity."297 He stated that ItThese are rights protected by the First
Amendment and, in my view, they are absolute ...." 298 Second, pri-
vacy included the "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of ones life respect-
ing marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and up-
bringing of children. '299 He stated that although these interests are not
absolute, infringement of these interests must withstand strict scru-
tiny.3°° Finally, a third set of freedoms included "the freedom to care for
one's health and person, freedom flow• bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom
to walk, stroll, or loaf."301 This interest in bodily integrity also required
protection under the rigorous strict scrutiny standard. 302
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a series of cases explained and
expanded the privacy right. The Court distanced itself from its earlier
reliance on privacy as a necessary aspect of the marital relationship
and embraced increasingly individualistic interpretations. 303 In 1992,
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court gave its most explicit recogni-
tion of the link between liberty and self-definition:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.304
individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others." MILL, supra
note 111, at 11-12.
297 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring).
298 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
299 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
300 See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
30 ' Id. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring).
3°2 See Bolton, 410 U.S. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring).
398 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
394 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). The passage draws both from the Kantian tradition, with
its call for autonomy, and the tradition of self-individuation influenced by romanticism. It
invokes the idea of privacy as a shield not only against state infringement of certain acts,
but to protect the developing self from external influences upon self-definition wrought by
state involvement in such intimate matters.
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Though the contours of the privacy right have sometimes been
constrained by conservative interpretations," 5 new life was breathed
into it this past summer, in 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, which recog-
nized a liberty interest in the right of all individuals, regardless of sex-
ual orientation, to be free of state limitations on the manner of sexual
expression . 3" Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion articulates
a notion of freedom that is reminiscent of John Stuart. Mill."
If privacy and autonomy interests represent the negative half of
the idea of freedom, in that these interests give the individual the
breathing space to develop and to determine his or her own life, then
the positive half of the idea of freedom is found in the right of self-
expression. From the 1960s onward, free expression became the
dominant constitutional value of the Bill of Rights." Whereas more
traditional ideas of freedom of expression conceptualized it primarily
as a Political value, important for its instrumental significance in fur-
thering debate on public issues but limited to rational discourse,
more recent conceptions reject this Ruination." The right of free
expression is increasingly linked to more personal values; indeed, it is
a right of se/fexpression grounded not on the need for public dis-
course—on the right of the public to hear—but on the right of the
speaker to speak.
The Kantian and romantic strains often are intermingled in mod-
ern interpretations of this right. The Kantian tradition views the right
to freedom of speech as a reflection of our capacity for autonomy and
as a measure of self-respect.") The right is grounded in our rational
305 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that there is
no constitutional right of the individual to assisted suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy law as applied to homosexuals), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
306 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (overruling Bowen, and striking down law prohibiting homosex-
ual sodomy),
307 Secjeffrey Rosen, Kennedy Curse, NEW REru 111.1C, July 21, 2003, at 15.
308 justice William Brennan has said that the First Amendment is the most important
of all constitutional provisions. NAT FIEN•OCIF, SPEAKING FREELY 138 (1997) (recounting a
conversation Hentoff had with Brennan in which Brennan said that the First Amendment
"gives us this society. The other provisions of the Constitution merely embellish it.").
909 See ALEXANDER MEIRLEJOIIN, FREE SPLEGII 24-26, 88-89 (1948). But see Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Souse First Amendment Prvblems, 47 114n. U. I, 26-28 (1971) (ar-
guing that Meiklejohn, who would protect nonpolitical forms of speech, goes too far).
310 As David Richards put it,
The value placed on [speech and association] derives from the notion of self-
respect that comes from a mature person's full and untranuneled exercise of
capacities central to human rationality. Thus, the significance of free expres-
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nature, and in recognition of our inherent dignity as human beings. In
speaking, we manifest our humanness; our right to take part in public
discourse is the first measure of our civic inclusion. 3 " Those influenced
by romantic ideals have adopted a more openly emotive conception of
this right. The right is seen as a right to disclose the self in a plethora of
diverse ways and in a variety of contexts. One is one's expression," as a
political thinker has put it. 312 Through expression, the self finds its
deepest realization not simply by discussing ideas, but by reflecting the
full spectrum of one's personality outwardly into the world. As such,
self-expression is an act of self-disclosure requiring social and political
courage.3 " Each of these intertwined traditions concludes that expres-
sion is not merely instrumental to other purposes—including the pres-
ervation of democracy—but that it has intrinsic significance in its
reflection of our choice making and self-defining nature.
One of the most significant aspects of the right to self-expression,
as interpreted in self-individuating conceptions of freedom and by the
romantic influences behind it, is the fusion of form and content, of
the emotive and the substantive aspects of speech. A telling example of
this occurred in Cohen v. California, in 1971 .314 A central tenet of the
tradition inspired by the romantic conception of human personality is
the conviction that communication does not operate simply on the
rational faculties; rather, communication is, or should be, emotive in
character. In Cohen, the Court overturned a conviction for disturbing
sion rests on the central human capacity to create and express symbolic sys-
tems....
The mine of free expression	 rests on its deep relation to self-respect
arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of the
spirit is meager and slavish.
David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. I's. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974); see also Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression, 1 PHIL & Pus. AEF. 204, 213-222 (1972) (defending a "Malian Principle' for
freedom of expression based on our autonomous capacity as human beings).
311 See ARENDT, THE HUMAN ConorrtoN, supra note 3, at 176 ("Through [speech and
action] men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct .... With word and
deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth
")
112 See Kateb, supra note 254, at 53 ("Freedom of expression is not, then, properly con-
ceptualized as a means or instrument for persons who exercise it 	 Whatever goals we
attain by expression are, 1 think, conceptually secondary. The primary notion is that
one is one's expression, one lives to express, one lives by expressing. One does not merely
use speech, one is one's speech, one's life is mostly speech.").
313 ARENDT, TIrE HUMAN CONDr1TON, Slipra note 3, at 186.
3t1
	
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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the peace against a man who wore a jacket with the expression "Fuck
the Draft" written on it into the Los Angeles County courthouse. 315
The Court addressed the state's contention that Paul Cohen could
have expressed himself fully with less vituperative language, and so
could have exercised his free speeCh rights without offending others:
[W]e cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated
by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expres-
sion serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words
are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, prac-
tically speaking, may often be the more important element
of the overall message . .. . 316
The Court further stated that it "cannot indulge the facile assumption
that one can forbid particular words without also running a substan-
tial risk of suppreSsing ideas in the process." 3 " In sum, there is no
rigid separation between the content and the form of speech.
Similarly, various other activities have received First Amendment
protection by virtue of their expressive content, including the distribu-
tion of sexually explicit films and books 318 and the limited use of lan-
guage once outlawed as profane.319 Nevertheless, despite arguments by
classical libertarians and other conservatives that commercial speech
and speech in the context of political fund-raising should receive the
same protection as personal speech, the modern Court has accorded
313 In Cohen, the appellant had been convicted of "'maliciously and willfully dis-
turb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by ... offensive conduct.'"
Id. at 16 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415).
316 Id. at 25-26.
311 Id. at 26.
313 The First Amendment does not protect "obscene" material. Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973). But not all, films that depict sexual conduct are obscene;
thus some films depicting sexual conduct are still entitled to First Amendment protection.
See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161(1974) (overturning conviction for exhibition of
the movie Carnal Knowledge).
319 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; FCC V. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729, 748-50 (1978)
(upholding the authority of FCC to regulate speech that is "indecent but not obscene"
(George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue), but indicating that the holding is narrow,
only applying to broadcast media because of their "uniquely pervasive presence" and ac-
cessibility by children).
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these forms of speech less protection under the First Amendment. 32°
The most plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that the Court
is increasingly moved by a conception of expression that values the
authentic expression of the self—not expression as money or expres-
sion for money, but personal expression for its own sake, through
which one's self-identity is reflected and confirmed in the world.
Although this represents an increase in freedom in one sense,
there is reason to be concerned with the course liberty has taken. The
more liberty is "introverted," connected to some conception of self-
development or self-individuation, the more tenuous is its connection
to the political and social ground upon which freedom depends. The
two major developments outlined in this Section demonstrate the in-
creasing withdrawal by the individual from the public and political do-
mains. Connecting freedom to privacy suggests that personal activities
will be protected so long as they do not touch upon, and are shielded
from, the public. 321 From the classical liberal ideal of freedom as non-
constraint, which leaves an open field for individual initiative, its distant
descendant privacy envisions a freedom emasculated, domesticated,
and circumscribed within the walls of its own protective limits. Ironi-
cally, the broadening of the freedom of expression has tended to dif-
fuse it. As expression is channeled in other directions—to the pursuit
of the aesthetic, the hedonic, or even the erotic—the expressive ener-
gies of society arguably are scattered in a thousand different directions.
In the language of positive liberty discussed earlier, 322 the development
of the modern right to self-expression has accentuated the "exercise"
aspect at the expense of the "achievement" ideal. In the process, the
self is increasingly free to express itself in a myriad of ways that have
more to do with the self, and less to do with any real connection to the
political, the social, or, as with the reduced protection for commercial
speech, the economic. The final Part examines at greater length this
920 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating that the Court
has "afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 143 (1976) (upholding limits on campaign contributions, but striking down limits on
campaign expenditures).
321 A good example of this is the different treatment accorded intimate versus non-
intimate associations. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 635-36 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that asso-
ciations are subject to more rigorous constitutional scrutiny when they enter the commer-
cial sphere).
322 See supra Part I.
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concern that freedom has been overly "introverted," and that it has lost
its social ground.
V. FREEDOM AS COMMUNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY: THE HOMEOSTATIC-
COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
From the 1950s onward, social thinkers across the political spec-
trum have developed a distinct critique of liberalism as it has evolved
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The "communi-
tarian"323 and "civic republican" critiques of liberalism defy easy
classification on the traditional left-right political axis 324 and, notwith-
standing their differences, share essential similarities of political per-
spective. Most importantly, both insist that modern liberalism has un-
dervalued the importance of the common good to the individual, and
has served to disconnect the individual from his or her social world in a
number of ways—leaving him or her rootless, alienated, and without a
sense of public responsibility, but with an exaggerated sense of entitle-
men 1 525 Civic republicans raise another concern, arguing that not only
323 The comtnunitarian tradition is sometimes traced to Tocqueville's observations on
American culture, particularly his emphasis upon the importance of associational life.
TocquEvn.LE, supra note 144, at 189-95, 513-28. Perhaps the first important modern
writer who sounded communitarian themes was Robert Nisbet, whose 1953 book remains a
classic of conservative conununitarianism. See generally ROBERT NISBET, A QUEST FOR
COMMUNITY (ICS Press 1990) (1953). Yet the word "conununitarian" was coined only later
by Amitai Etzioni, who often is regarded as the founder of the modern communitarian
movement. See generally Am I'm ETZION I, Tint: SPIRIT or COMMUNITY ( 1993).
324 Traditional communitarians emphasize the importance of authority and social hi-
erarchy, which are certainly more "conservative' themes. See ROAM NISBEN, Twium yr or
AU'llIORrrY 238-39 (1975). Similarly, many recent communitarians distance themselves
from the quest for substantive equality and the demand for social entitlements characteris-
tic of progressive thought. Communitarians' defense of the two-parent family and of the
need for a liberal form of "morals education" is also consistent with recent conservatism.
See William Calston, A Liberal-Dernocratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, REsPoNsivE Commu-
NUN, Winter 1990-1991, reprinted inn TIIE ESSENTIAL COMMIUNITARIAN READER 145, 145-55
(Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998). Nevertheless, their quest for greater political access and par-
ticipation, their concern with the alienation of the individual wrought by modern bu-
reaucracy, their distrust of special interests in politics, and their call to create more parks
and public spaces and to rebuild inner cities are certainly more "liberal" themes. See infra
notes 364-376 and accompanying text. Conununitarian theory tests the old "left-right"
distinction in fundamental ways.
323 Communitarians and defenders of recent republican theory share three essential cri-
tiques of liberalism. First, they both criticize the alienation wrought by modern conditions of
hyper-individualism. traditionally a concern both of conservative commttnitarians and the
New Left. See RoBEHT N. BELLAII ET AL., HABITS or ill E HEART 3-26, 55-84 (1996); NISBET,
supra note 323, at 3-22 (presenting the more conservative version). Second, both are con-
cerned with the tendency to exaggerate "rights" talk, which, they argue, undermines social
cooperation by giving each individual an absolute claim that refuses to admit of compromise.
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is something lost by viewing freedom in wholly introspective terms, but
also there is something dangerous about this attitude. If the liberal is
content to forgo the benefits of a sense of communal membership, and
turns his or her back on the social and the political in pursuit of the
private, he or she does so at his or her own peril. Both liberals and re-
publicans have maintained historically that private interests can not be
pursued at the expense of attention to the political.328 What James
Madison said two centuries ago is still defended today by many across
the political spectrum: The nation which reposes on the pillow of po-
litical confidence, will sooner or later end its political existence in a
deadly lethargy. "327
The "homeostatic-communitarian" conception of liberty, to he ex-
plored in this Part, offers a distinct conception of freedom grounded
upon a more-decentralized and less-individualistic political ideal. Free-
dom, according to this view, inheres in the network of stable and recip-
rocal social relations among individuals that make up civil society. As
such, it offers a modus vivendi between extreme forms of liberalism
and extreme forms of republicanism. 328
In the next Section, we explore the "macro" picture—the overall
social and political structure most likely to ensure freedom, as the
modern communitarian conceives it.. The final Section of this Article
discusses the elements of the communitarian ideal of freedom with
greater specificit): 329 In theory, communitarianism can be detached
See Mary Ann Glendon, "Absolute' Rights: Property and Privacy, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall
1991, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNEEARIAN READER, supra note 324, at 107,107-14.
Finally, they share a concern over the loss of civic participation and of the individual's lack of
access to the channels of political change brought about by highly centralized government.
See Dallin H. Oaks, Rights and .Responsibilities, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-1991,
rcprinted in TIIE ESSEN'llAL COMMUNEEARIAN READER, supra note 324, at 97,97-105.
326
 This was traditionally a republican theme. The republican's concept of ''civic vir-
tue." the public spiritedness of the citizen who takes an active interest in politics, has found
its communitarian analogue in the communitarian's call for greater community involve-
ment. Benjamin R. Barber. A Mandate for Liberty: Requiring Education-Based Community Serv-
ice, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring 1991, reprinted in THE ESSEN'T'IAL COMMUNEEARIAN
READER, supra note 324, at 237,237-45.
327 JAMES MADISON, Virginia Assembly, Jan. 23,1799, in Tit E COMPLETE MADISON, supra
note 48, at 340,340.
525 Communitarianism is in a number of ways an "intermediate" philosophy between
modern liberalism and republicanism. Conununitarians locate freedom neither ill the
isolated individual nor in the collective politics of the state, but in the intermediate web of
social relations that make up civil society. It is thus able to appeal to a moderate kind of
individualism that finds the source of individual meaning not in the self, but in our shared
relations with others, akin to Tocqueville's "self-interest properly understood." See
ToctauEVILLE, supra note 144, at 525-28.
329 Sec infra notes 354-376.
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from the homeostatic ideal, but in modern pluralistic society, the for-
mer requires the latter: one cannot be a communitarian at the local
level without holding some version of the homeostatic theory of social
pluralism at the "macro" leve1. 330
A. The Political Ideal: Freedom Requires Diversity-in-Balance
The roots of the homeostatic ideal emanate from one strand of
classical republican theory, a sub-tradition more favorable to social plu-
ralism and individualistic conceptions of freedom than are other
strands of republican thought."' Elements of this idea are found in Ar-
istotle,332 and in the writings of the Roman historian and social thinker
Polybius.333 Central to this tradition is the idea that freedom and social
3311 Some might argue that these two ideas, the "homeostatic" and the communitarian,
are not necessarily connected in modern political thought—that one may adopt conunun i-
tarian principles without ever drawing upon a homeostatic conception of social balance that
inheres between these communities. Others might argue that the "checks and balances"
idea central to Madisonian republicanism can be detached from any communitarian con-
ception of politics (the second argument hits more plausibility than the first—the idea of
checks and balances often is thought to play an essential role in modern negative liberal
theory). I argue that modern communitarianism grows out of the same general tradition as
Madisonian republicanism and functions as 'a modern corrective to its shortcomings. Mod-
ern republican theory faces a dilemma between adopting the republicanism of the polls
versus the republicanism of a modern pluralistic society. The dilemma is characterized by
the difficulty of retaining some meaningful conception of self-government in a large, plural-
istic society. Sec TIIE FEDERALIST No. 10 ( James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) (describing how size and diversity operate as a check on ''faction").
Twentieth-century republicanism has forsworn the republicanism of the polls in favor
of a pluralistic conception of society. Communitarianism can be seen as a response to the
lost values of republicanism in seeking to foster local self-government within a broader
pluralistic society. Thus, 1 argue that one cannot be a communitisrian in a large pluralistic
society without adhering to some concepticin of diversity-in-balance by which the commu-
nity is protected from the majoritarian and equalizing influences of modern society.
531 Republican theory falls along a spectrum between relatively more 'monistic" con-
ceptions of society and those that are more pluralistic. The republic envisioned in Rous-
seau's The Social Contract, modeled after ancient Sparta, is the best modern example of
monistic republicanism. Every effort is made in the constitution of Rousseau's state to
meld the voices of the many into one General Will. See RuiissEnu , supra note 4, at 203-04,
235-37. Associations outside the state are discouraged, there is no public debate for fear
that some will be unduly swayed by the interests of others, and there are no limits to the
power of the state over the life of the individual. Id. at 203-04. Indeed, Madison probably
had Rousseau's conception of the republic, in mind when he wrote that "lilt could never
be more truly said that ... the first remedy. , • was worse than the disease." Tut: FEDERAL-
isvr No. 10 ( James Madison), supra note 324, at 130.
332 ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 1113-316.
333 See ZERA S. FINK, TUE CLASSICAL REPUBLICANS 3-6 (1945) (describing Polybins as
the originator of the idea that social classes and interests must be balanced against and
blended with one another); PoLvitius, Booas 1, II & VI (Evelyn S. Shucksburgh trans.,
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stability are best preserved not by ensuring a uniformity of condition
among the citizens of a state, but by balancing, even exploiting, the
clash of interests represented by different aspects of society. This idea
of the "mixed state," in which different social classes vote on and con-
trol diverse agencies of government, was central to the political struc-
ture of the Roman republic. 334 Through a tradition of republican
thought that includes Machiavelli, 335 Harrington , 336 Montesquieu, 337
and Hume,338 these ideas evolved and took modern form in such
mechanisms as the separation of powers and the idea, central to Madi-
son's The Federalist No. 10, that a larger republic is better suited to with-
stand the vicissitudes of political instability than a smaller one. 338
Liberalism has influenced the development of this idea primarily
by emphasizing the inevitability of social diversity, and its positively
beneficial character as a condition of individual freedom. The liberal
tradition inherited the idea, from English Whig thought of late seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries and from earlier republican tradi-
tion, that diverse interests serve to counterbalance each other, pre-
venting tyranny and the monopolistic concentration of power. The
idea that a balanced diversity of interests serves to preserve liberty
underlies both the horizontal division of powers between the three
branches of government, and the vertical distribution of power be-
tween the federal government and the states. The Framers' idea, em-
bodied in Madison's The Federalist No. 51, that the "policy of supplying,
by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives," underlies
our theory of checks and balances and the separation of powers
within government.340 Madison draws upon the same principle, in the
1889), exempted in GREEK HISTORIANS 441-501 (MI Finley ed., 1959). Palybius's idea of
the "mixed state" would influence republican theory for nearly the next two millennia.
334 See POLYBIUS, BOOK VI, supra note 333, at 473-501; see a/soJourt CROOK, LAW AND
LIFE or Rosie 68-97 (1967) (describing the "machinery of law," and particularly the con-
stitutional developments); MIChAEL GRANT, HISTORY or ROME 67-83 (1978) (describing
the legal machinations of the class struggle).
335 See generally NIccoLo MACIIIAVELL/, THE DtscowtsEs (Bernard Crick ed., Leslie J.
Walker trans., Penguin Books 1970) (1531).
336 See generally HARRINGTON, supra note 155, at 72-135.
"7 See M oNTEsciu mu, supra note 47, at 11-15.
336 See generally DAVID HUNIE, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in ESSAYS MORAL, PoLrri-
CAI„ AND LITERARY 512, 512-29 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985).
339 See Douglass Adair, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" David Hume, James
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 FluNTINoloN LIBR. Q. 343 (1957), reprinted in FAME
AND THE FOUNDING FATIIERS 93, 98-106 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974) (arguing that Madi-
son was deeply influenced by Hume's essay, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth),
340
 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
2009]	 Five Faces of Freedom	 583
same The Federalist No. 51, to justify federalism. The division of power
between the national government and the states provides "double se-
curity .... [so that t]he different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." 341
Yet, as both The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 illustrate, checks and
balances function not simply to control the ambitions of public actors,
but to avoid one of the chief problems of social pluralism. Counter-
balanced interests throughout society serve as a corrective to democ-
racy by controlling the majoritarian tyranny that can endanger it. In
The Federalist No. 51, Madison states that limn the extended republic
of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties,
and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole so-
ciety could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good ...."312 In The Federalist No. 10, Madison
argues, in direct opposition to some forms of republican theory, that
republican values are best fostered in a large, rather than in a small,
nation state. He states:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct par-
ties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found
of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the most easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it.
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens . . 343
The same idea appears, yet again, as an answer to strife and in-
tolerance in the civil sphere. Madison's defense of religious diversity,
made in the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788 and elsewhere, link
diversity to freedom in a straightforward way: religious freedom
"arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and
which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any soci-
5" Id. at 357.
542 Id. at 359; see also id. at 358 ("Whilst all authority in (the republic( will be derived
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts.
interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
little danger from interested combinations of the majority.").
313 TILE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 324, at 135.
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ety."344 Diversity thus promotes a counterbalance of power that pre-
vents persecution, the social equivalent of political oppression. Simi-
larly, the benefits of diversity have been used (by Madison and many
others) as justification for a wide distribution of property, 345 for the
freedom of speech and of the press, 3411 and for the right to trial by
jury,347 among other interests:34 B
If the homeostatic ideal envisions a balance among diverse
groups and interests along the "horizontal" axis of social organiza-
tion—groups offset groups, commercial interests balance commercial
interests, and sects are set off against sects—a second communitarian
component serves as a principle defining the "vertical" structure of
social organization. This second component requires a great degree
of political decentralization, which is the primary reason for federal-
ism, for defining a sphere of local autonomy left to the states and
their subdivisions 349 In contrast to the rough notion of decentraliza-
tion characteristic of federalism, communitarians have reduced the
idea of decentralization to a basic principle. The Responsive Comm:0i-
tarian Platform, written and signed by a number of leading communi-
tarians, puts it succinctly: "Generally, no social task should be assigned
344 JAMES MADISON, In Virginia Convention, June 12, 1788, in THE COMPLETE MADI-
SON, supra note 48, at 306, 306 (stating further that "where there is such a variety of sects,
there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest"); see also
JAMES NiADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in THE COMPLETE MADISON, supra note 48,
at 299, 299-306.
345
 Madison was a defender of free trade but also considered a wide distribution of
property to be a bulwark against the concentration of power. See James Madison, NA'I'L GA-
ZE:TEE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 171 I E COMPLETE MADISON, supra note 48, at 267, 267-69..
346 See patts NIArnsoN, Address to the General Assembly of Virginia, Jan. 23, 1799, in
THE COMPLE•E MADISON, supra note 48, at 295, 295. These sentiments fostered the adop-
tion of the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
347 See BAILIN, supra note 10, at 74 (quoting John Adams as saying that the jury was es-
sential to preserving English liberties by injecting into the "executive branch of the consti-
tution ... a mixture of popular power"), Similarly, Tocqueville called the jury an "emi-
nently republican" institution, and declared that It is the civil jury which really saved the
liberties of England." TocquEVILLE, supra note 144, at 272, 274.
119
 If this idea of diversifying and counterbalancing power was initially a "republican"
idea, liberals have extended it to spheres of human activity outside of politics. Liberals
believe that truth is best achieved through the free clash of opinions, criminal justice
through the clash of prosecutor and defense, growth and prosperity through a system of
free competition—and justice and liberty through the clash and counterbalancing of so-
cial interests.
319
 See AntimiEtzioni, Introduction to TILE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARMN READER, supra note
324, at ix, xiii–xiv ('Well-integrated national societies may be said to have conummitarian
IG[ontemporary communities tend to be new communities that are part of a
pluralistic web of communities.... [Thus, 1)1 is best to think about communities as nested,
each within a more encompassing one.").
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to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job." 35° Com-
munitarians favor a relatively decentralized sociopolitical structure in
order to preserve communities, and with them, the sense of attach-
ment, civic responsibility, and participation necessary to their concep-
tion of freedom and social order: Although the details sometimes re-
main unclear, communitarians are committed to reinvigorating
federalism as a response to increased political centralization at the na-
tional level, to defending local politics against state intervention, and
to protecting the autonomy of nonpolitical institutions—most impor-
tantly, the family—from all unnecessary forms of political interven-
tion.351
One of the more interesting issues raised by the homeostatic-
commtmitarian ideal is the extent to which it. requires a revision of
our conception of the role and autonomy of associations in American
political life. Many conununitarians are wary of the implications of
recent IU.S. Supreme Court decisions that have limited the autonomy
of associations in the quest for increasingly egalitarian social out-
comes.352 Modern communitarians defend a broad network of asso-
ciations both as a way to give the individual a meaningful sense of par-
ticipation, thereby fostering the virtues of positive freedom, and as a
buffer against expansion of the political sphere, thereby protecting
negative freedom. The role of associations in American political life
has been a central tenet of communitarian ideals from the time of
Tocqueville.353
B. The Communitarian Idea af Freedom
What is the homeostatic-communitarian ideal of freedom? Is it
essentially a modified "negative" idea of freedom that emphasizes pro-
tection of the group, rather than the individual? Or is it a positive
ideal? Or is it. perhaps some combination of both?
The homeostatic-communitarian ideal of freedom is drawn from a
combination of sources—liberal, republican, and Burkean—but it di-
verges hi essential ways from each of these traditions. Conununitarian
35D The Responsive Communitatian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities. in 111 E ESSENTIAL
COMNIUNITARIAN READER, supra note 324, at xxv, xxx.
35I See BEi.t.An rr AL., supra note 325, at 250-71; AMITAI EWIONI, supra note 323, at 44,
144-47; NISBET, saps note 323, at 221-47.
362 See, e.g„ William A. Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57
Mn. L. REV. 236, 242 (1998) (arguing that the Court should protect diversity "between"
and not diversity "within" groups).
347 See TocquEvm.F., supra note 144, at 509-24.
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theory is usually conceived of as a liberalized version of one strand of
republican theory, in that both theories emphasize the positive dimen-
sions of freedom, particularly the right of participation and the virtues
and responsibilities of citizenship. Nevertheless, homeostatic-
communitarian theory largely diffuses this positive conception of free-
dom, displacing it from the political to the social sphere. Whereas lib-
erty is primarily a political value in traditional republican accounts—a
right to participate in the political process of the state—homeostatic-
communitarians conceive of this positive freedom as a right to
influence one's political, social, and personal environment through
participation not only in the state, but also in the community, in secon-
dary associations, at one's work, and in other extra-political spheres. 354
This is positive freedom writ large upon our social world, which brings
the idea closer to the liberal's conception of negative Iiberty. 355
Less explicitly, but vitally important, the homeostatic-col -111mm-
itarian draws from republican theory a certain "middling" conception
of the nature of freedom, which views freedom as an intermediate
state between two pathological extremes. In classical republican the-
ory, these two extremes are tyranny and anarchy, respectively: the lack
of genuine self-government either because of domination by an inter-
ested class or elite, or because of excessive disorder. This middling
idea of freedom was central to eighteenth-century conceptions of
freedom that influenced the American Revolution.356 As Locke ar-
"4 Perhaps the traditional republicanism of the polls viewed liberty as a political value
because politics was direct, involving face-to-face discussion, debate, and dialogue. The
intermediate social sphere was not as important in the small republic—certainly not as
important as it is today in a large pluralistic society. Thus, it is only natural that the com-
munitarian should respond to the conditions of modernity with a diffused, socialized con-
ception of positive freedom. Compare ARENoT, THE HUMAN CONDLTION, SUpro note 3, at
192-99 (describing the political as the only arena in which the individual could achieve a
kind of individual substantiality that transcends time), with BARBER, supra note 26, at 163-
212, and BELLAil FIT AL., supra note 325, at 167-95 (describing the modern variant of ''get-
ting involved").
555
 Positive freedom in the social sphere includes values that we normally associate
with negative liberalism, especially rights to be free from interference with associational
activity. Furthermore, positive freedom in the social sphere permits us to shape institutions
in a way that is conducive to the negative liberal's idea of freedom as living as one wishes.
The rights to take part in corporate self-governance or community policing, for example.
appear as varieties of 'positive" freedom because they entail a kind of sovereignty in these
areas, a right to shape normative conditions. Yet, only through this "positive" right to set
the normative conditions of one's world can one truly live a life of non-interference. In
sum, positive freedom in the social sphere helps create conditions of resilient negative
liberty. See PHILIP PETI1T, REPUBLICANISM 50-51 (1997).
356 See REID, supra note 46, at 27-29, 32-37, 55-59.
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geed, freedom is not the liberty for everyone to do what lie lists," 357
or merely an act of unconstrained volition, 358 but rather action that
comports with a law of nature, or with right reason, or with some con-
ception of social or moral order. 359 Freedom, for homeostatic-
communitarians and republicans, is deeply normative, conditioned by
considerations, such as social order, stability, and justice, which serve
to keep it "on track."36°
This normative idea implicates another aspect of the hotneostatic-
commimitarian ideal of freedom ; it cannot be conceived in isolation
from other values; it cannot be distilled or separated from other im-
portant social and moral norms-1.-neither in practice, nor as a theo-
retical matter. 361 Freedom is embedded within social order, and order
within freedom. Thus, the "tradition of ordered liberty" to which Jus-
tice Benjamin Cardozo appealed,352 and that continues to attract ho-
meostatic-communitarian defenders, is drawn from a tradition that
dates to classical antiquity. Together, these attributes give freedom a
more-conservative, less-individualistic cast that values the traditions
357 Loom, supra note 108, at 17 (emphasis omitted).
358 Communitarian ideals thus flow from that tradition which is at odds with Hobbes's
empirical definition of freedom. The conummitarian ideal embraces sonic version of the
normative ideal of freedom. See supra Part II.A (discussing empirical and normative ideas
of freedom).
359 Modern communitarians do not hold a traditional natural law conception of free-
dom, but rather link freedom with practical, rather than abstract, rationality. As a leading
communitarian put it, politics and government cannot "be divorced from fundamental
values." Philip Selznick, Foundations of Communitatian Liberalism, REsroNsna CommuNrry,
Fall 1994, reprinted in TIIE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER, supra note 324, at 3, 11.
Attacking the libertarian idea of freedom, another conununitarian argues that libertarian
doctrine decontextualizes human freedom, and hence loses sight of the way that it inter-
acts with, and indeed is dependent upon, other human values." Thomas A. Spragens, Jr.,
The Limitations of Libertarianism, RESPONSIVE COMMUNEIT, Winter 1991-1992. reprinted in
THE ESSENTIAL COM NI UN ITAR IAN READER, supra note 324, at 21, 23.
360 Spragens criticizes libertarians and other liberals for defining freedom as nothing
more than acquiescence to inclination." Spragens, supra note 359, at 23. lie argues that instead,
freedom should be understood as autonomy and the capacity for self-government. See id. at
27 (claiming the liberal agenda should not be the apotheosis of self-indulgence but the creation of
a society in which people can be self-governing"); see also Selznick, supra note 359. at 6-9 (making
a similar critique). Libertarians also inspire the traditional republican fear of social decay—
the result, in classical republican theory, of licentiousness. See id. at 10 ("The decay of a
moral environment ... can be crucial, not only for the community's identity and character
... but also to the elementary conditions of social order."). The idea of moral balance is
always present in communitarian thought.' See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Moral Reawakening
Without Puritanism, REsPoNsivE CommuNnY, Fall 1991, reprinted n 1)i El ESSENTIAL COMM-
NITARIAN READER, supra note 324, at 41, 41-45; Oaks, supra note 325, at 97-105.
361 See Spragens, supra note 359, at 23.
362 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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and customs of a people, and that discounts conclusions drawn from
theory or from .
 disembodied rational schemes. As the leading homeo-
static-communitarian Philip Selznick put it, in terms reminiscent of
Burke and the modern conservative, the tacit knowledge of custom is
often wiser than a scheme based on explicit theorizing." 563
Despite the similarities to republican political theory, however,
the homeostatic-communitarian idea of freedom is a distinctly liberal
conception of freedom. The reason for asserting this is that the ho-
meostatic-communitarian idea of freedom is still "individualistic" in
the most basic sense of the idea. The "top-down" republican idea of
freedom holds that freedom is primarily an attribute of the state as a
whole, and that individual freedom is derivative of this. 364 In contrast,
homeostatic-communitarians hold that freedom should be under-
stood from the ground up—that free societies are made up of free
individuals, even if this freedom is expressed in a network of commu-
nities that order society and shape individual identity. 365 One implica-
tion of this is that homeostatic-communitarians defend individual
rights, limited government, and secondary associations as bastions of
freedom and social order, whereas republicans sometimes have been
ambivalent, if not hostile, to each of these ideas."3
Consistent with its character as a modus vivendi between other
conceptions of politics, the homeostatic-communitarian idea of free-
dom is distinct from both libertarian and progressive ideas of free-
dom. Many strands of negative liberalism emphasize liberty as free-
dom from outside forces and hold that political participation is, at
best, a necessary evil. In contrast, the homeostatic-commtmitarian in-
sists that the negative and positive aspects of freedom are never sepa-
rable in practice: to have the freedom of living as one chooses, one
must be able to exercise some influence on one's local world. Moreo-
363 Selznick, supra note 359, at 9; see MICHAEL °AKE:SHOW, RATIONALISM IN POLFI1CS
passim (1962); cf. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON 11IE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE passun
J.C.D. Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790).
3a4 See SKINNER, supra note 43, at 3-5,59-99.
365 Thus, conununitarians reject the Kantian conception of self-identity as distinct
from one's social commitments, instead viewing identity as formed in association with oth-
ers. See RELLAII El' AL., supra note 325, at 27-51; SANDEL, supra note 183, at 147-54. Com-
rnunitarians are dubious of the notion that individuals may be remade from the top down,
except to the extent that they are exposed to moral education, and taught the values of
self-respect and respect for others. Although moral tradition and custom tray inform the
education of the person, attempts to construct individuals completely, as some extreme
"progressives" might advocate, are regarded with deep suspicion by cottununitarians.
3r4 Sec ROUSSEAU, supra note 4, at 203-04 (criticizing "partial societies" that separate
individuals from each other and from the state).
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ver, homeostatic-communitarians hold that our identities are formed
as the result of communal attachments, and that the social atomiza-
tion wrought by extreme forms of negative liberalism splinters the
identity, leaving the individual without a set of coherent commitments
and self-identifications from which to act. 367
flomeostatic-communitarians are also dubious of modern progres-
sive liberalism, primarily because the centralization required to ensure
the progressive conception of social and economic equality is seen as
destructive to family, charities, local government, and civil society. Ho-
meostatic-conummitarians also tend to reject the more-substantive con-
ception of equality defended by progressives, viewing it as destructive to
real diversity and social order.369 Homeostatic-communitarians prefer
instead a conception of moral equality that emphasizes our "shared
identity,' rather than the "celebration of difference [that leads to] mis-
understanding and distrust."369
This rejection of identity politics reinforces the moderate ho-
meostatic-communitarian conception of social pluralism—one that
charts a middle path between the radical conception of social plural-
ism offered by Mill and followed by today's multiculturalists, 3" and
the more monistic conception of society defended by modern cosmo-
politan liberalism. 371 Modern homeostatic-communitarians do not
3°7 Indeed, communitarians argue that true self-individuation requires community to
allow the individual to develop the kinds of capacities. attributes, and virtues he wishes to
develop. Sec BELLA!' El' AL., supra note 325, at 142-63; Nts BET. supra note 323. at 205-11.
368 Traditional conservative conummitarians criticize modern conceptions of equality
for being destructive of authority and social order. Sec NISBET, supra note 324. at 1-19. But
even liberal" contemporary communitarians argue that an overemphasis on equality de-
stroys the institutional diversity necessary for a good society. See Seim ick, supra note 359. at
5 (stating that "[t]he current zest for equality ... lacks such an anchor; indeed it lacks a
rudder as well. Popular liberalism has come to suppose that every kind of privilege,
authority, coercion, classification, or segregation is an actual or potential affront to the
subject's dignity as a person, and therefore to moral equality. Equality becomes a powerful
but untamed abstraction ... .").
Similarly, William Galston argues that modern liberalism advances a theory of differ-
ence "Withill," which requires that every institution reflect the differences among persons
within society, whereas a truly diverse society would protect differences "between," which
would permit institutions more autonomy in selecting their members so as to create real
diversity between groups. Sec Galston, supra note 352, at 242-43.
369 Selznick. supra note 359, at 5.
3" Mill's conception of society envisions semi-autonomous subcultures in which indi-
viduals may associate with other like-minded individuals. These subcultures are more or
less peripheral to general society, depending upon the extent to which their visions of
individuality conform with more popular ideals. See MILL. supra note 111, at 12,73-91.
371 I argue that modern cosmopolitan liberalism is socially monistic because, although
at the level of the individual, cosmopolitan liberalism embraces diversity among persons, at
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accept Mill's radical conception of diversity with its implication that
all "self-regarding" behavior may take the form of a "life experiment,"
which may then form the basis of a community of like-thinking indi-
viduals. Nevertheless, they give measured assent to the idea that free-
dom is enhanced by conditions of moderate cultural pluralism. 372 In-
deed, pluralistic differentiation among communities is a necessary
expression of the differing ways of life embodied in these diverse
communities, and gives deeper meaning to the participatory virtues
offered by homeostatic-conrummitarian theory. 373
the level of the group, it emphasizes uniformity. Genuine social pluralism entails genuine
differences between groups, rather than between members within groups. See Galston,
supra note 352, at 247-49. The modern liberal goal that each group reflect differences
among the general population destroys social pluralism by ensuring that each group is just
like every other group, differences within the group notwithstanding. Wisconsin u Yoder
illustrates the differences between genuine social pluralism and cosmopolitan liberalism.
See 406 U.S. 205, 234-36, 245-46 (1972). In Yoder. the Court permitted the Amish to with-
draw their children from school after eighth grade in violation of a state law requiring
students to stay in school until the tenth grade. Id. at 234. In dissent, justice William Doug-
las claimed that the affected children were deprived of their capacity to make effective
choices about the course of their lives by not being exposed to the external world. Id. at
245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). This liberal cosmopolitan attitude reflects a con-
ception of autonomy and equality that is in tension with the interest of heterogeneous
groups—here, the Amish—in preserving their identities.
372 See jean Bethke Elshtain, Democracy and the Politics ofDifftrence, REsroxstvE Comm U-
NITY, Spring 1994, reprinted in Tim ESSEN•ELAI. COMMUNITARIAN READER, supra note 324, at
259, 259; Diane Ravitch, Pluralism vs. Particularism in American Education, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNrIY, Spring 1991, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITAR IAN READER, supra note
324, at 269, 272-73.
373 Communitarianism charts a "middle way" between the cultural particularism de-
fended by the early romantics, and the more unitary conceptions of society that leave little
room for cultural differentiation. Sec The Responsive Communitarian Platform, supra note 350,
at xxxv ("Our commit nitarianism is not particularism."). Communitarians endorse neither
the radical particularism of romantic and liberal movements that allow virtually every set
of values to define a conununity, nor do they defend the old forms of particularism that
tended toward ethnocentrism, localism, ignorance, and bigotry. See Selznick, supra note
359, at 6. Nevertheless, Selznick states that "[i]it contrast to cosmopolitan liberalism, we
take seriously the claims of particularity." Id. tasked Selznick by what principle corrummi-
tarians decide to defend some communities and not others—why defend the Amish, but
not a subculture devoted to experimentation with drugs or a subculture of Nazis? He re-
sponded that communitarians defend "virtuous" cultures but not those that inculcate de-
structive or other vicious values. See id. at 11 (arguing that politics cannot be divorced from
"fundamental values").
The Responsive Comm unitarian Platform states that, to be "responsive." a community must
embody certain moral values, in particular, equality, justice, the existence of generalized
standards applicable to all, and openness to, and capacity for responding to, the needs of its
members. See The Responsive Communitarian Platform, supra note 350, at xxvii. Communities
that meet its standards are deemed worthy of protection against homogenizing social forces.
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For the homeostatic-communitarian, freedom depends neither
upon the unconstrained will of the individual to do as he or she
wishes, constrained only by the narrow compass of others' rights, nor
on the inter-penetration of virtually every sphere of life by centralized
political forces. Rather, as The Responsive Communitaiian Platform puts it:
[I]ndividual liberty depends on the active maintenance of
the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for
others as well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense
of our personal and civic responsibilities, along with an ap-
preciation of our own rights and the right of others; where
we develop the skills of self-government as well as the habit of
governing ourselves, and learn to see others—not just self. 371
' The homeostatic-cotnmunitatian idea of freedom is a deeply
"moral" ideal that places it in tension not only with "physicalist." con-
ceptions that come down to us from Hobbes, but with any theory,
whether of the negative liberal or the weak progressive, that equates
freedom with the unconstrained volition of the individual. Likewise,
homeostatic-communitarian freedom is equidistant from both the radi-
cal individualism of self-individuating liberalism and progressive con-
ceptions, which tend to erode liberal conceptions of individuality by
reducing the sphere of individual responsibility. In sum, the homeo-
static-communitarian ideal pursues a middle way between the progres-
sive's tendency to equate freedom with substantive equality; and the
negative liberal's penchant for finding these values invariably opposed.
"Members of the community have a responsibility, to the greatest. extent
possible, to provide for themselves and their families," as well as "a re-
sponsibility for the material and moral well-being of others."375
 At the
'same tune, however, homeostatic-communitarians still believe that:
For its part, the community is responsible for protecting
each of us against catastrophe, natural or man-made; for en-
suring the basic needs of all who genuinely cannot. provide
for themselves; for appropriately recognizing the distinctive
contributions of individuals to the community; and for safe-
guarding a zone within which individuals may define their
own lives through free exchange and choice. 37°
374 Id. at xxv.
375 Id. at XXXiV.
876 Id.
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CONCLUSION
We now come to the central question posed in the Introduction:
How have the contours of freedom changed over the last two centu-
ries? And to what extent? In what sense are we more or less "free" to-
day than we were, for example, in 1789?
Obviously, those of neo-Lockean sensibilities would argue em-
phatically that we are undoubtedly less free today, because legislation
everywhere has narrowed the scope of individual initiative and free-
dom of choice. Advocates of progressive ideals, in contrast, would as-
sert that, although we have not gone as far as they would like, we are
nevertheless much freer today as a result of the same legislation la-
mented by the libertarian. For his part, the defender of positive free-
dom in the first sense, discussed in Part I, must be profoundly ambiva-
lent. On one hand, the right to vote has been broadly expanded so
that there is now near universal suffrage among our citizens. On the
other hand, the relative effective power of the vote, and our connec-
tion to government generally, is radically diminished compared to
that of a voter two centuries ago. We might say that the "exercise"
value of the vote is now almost universally distributed, but its
"achievement" value has been radically diminished. Greater numbers
now have positive freedom, but each has less effective political power.
Similarly, the negative freedom associated with our personal deci-
sions has broadened in one respect and narrowed in another. Indi-
viduals are protected to a much greater extent today in the zone of
choice making most proximate to the self—the zone involving inti-
mate and important life decisions. Moreover, protection for this lim-
ited zone of negative freedom has been "equalized" by the extension
of rights to minorities, women, homosexuals, and others. The level of
protection for this zone is also undeniably greater in the sense that
people today are protected from a range of interferences that largely
went uncurbed, at least by the sanction of law, until relatively recently.
Consider as one example the body of law that has developed over the
last twenty years as a response to sexual harassment in the workplace.
Our freedom from interference is "deeper" and more inclusive today
than it has been ever before.
Yet we cannot deny that the outward compass of negative free-
dom has been withdrawn considerably by these same developments.
Almost any activity that touches, even tangentially, upon the interests
of others is subject increasingly to government control, and not
merely in regards to economic legislation. Consider the recent cam-
paign to eliminate public smoking. The notion of "interference" has
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mutated from an actual physical impediment to action, into any con-
dition that potentially threatens the health or well-being of the indi-
vidual—or that simply may happen to offend him, The "negative
freedom" of the bystander not to breathe another's smoke is pre-
served at the expense of the negative freedom of the smoker not to be
interfered with in his enjoyment of a cigarette.
Perhaps the most unambiguous increase in our overall social
freedom is in respect to the number of options—social, religious,
economic, and personal—front which we are able to choose today.
Despite all of the direct and indirect forms of constraint imposed by
modern life in the big city, it is hard to deny (although some have) 3"
that today's affluent resident of Manhattan is vastly more free, in the
sense of having more choices, than a Kentucky backwoodsman in the
year 1800. Nothing gives the lie to more austere forms of negative lib-
eralism than our recognition that, in modern society, there is greater
choice even with more constraints on human action.
If we had to sum all of these developments up, we would have to
conclude that "freedom," in its many facets, has been democratized and
domesticated over the course of the last two centuries. It has been de-
mocratized in the sense that it has been equalized to a great extent by
the extension of negative and positive rights to greater numbers of
people, and by the consequent qualitative limitation of these same
rights necessitated by their expansion. Freedom has been domesticated
in the sense that, in its negative mode, it increasingly is imbued with a
defensive, protective character associated with security, safety, and the
elimination of risk. Even in its various positive modes, freedom does
not mean the active liberty of the ancient Athenian, or the modern en-
trepreneur, or even the social reformer, who direct their activity in an
outward fashion to influence their world in powerful ways. Rather, posi-
tive freedom today is exemplified largely by the symbolic liberty of vot-
ing, the inner quest for self-individuation, or the claim to social enti-
tlements characteristic of positive rights.
Liberty, like any other normative concept, does not exist in isola-
tion in the moral universe. It takes its meaning from its relative position
in the constellation of values with which it is associated. As the relation-
ships between these values change with time and place, so too do the
meanings we give to each embedded concept. And so it is with free-
dom. Freedom, in the form commonly defended today, has lost its
more turbulent and active connotation and, with it, its capacity simulta-
777 See STEINER, supra 'tote 2, at 54.
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neously to provoke disorder and to stir the human soul. On the left,
freedom today has more to do with equality and security; on the right,
with moral order and economic efficiency. In either case, freedom has
little in common with what Arendt called the "vita activa," the active
life. The "liberal" today, as the philosopher Richard Rorty has observed,
seeks the abolition not of constraint, or even of vanity, but of cruelty.
The contemporary liberal's overarching aspiration is "to make human
beings equal in respect to their liability to suffering."378
One only can wonder how Thomas Jefferson, who, in a profoundly
different spirit, proclaimed that "the tree of liberty must be refreshed
from time to time by the blood of patriots and tyrants," would have re-
garded this idea of freedom.
375 RICIIARD RORTY, CON'YINGENCY, IRONY, AND Soinvotrry 88 (1989).
